Investigation by Frontelligence Insight reveals that since 2022, despite sanctions, Russian cruise missile manufacturer Raduga has not only continued to operate but also expanded production, thanks to imported Western and Chinese machinery
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2/ "Raduga" is a design bureau located in Dubna, Moscow Oblast, specializing in the production of missile systems, which are now used against Ukraine. This includes various modifications of the Kh-55, Kh-59, and Kh-101 missiles, as well as other missile types and models.
3/ The Raduga State Machine Building Design Bureau was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury on March 24, 2022. Despite these sanctions, the enterprise has continued its operations. However, the production of high-precision missiles isn't entirely reliant on domestic resources alone.
4/ Thanks to the Ukrainian Cyber Resistance @CyberResUa, which provided us with materials from Raduga, we were able to analyze hundreds of conversations and inspect documents containing evidence of the continued acquisition of foreign components for production.
5/ The key document of our investigation is Raduga's Plan for Technical Modernization and Reconstruction for 2023. It provides a detailed description of needs, expansion costs, and goals aimed at meeting the requirements and production volumes set by the Ministry of Defense
6/ This detailed plan included a budget and a list of specific equipment, along with their country of origin. The following non-Russian companies have been listed: Fagima Jazz R (Italy), Automator (Italy), Hottenger Gmbh (Germany), Hangcha (China), and Hision (China).
7/ It remains unclear whether this equipment is purchased through third parties or third countries, but in some cases, like with Italian FAGIMA FRESATRICI SRL, business was likely conducted directly with the company.
8/ Based on the semi-annual report on task progress, most tasks were completed on time, with some even ahead of schedule, suggesting that some of the listed equipment has already been successfully purchased and delivered.
9/ Based on the same document, it's evident that the finances were allocated towards purchasing new equipment, constructing and modernizing buildings, upgrading laboratory and testing facilities, and developing IT solutions.
10/ While the Frontelligence Insight team cannot determine whether all these companies are fully, partially aware of this, or unaware of it at all, without strict enforcement of sanctions, Russia will find ways to circumvent sanctions and expand its military production.
11/ These companies should undergo additional scrutiny to determine how their equipment ends up in Russian missile production:
12/ Thank you for taking the time to read our investigation.
The full report with more details will be released later this week. Meanwhile, we would greatly appreciate it if you could consider liking and sharing the first message of the thread to help increase its visibility
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When it comes to the AFU estimates of Russian losses, they're not far from reality, at least in 2026. Russia's own internal reporting indicates close to ~1,000 casualties per day on average, with roughly half or more being KIA (we classify most MIAs as KIA).
🧵Short thread:
2/ We think Ukraine's 2022-2023 reporting undermined the credibility of its figures. By 2026, however, its estimates are much closer to reality. Ukraine's reported RU personnel losses generally align with the combined Russian KIA, WIA, and MIA totals, usually within 10-20% margin
3/ In some cases we've observed a 30-35% gap between Russian reporting and Ukraine's official figures. However, when averaged over year, the overall picture aligns more closely. It's not perfect, but for a belligerent party reporting enemy loss, it's quite accurate
Ukraine has just struck multiple Wildberries logistics hubs. One of them, in St. Petersburg, is engulfed in flames, disrupting Russia's second-largest city.
Here's one of Russia's largest 24/7 news websites (auto-translated). This is the virtual reality many Russians live in.
2/ The only mention of the attack is a brief report claiming that drones were shot down. Here's the auto-translated version:
The crisis in Crimea continues, with conditions worsening. After Crimea's occupation head, Sergey Aksyonov, claimed steps were being taken to address the situation in a recent Telegram post, hundreds of locals flooded the comments, challenging his narrative. 🧵Translations:
2/ "Please, just do something! Have you forgotten about northern Crimea? Have you abandoned the people? Soon people will be starving, and we are already close to breaking down! At least say something! Declare an evacuation, do anything at all! This is not life, this is suffering"
3/ "I wonder if Aksyonov (governor) would be willing to bring his family and come stay with us in Dzhankoy, sitting through the complete blackout that has already lasted a week, while telling us to hold on until mid-August."
The situation in Crimea is becoming critical. As authorities remain largely silent, residents are flooding the Telegram channel of the head of Crimea with complaints about power outages, communication disruptions, fuel shortages, and water supply issues. Thread with translations:
1/ "Why is gasoline so expensive? It's twice the price compared to the mainland! Are people here supposed to be twice as rich or something? 😳"
2/ "The city of Dzhankoy has been without electricity for more than 24 hours. If the situation does not improve in the near future, a collective complaint will be drafted and sent to Moscow tomorrow."
The grooming of Orban's regime as a Trojan horse inside the EU and NATO is no longer speculative: it's now evidence-based, confirmed by leaked Budapest-Moscow communications. Agentstvo reports that roughly half of all Russian embassy staff maintain ties to intelligence services:
2/ The EU officially identifies Russia as one of its primary security threats. Yet Orban has been systematically distancing Hungary from both the EU and NATO, deteriorating relations with neighbors including Ukraine, while growing increasingly reliant on Russian influence.
3/ Moscow has no genuine interest in Hungary itself, or in the country's long-term wellbeing. What it wants is a lever - to undermine EU institutions, erode European support for Ukraine, and seed distrust between member states toward one of their own EU members and NATO allies
There’s been a lot of discussion about the potential threat FPV drones could pose to US forces on the ground, with some going as far as claiming that American troops would suffer heavy casualties from FPV drones. That’s possible, but it’s also worth questioning the assumptions:
2/ First, it’s not clear to what extent Iran has actually trained and prepared its ground forces for large-scale use of small drones. Even relatively decentralized militaries still operate within ORBAT and logistics. So far, there isn’t strong evidence of systemic changes within the Iranian army to support widespread FPV deployment.
3/ Second, we’ve seen relatively little FPV usage from Iran-supported groups like Hamas or Hezbollah, despite continuous war with Israel. A few examples have emerged from Iraq, but we’re talking about a handful of videos at most. That’s not a level of a large-scale implementation