The Frontelligence Insight assesses that Russia is very close to launching the new railroad line between Burne and Malovodne (Donetsk Oblast), likely within weeks or days. The satellite imagery confirms limited train movement
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2/ The construction of an 80km railroad in Donetsk Oblast, approximately initiated around June 2023, aimed to establish a direct link between occupied southern Ukraine and the rest of Russia as a partial alternative to the Crimean Bridge.
3/ According to Mariupol mayoral advisor Petro Andriushchenko's statement on May 8th, operations are expected to commence by late May or early June. Additionally, in April and early May, three test trains traveled from Volnovakha in Donetsk Oblast to Mariupol's port and back.
4/ Based on mid-resolution imagery, it's evident that on May 24th, at least one train was traveling on the new railroad. With the aid of satellite imagery captured with a time gap, we confirmed that the train was in motion and not static.
5/ The current resolution does not allow us to determine whether it was another "test" train or if it's a train involved in railroad construction. However, based on other high-resolution imagery, we assume that this is the very final stage before its launch
6/ Our team assesses that this new railroad would suffice to supply the region even if the Crimean Bridge is destroyed. Additionally, the railroad reduces travel time from Russia. For more details on the impact and deeper assessment, refer to our latest report on our website
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How bad is Russia’s war chest? Has the country entered stagflation? Why does it fear falling oil prices, but not a crash? And how is the tariff war hurting Russia?
These questions — and more — are explored in a special interview with Russian economist Vladimir Milov.
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2/ Tariff wars:
China’s economic slowdown has closed its market to many Russian products, hitting major industries hard. The China-focused Russian coal industry is struggling, and Russian non-energy and non-commodity exports are down by about a quarter compared to pre-2022 levels
3/ Tariff war will obviously exacerbate the Chinese slowdown. The slower Chinese growth, the less market for Russian goods. Share of China in the total Russian exports is as high as a third now - we're heavily dependent on this market and its well-being.
1/ The exhaustion of Russia’s vehicle fleet is becoming increasingly evident. The reduced use of armored vehicles and the growing reliance on civilian: including motorcycles, golf carts, and vans, continues to signal a degradation in Russian maneuvering capabilities.
2/ During the winter, outside of Kursk, Russia achieved mostly tactical gains, notably in Kharkiv Oblast, the Chasiv Yar area and Kurakhove–Velyka Novosilka axis. While these advances have been troubling for Ukraine, Russia has so far failed to capitalize on them strategically.
3/ Despite slow progress, Russia still retains the resources and capability to conduct active offensive operations through the summer and fall of 2025. However, as I noted in my analysis last year, the diminishing returns will determine whether Russia will continue this war
While our team continues working on the latest updates, here are a few updates on the current state of the frontline:
1/ Despite holding the advantage along much of the frontline, Russia’s winter campaign yielded limited results - indicating Ukraine’s situation is not dire
2/ The Pokrovsk area now appears more stable than in February. At that time, Russian forces had established a foothold in Zvirove, with deeper advances into Pokrovsk looking imminent. Since then, not only have the Russians stalled, but they have actually lost some ground.
3/ The overall composition and number of Russian forces near Sumy oblast currently seem insufficient to support a large-scale offensive operation deep into the region.
One of the biggest problems of this war is that Ukraine and the West haven’t clearly defined what "winning" looks like. This has allowed the Russians to present the "Istanbul Agreements" as the only viable negotiation framework, due to the absence of a well-defined alternative.
2/ The "Victory Plan" presented by Zelensky is not a true negotiation framework, and it didn’t resonate with the previous administration, let alone the current White House administration. Of course, there are alternative options, such as Russia retreating to 1991 borders
3/ The problem is that Russia won't do that, and there is no realistic enforcement mechanism, short of intervention. The United States isn’t going to bomb Russia. This raises the question: what does a "desired outcome," based on the realities on the ground, actually look like?
Almost every day, we hear about strikes against targets inside Russia, but we rarely get the full picture of their actual impact on the war. Radio Liberty and Frontelligence Insight have joined efforts to analyze hundreds of data points to answer this question.
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2/ Our research covered the period from September 2024 to February 2025, divided into two sections: strikes on military targets, infrastructure, and on the energy sector. We found that strikes on Russia’s energy sector caused at least $658 million in damage over ~6 months
3/ The real damage to the Russian energy sector and the economy as a whole may be higher. In at least 67 out of 100 cases, Ukrainian strikes were successful, while in another 33 cases the result of the attacks remains unknown or it is impossible to prove Ukraine's involvement.
Kursk Offensive: A Preliminary Assessment by Frontelligence Insight.
A condensed version of report for X. 🧵Thread:
1/ With Ukrainian forces withdrawing from Sudzha, the operation is clearly approaching its conclusion though it is not yet entirely over.
2/ To assess the operation, not in isolation, but within the broader context of the war, we broke down the Kursk operation into 3 key questions: whether its geopolitical objectives were met, whether the attrition rate was favorable, and whether it achieved battlefield success
3/ To determine equipment attrition, we analyzed data from OSINT analyst @naalsio26, who tracks losses across multiple frontlines. Our graphs show losses from August to March but are not exhaustive, as they exclude some retreat-related losses. The cut-off date was March 10.