In 1942, the U.S. government forcibly removed more than 110,000 ethnically Japanese people from their homes and sent them to internment camps in remote parts of the country.
People are resilient, but losing everything is hard.
How did victims' lives turn out?🧵
First, we need background.
Japanese citizens began arriving to the U.S. in the latter part of the 19th century.
The scale of migration was substantial. By 1942, 40% of Hawaii was Japanese (Hawaii wasn't a state until 1959).
This influx of immigrants quickly became a political problem.
1886-1911, more than 400,000 Japanese set out to American lands. Citizens called for an end, resulting in the Gentleman's Agreement of 1907:
The U.S. wouldn't harass its Japanese and Japan would restrict emigration.
Immigration from Japan was cut down to virtually nothing from 1924 to 1952, creating a "missing generation" of people and distinguishing the first-generation "Issei" from their American-born "Nisei" children.
By 1940, Hawaii had 160,000 or so Japanese residents and the U.S. proper (recall, Hawaii was not a state) had an additional roughly 120,000.
As you can see, the largest portion of them were in California, in both Census and interment camp-derived figures.
On December 7th, 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, resulting in the deaths of 2,008 sailors, 109 Marines, 208 soldiers, and a further 68 civilians and ten others, along with the destruction of almost 200 aircraft, four battleships, and more.
With Japan's declaration of war, Issei transformed into enemy aliens on U.S. soil.
The first governmental response was for the FBI to start rounding up community leaders, resulting in the detention of 222 Italian, 1,221 German, and 1,460 Issei men that month.
The Ni'ihau Incident that happened after the bombing of Pearl Harbor also started to cement into American's minds the problem of enemy aliens.
Shigenori Nishikaichi crash landed his Zero after the attack and two Japanese island residents agreed to help him.
The Haradas (an Issei couple) and Ishimatsu Shintani helped Shigenori get his equipment + papers + torch his plane while kidnapping three native Hawaiians
The Hawaiians fought back. They killed Nishikaichi, Yoshio Harada killed himself, and Shintani and Yoshio's wife were caught
Around that time, FDR and Attorney General Biddle made statements calling for Americans to respect the rights of minorities including enemy aliens.
But shortly after that on February 19, FDR signed Executive Order 9066, allowing the military to set up exclusion zones.
The EO didn't specify anything for Japanese Americans, but it didn't have to, because Japan was busy frightening American civilians and military personnel.
On February 23rd, Japan bombed an oil field near Santa Barbara.
From November 1944 to April 1945, the Japanese had been launching Fu-Go balloon bombs that ended up dropping incendiary munitions in California and fourteen other states.
The Japanese also attacked a baker's dozen U.S. ships off the California coast.
Americans were so afraid of a Japanese invasion that they inflicted damage on themselves in the "Battle of Los Angeles."
The fear was rightful: The Japanese had subs 20 miles from California on December 24, 1941 and California only had sixteen modern airplanes protecting it!
Leveraging the powers granted by the EO, the military split the West Coast into two military areas and began distributing signs encouraging Japanese people to go East.
The voluntary migration scheme failed and the War Relocation Authority was set up to administer ten camps scattered across the U.S., for 110,000 Japanese Americans living on the West Coast
These relocated people had to get out quickly, selling possessions at "fire sale" prices
It's from this background that the analysis begins:
Arellano-Bover used Census, Japanese-American Research Project, and War Relocation Authority data to identify interned Japanese Americans so data on their socioeconomic outcomes could be put to use.
If we look at home ownership after the war, we see that the interned Japanese were definitely negatively impacted:
In the period 1946-52, they had significantly lower homeownership rates than Japanese Americans who weren't interned.
But look at 1953 to the '60s. Recovery?
Homeownership is about an asset. If we look at income data, we actually see that the Japanese who would go on to be interned had lower incomes than the non-interned Japanese in 1940, and equal incomes by 1950-60.
So the internment... raised incomes?
The answer to this seems to be "Yes."
Not only did the Japanese who were interned recover, they caught up despite starting further behind the Japanese who weren't interned.
