Investigation by Frontelligence Insight reveals that since 2022, despite sanctions, Russian cruise missile manufacturer Raduga has not only continued to operate but also expanded production, thanks to imported Western and Chinese machinery
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2/ "Raduga" is a design bureau located in Dubna, Moscow Oblast, specializing in the production of missile systems, which are now used against Ukraine. This includes various modifications of the Kh-55, Kh-59, and Kh-101 missiles, as well as other missile types and models.
3/ The Raduga State Machine Building Design Bureau was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury on March 24, 2022. Despite these sanctions, the enterprise has continued its operations. However, the production of high-precision missiles isn't entirely reliant on domestic resources alone.
4/ Thanks to the Ukrainian Cyber Resistance @CyberResUa, which provided us with materials from Raduga, we were able to analyze hundreds of conversations and inspect documents containing evidence of the continued acquisition of foreign components for production.
5/ The key document of our investigation is Raduga's Plan for Technical Modernization and Reconstruction for 2023. It provides a detailed description of needs, expansion costs, and goals aimed at meeting the requirements and production volumes set by the Ministry of Defense
6/ This detailed plan included a budget and a list of specific equipment, along with their country of origin. The following non-Russian companies have been listed: Fagima Jazz R (Italy), Automator (Italy), Hottenger Gmbh (Germany), Hangcha (China), and Hision (China).
7/ It remains unclear whether this equipment is purchased through third parties or third countries, but in some cases, like with Italian FAGIMA FRESATRICI SRL, business was likely conducted directly with the company.
8/ Based on the semi-annual report on task progress, most tasks were completed on time, with some even ahead of schedule, suggesting that some of the listed equipment has already been successfully purchased and delivered.
9/ Based on the same document, it's evident that the finances were allocated towards purchasing new equipment, constructing and modernizing buildings, upgrading laboratory and testing facilities, and developing IT solutions.
10/ While the Frontelligence Insight team cannot determine whether all these companies are fully, partially aware of this, or unaware of it at all, without strict enforcement of sanctions, Russia will find ways to circumvent sanctions and expand its military production.
11/ These companies should undergo additional scrutiny to determine how their equipment ends up in Russian missile production:
12/ Thank you for taking the time to read our investigation.
The full report with more details will be released later this week. Meanwhile, we would greatly appreciate it if you could consider liking and sharing the first message of the thread to help increase its visibility
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SLB, the world’s largest offshore drilling company headquartered in Texas, continues to operate in Russia despite international sanctions, according to documents published by the analytical firm @dallasparkua. 🧵Thread:
2/ In March 2022, SLB publicly announced that it would suspend all new investments in the Russian market in response to international sanctions. This was in the statement from Chief Executive Officer Olivier Le Peuch, issued from the company’s Houston headquarter
3/ In October 2022, the company underwent a global rebranding, changing its name from Schlumberger to SLB. The Russian subsidiary retained the name Schlumberger Technology Company. However, leaked correspondence point that it continues to be integrated into SLB’s global framework
Breaking: On October 13, Russia’s Government Legislative Commission backed a Defense Ministry bill allowing the use of reservists for defense-related tasks in peacetime. The measure expands the military’s authority to call up reservists for wartime needs. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to the draft law, “special assemblies” are military call-ups for specific defense missions during armed conflicts, counterterrorism operations, or when forces are deployed abroad. Only reservists will be subject to these special assemblies.
3/ Russia’s mobilization reserve consists of individuals who have voluntarily signed contracts to remain in reserve. Putin established the country’s mobilization manpower reserve in 2015 through an executive decree.
Our report on Russia’s tank production and expansion plans has, predictably, drawn significant attention and generated many questions. Rather than replying individually, we decided to answer the most common ones - and even address questions about the Armata. 🧵Thread:
Russia’s T-90 tank production in 2024 reached around 240 units, including both new and modernized tanks. But internal planning papers analyzed by Frontelligence Insight show Moscow’s plan to lift output by 80% and launch production of a new T90 variant. 🧵Our Special Report:
2/ Our investigation began with what appeared to be a routine document: Uralvagonzavod requested “IS-445” engine RPM sensors from Zagorsk Optical-Mechanical Plant (ZOMZ) for a project listed as “Product 188M2.” This single line became the starting point of a larger discovery
3/ Digging deeper, we identified “Product 188M2” as the T-90M2, the latest variant of the T-90M (Product 188M). A careless online bio from a Russian engineer posted on Russian Scientific and Engineering Union revealed its name: “Ryvok-1", which roughly can be translated as Dash-1
Recently, @CITeam_en has raised some good and bad points about verifying the authenticity of RU mil documents. I’ll start with a pushback: the notion that the legitimacy of Russian documents can be judged by whether they have all the formal characteristics is outdated:
2/ While it is true that all classified documents follow strict protocols, the reality of war is far messier. Most documents are produced internally, shared outside of formal chains: in Excel, Word, or PDF formats and shared through messengers, email, or other convenient channels
3/ I have personally reviewed hundreds, if not thousands, of pages of Russian documents: leaks, data from captured phones or submissions to our team, that contained sensitive information. Yet only a tiny fraction carried any formal classification stamps, despite being valuable
Despite progress, including holding Pokrovsk, inflicting tangible casualties, and striking Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure, it would be dangerous for Europe to assume that “Ukraine has this.”
The battlefield situation has improved but remains suboptimal.
🧵Thread:
2/ The recent negative dynamics in Kupyansk show that the fundamental issue of Ukraine’s military remains: it is forced to operate in a fire-brigade fashion, reinforcing threatened sectors of the front such as Pokrovsk at the cost of other directions.
3/ As our team’s investigation into desertions shows, Russian troops are abandoning their posts at increasingly growing rate. Yet desertions still remain more frequent on the Ukrainian side, and Moscow is more effective at returning its troops to the front.