The DoJ just busted a massive scam involving North Korean IT workers infiltrating major US companies.
They had some help in the US and were posing as remote freelancers to siphon off money and sensitive info.
Holy crap, here's what we know:
How they operated:
North Korean operatives are stationed in countries like China, Russia, and parts of Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia.
They then use fake documents and buy accounts to get remote jobs in the States.
On May 16, the DOJ indicted five people connected to this scheme.
One is an Arizona woman who helped North Korean IT workers by validating stolen identities, making them look like US citizens.
This woman also hosted laptops from US companies to spoof locations
This bypassed any geofencing making it seem like the North Korean workers were based in the US.
The scheme has raked in millions of dollars in wages from over 300 companies.
This money likely supports North Korea's regime, including its nuclear weapons program, according to the FBI.
North Korea's government is highly motivated due to heavy international sanctions.
They've been behind major cyber heists like the $81 million stolen from Bangladesh Bank via the SWIFT system in 2016.
Facilitators, or "mules," are key players in this operation.
They manage multiple fake identities and handle risky tasks like job interviews and drug tests, then pass the credentials to the actual North Korean workers.
These facilitators make big money.
For example, a Ukrainian facilitator managed about 870 identities and hosted 80 computers, earning over $900,000 over six years.
The IT workers, often highly skilled, work under harsh conditions with strict oversight.
Their activities include cryptojacking, targeting security researchers(!!!), and other cyber attacks to fund the regime.
How does your company verify remote worker identities? Would your process stand up to this threat?
MSFT released new research on Silk Typhoon's supply chain attacks.
Key shift: Group now heavily leveraging stolen API keys and PAM credentials to hit downstream customers, particularly state/local gov and IT sector targets.
Here's what we know 🧵
Initial access vectors include 0days, compromised third-party services, and password spraying.
Notable: Found several instances of corporate creds exposed via public GitHub repos being used in attacks. (They should be following @InsecureNature)
@InsecureNature Post-compromise, actors use stolen API keys to access downstream customer environments.
Primary focus: Data collection related to China interests, US gov policy, and LE investigations.
Hackers claim to have compromised Gravy Analytics, exposing millions of smartphone location records—including data sold to U.S. government agencies.
This could be the first major breach of a location data broker. Here’s what you need to know 👇
Potential impact:
- Precise GPS coordinates + timestamps on millions of people
- User movement classifications ("LIKELY_DRIVING")
- Customer lists (Apple, Uber, Equifax & more)
- Root access to Gravy's servers, control of domains, and Amazon S3 buckets
For years, firms like Gravy have sold location data to military, DHS, and even the FBI. Now hackers claim to have access dating back to 2018.
Potential risks:
- De-anonymization of individuals
- Tracking high-risk people
- Exposure of schools, clinics, and more
(img: EFF)