This result is actually very robust!
So we have to ask Why?
Let's check attitudes towards work.
Bupkes. The interned and non-interned Japanese don't differ in work attitudes, so they couldn't get ahead that way.
What about attachment to Japan and Japanese culture?
Sansei (third-generation Japanese) were just as likely to have Japanese-speaking grandparents and citizenship/Americanness-wise, if anything, the interned were a bit less American.
This probably isn't it either.
Here's the meat:
In 1940, Japanese on the West Coast were disproportionately likely to be farmers and unskilled laborers, whereas the Japanese who migrated East and were thus less likely to be interned worked more often in skilled occupations.
This migration-related occupational stratification must not have been very selective by ability, because the interned/non-interned converged.
They also converged, in part, because the interned used the experience to move and change jobs.
The camps had more socioeconomic diversity than the places internees came from, so they were exposed to a diversity of opportunities and their family ties binding them to certain occupations were broken.
There were frictions the camps help them to overcome!
It was common to hear stories about internees entering poor and vowing to make it big when they got out, like this pictured one.
And that's what they did: interned Japanese Americans overcame the experience and wound up, miraculously, better off for it.
If you're interested in learning more about this amazing example of human resilience in the face of discriminatory adversity, go read the paper, here: cambridge.org/core/journals/…
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A review of the 23,551 randomized clinical trials in the Cochrane Database suggests that power is generally very low.
- "Significant" effects are usually overestimates
- "Nonsignificant effects" are frequently important
- Contradictory studies often disagree due to noise
The modal study achieving significance has too little power to accept any reasonable, non-extreme effect size. Hence exaggeration.
The modal study failing to achieve significance is so weak that large effects won't tend to be statistically significant. Hence erroneous failures.
When studies fail to replicate, a common reason is likely to be that the replications just weren't powered for it. Hence a potential unreal replication crisis.
The situation is decidedly bad.
Simply put: if clinical trials are this poor, imagine the state of clinical guidance.
Proponents of environmental theories of group differences regularly treat open sharing of code and data like their biggest fear
A session at the Behavior Genetics Assn. meeting today included the argument that hereditarians have weaponized transparency (i.e., doing good science)
It has always been true that hereditarians have been more into doing science correctly, because they are generally the sorts of people who want to know if they're right, so they demand tests.
Their opponents, on the other hand, promote ignorance, make incoherent arguments, and mislead, with intent. People like Kamin and Lewontin used to be open about misleading others. People like Turkheimer now simply act like scientific discovery is impossible, without real reason.
The whole "nanny dog" thing is made up and there is no historical evidence that pit bulls were ever bred to be stewards or friends to children.
The evidence for that myth is basically 'someone said it on Facebook.'
Even many sources that are favorable towards pit bulls or active promoters of them will occasionally admit there's no real basis for the "nanny dog" claim.
Yesterday was Juneteenth, a federal holiday in the U.S. dedicated to celebrating the day the last slaves in America were freed when the Emancipation Proclamation was enforced in Texas.
Economically, what were the fates of slaves? What about slaveowners?
🧵
Starting with slaves, a paper that came out last year looked into the matter.
The paper used Census and administrative records from 1850 to 2000 to compare Black Americans whose ancestors were enslaved for different amounts of time.
Compare these trajectories:
One thing that stands out is that, in terms of literacy, there's a lot of convergence. In terms of occupational quality, not so much.
Depending on how you think, this might be obvious or a surprise.
In 2014, David Graeber wrote an article for the Guardian in which he argued "Working-class people... care more about their friends, families, and communities. In aggregate... they're just fundamentally nicer."
The Economist put up a similar article at the time.
Were they right?
To make his case, Graeber wove a nice little narrative together about how the rich don't need to care, so they don't, and thus they're bad at empathy and they do things like hiring out the sons and daughters of the poor to do the job when empathy is needed.
The meat of Graeber's case was a set of two social psychological papers.
The first was a set of three studies in which the poor appeared to outclass the rich at tasks like the Mind in the Eyes, or figuring out the emotions of people they're talking to.