Russia conducted an exercise in which it practiced starting a nuclear war. A short thread. iz.ru/1699925/2024-0…
We get to see a convoy of Iskander vehicles -- a very rare security vehicle, some transloaders, some containerized missiles (ballistic and cruise) and some support vehicles.
We also get to see what seems to be a warhead convoy, although we don't have great reference imagery. Still, we see a different, also very rare security vehicle and some mundane looking trucks, which isn't much but its what we'd expect for the 12 GUMO.
Russia blurred the warheads on the Iskander SRBMs --which looked like inert training models; see the fins -- so this is very theatrical but probably uneccessary.
We see a new (to us) canister for the Iskander cruise missile. The ports are in different places than in any version we've seen before. The warhead and guidance are located in different places in the nuclear and conventional versions. That *may* be why the ports are different.
We also see some pretty normal pre-flight operations for a Tu-22M Backfire bomber and a MiG-31K. Not much to see there, but then again I am not a big airplane guy.
So, yeah, the Russians really practiced starting a nuclear war and went out of their way to make sure that is super, duper clear. Good times.
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After the US transmogrified Qasem Soleimani into his final form as a a parade float, Iran conducted a big missile strike against a US airbase in Iraq. Miraculously, no one else died.Did a whole pod ep on it.
Some implications for this morning. Season 2, Episode 5: The Worst Case Scenario (Almost) middlebury.edu/deal-podcast
Iran was prepared for a significant escalatory response by the US -- so much so that a jumpy Tor SAM crew shot down a civilian airliner (PS752) taking off from Tehran International Airport, killing all 176 people on board. cnn.com/2023/04/17/mid…
The US minimized the impact of the strike -- correctly stating that no one was killed in strike and incorrectly claiming that no significant injuries (Traumatic brain injuries are not "headaches".) However, by not responding, the situation was allowed to deescalate. washingtonpost.com/national-secur…
A quick summary on Iran's drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles that can reach Israel. Reminder, Iran is about 2000 km from Israel.
“Drones” usually means the Shahed-family of loitering munitions, like the -131/136 models that Iran exports to Russia. They are long-range, but only carry about 20 kg of explosives. (Not that I would want 20 kg of explosive dropped on my office, mind you.) dia.mil/Portals/110/Do…
IDF officials have said the attack “also includes cruise missiles and not just drones." While there isn’t a clear dividing line between the two, that likely means Iran is also firing what I'd call land-attack cruise missiles which can have a 1000 kg payload.
This is some amazing reporting, but I am unpersuaded by the framing. Russia's nuclear doctrine as described sounds exactly what official documents say it is. A short thread. ft.com/content/f18e6e…
In 2020, Putin signed a decree titled “Foundations of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence.” @AnyaFink translated it for CNA at the time. So, we can compare the @FT story with it. apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD115…
The story doesn't contain the documents nor does it quote them at length. So, we get a lot of vibes rather than block quotes. Still, compare these ¶s with the official policy of the Russian Federation. They seem substantially the same to me.
The case for the Russian missile that struck Kharkiv on January 2 being a North Koran Hwasong-11 variant is a very, very strong. A short thread building on the work of the #OSINTatMIIS team, especially the amazing @DuitsmanMS. politico.com/news/2024/01/0…
A point of clarification. North Korea manufactures several variants of the Hwasong-11 including the Hwasong-11A (US designation: KN-23) and the Hwasong-11B (KN-24). We're still not sure which variant was used in the attack on Kharkiv. I made a chart to help you out.
Based on the description of the graphic that the USG handed out, which mentioned both the KN-23 and KN-24, it seems the USG isn't certain either. TBH, the variants look very similar when shiny and new. What's left of the missile at the end of the ride is pretty well-done. reuters.com/world/europe/r…
The use of "ban" implies some sort of legal agreement. Biden can't manifest treaties in meetings with foreign leaders. We're more likely to get something akin to the 1998 US-PRC nuclear non-targeting agreement -- nice, aspirational and useless. clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/WH/New/China/1…
Given how the US defines "autonomy" and "artificial intelligence" -- broadly -- a ban would capture many capabilities already widely deployed. As a result, the USG tends to emphasize principles for the "responsible" use of AI, not bans.
Ok, we're on track to publish something on Ted Postol's analysis of North Korea's Hwasong-18 ICBM. But I wanted to do a short thread that illustrates just how incompetent Ted's analysis is.
I am aware of how this reads, but I’m not wrong. 😉
Ted says the Hwasong-18 is the Topol-M. So let’s start with some facts. The first stage of the Topol-M (RS-12M) is 1.86 m in diameter and 8.04 meters long. Russia had to declare this data under the START Treaty.
That makes the volume of the Topol-M first stage 21.85 cubic meters. The first stage weighs 28.6 tons or about 1.31 tons per cubic meter -- propellant, motor casing, insulation, nozzle, etc.