GLSDB has a range of >150 km while SDB has a range of ~110 km from a ~12 km release altitude and ~270 m/s release airspeed.
Position error due to accumulated inertial measurement unit drift is quadratically proportional to time of flight and range by extension.
2|5
Per interviews with Ukrainian pilots, they are typically releasing JDAM-ER at ~8 km. As SDB's employment profile is likely extremely similar, this is going to bring its range to <100 km.
3|5
Given that GLSDB fire missions will preferentially be against targets at greater ranges, it will experience greater time of flight while denied GPS and accumulate greater IMU drift leading to worse precision.
4|5
I strongly suspect this is why most of the published successfully GLSDB fire missions have been against targets close to the front line. GLSDB should perform similarly to SDB against targets at similar ranges.
5|5
So what is 3M22 Tsirkon (SS-N-33)? I have some thoughts based on written Russian sources, published test footage, and conversations with Ukrainian colleagues.
Is Tsirkon a “hypersonic (anti-ship) cruise missile? The answer is “yesn’t”👇🏻
1|20
While renders from the past decade depict it as a rocket-assisted scramjet vehicle, similar to X-51 Waverider, this is not accurate to the system that has been fielded.
I suspect that they potentially depict an earlier Tsirkon concept that was abandoned or not pursued.
2|20
Since the first live fire test in 2020, all published images and video have indicated a design substantially different design.
Rather than a scramjet vehicle, Tsirkon bore a striking resemblance to 3M55 Oniks (third image), Russia’s existing supersonic ASCM system.
3|20
This is going to be a spicy 🧵, especially for Ukrainians.
But people need to realize that there was no feasible way for Ukraine to have retained its Soviet nuclear weapons in the 1990s. And attempting to would not have ensured Ukraine’s sovereignty.
1|7
Russia had the codes for the weapons’ Permissive Action Links. Ukraine had no way to arm them without rebuilding the weapons and replacing their PALs.
Moreover, Ukraine could not maintain the warheads, which required regular servicing, without Russian assistance.
2|7
Even if Ukraine was willing to spend the money and time to build a nuclear weapons industry to overcome these challenges, both the U.S. and Russia were fundamentally unwilling to accept the existence of a nuclear-armed Ukraine.
3|7
Good overview of the challenges facing the Marine. Some additional context for SM-2 production. The SM-2 Block IIIAZ All-Up Rounds ordered from Raytheon are new build as far as I am aware. They are modifications of existing USN SM-2 Block IIIA stock.
The USN ordered 94 SM-2IIIAZ MODs and does not appear to be pursuing additional orders and there are no pending FMS orders. SM-2 Block IIIC MODS will likely continue through 2035 for the USN's Acquisition Objective for 1,000 SM-2IIIC AURs as well as FMS actions.
Upon the completion of the Netherlands', Denmark's, Chile's, and Taiwan's SM-2IIIA orders, the only new production AURs will be SM-2IIIBs for South Korea, Japan, and Australia as well as SM-2IIICs for Canada and an expected future Australian order.
Getting some pushback on my comments concerning @MriyaReport last night.
To clarify for those that aren’t familiar, myself and about 50% of the MR team (and 100% of MR’s subject matter experts) left in January 2023 because we were uncomfortable with the direction it was taking.
We became deeply uncomfortable with the volume of misinformation about the frontline and other topics that was being aired by MR’s leadership, @BalticSnowTiger (Axel) and @YAmzallagh (Joe), as well as frequent guests such as @ChuckPfarrer.
We took these concerns explicitly to Joe and Axel repeatedly. However, we were given a cold shoulder and our concerns were ignored. We also raised security and governance concerns regarding the incorporation of MR as a NGO with 501(c)3 status, but were likewise ignored.
.@anduriltech Roadrunner Round 2: I wrote my prior thread last night having only read the tweets and not some of the ancillary info and I was wrong about a few things, so wanted to go back and do something more serious.
Roadrunner is a reusable VTOL Group 3 UAS that supports a variety of modular payloads. Roadrunner-M is a Roadrunner equipped with a high explosive warhead for use as C-UAS effector against G-3 UAS threats.
In addition to loitering, Roadrunner-M can, depending on the payload, re-attack targets it fails to defeat, potentially be recovered after an attack, and is presumably retargetable.
So, much respect to Brynn, but a few issues with this thread. The ATACMS procurement figures are completely wrong. @ColbyBadhwar has a near exact breakdown of US inventory coming out in a few days, so standby for that
Also, no ATACMS were procured in FY23 according to the published FY23 and FY24 P-1s. The 2023 NDAA authorized the purchase of additional ATACMS, but no funding was appropriated in support of it afaik.
As for S-400. People keep hallucinating S-300P’s and S-400’s ABM capabilities. Yes, it does have some ability to defeat ballistic threats. Aeroballistic threats are a different matter.