In this war, timely aid and permission to strike are playing a key role. Ukraine must not be limited by weapon types or target locations. Delays or restrictions risk missing a critical window of opportunity, prolonging the war.🧵Thread about consequences and missed opportunities:
2/ These images show Russian concentrations of forces, camps, and field repair bases on the border with Ukraine. All these images have two things in common: by 2024, these sites have moved and dispersed, and none were targeted before their deployment to the frontlines
3/ It's fair to assume that many of these forces have been destroyed or damaged by now. However, the extent of casualties and damage they caused beforehand is unknown. This could have been avoided in 2022 and 2023 if Ukraine had permission and weaponry for strikes.
4/ Are there any valuable targets left? Yes, there are still valuable targets in areas bordering Kharkiv Oblast. However, Ukraine will predominantly deal with company and battalion-level threats rather than neutralizing entire regimental combat capabilities with few strikes.
5/ Ukraine should conduct strikes at the full range of provided weapons, with clear restrictions like civilian targets or nuclear facilities. Valuable targets remain in Rostov, Voronezh, and Oryol Oblasts, similar to those shown here, which won't be shared now for opsec reasons.
6/ Into the third year of this war, it's evident that these restrictions only cost Ukraine lives and territories. The aim of this thread isn't merely to criticize the strategy, but to show why such restrictions are damaging and urgently require to be openly removed by the West
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Over the past two weeks, our team has been closely following battlefield advancements, troop movements, and other war data. Below is a summary of our latest assessment of the operational situation and the trends:
2/ Sumy Front: As of early August, Russian forces have failed to establish the proclaimed “buffer zone” along the border in Sumy Oblast, managing only to create small, isolated pockets. We see no signs that the situation will improve for Russia significantly in the coming weeks
3/ Mobilization: Russia continues to expand its concealed mobilization efforts, aiming not only to sustain but to increase numbers. This runs counter to recent Russian statements about interest in negotiations and points to an effort to maximize the pace of offensive operations
The Financial Times recently published a report on Ukraine’s mobilization problems. While the article offers a broad and insightful overview, especially for those who are not familiar with the topic, I believe some additional context can help complete the picture:
2/ First, let's start with the fundamentals. One of the core underlying issues is timing. Nationwide mobilization efforts would have been most effective during the initial phase of the war. That window has closed, but that doesn't mean the situation can't be improved
3/ Second, while the Ukrainian government may have overused claims of insufficient Western aid to deflect criticism and maintain internal support, the point isn’t without merit. For example, the 2023 summer counteroffensive was pitched as a turning point to secure big aid package
A few observations drawn from insider insights, open-source data, information from russian internal documents, and conversations with senior officers, frontline soldiers, and volunteers - based on developments from Spring through Summer 2025. Thread🧵:
2/ Since early 2025, Russia's personnel losses have remained among the highest since the war began. But at the same time, Ukraine has faced a sharp rise in desertion and AWOL cases. The pace of Russian territorial advances is higher than during the same period in 2024.
3/ Each year follows a similar pattern: Russian forces form a pocket around a town, Ukraine cites manpower shortages and lack of aid, Russia takes heavy losses but advances, Ukraine inflates already high Russian casualty figures, while Moscow grossly downplays them
Penza Military Plant “Elektropribor”: Preliminary Damage Assessment
🧵Thread:
1/ In the early hours of August 2, Ukrainian UAVs struck multiple targets in Russia, including refineries and military-industrial sites. Here’s what’s known so far about the strike on Elektropribor
2/ First, we verified the strike by geolocating both the recording’s POV and the impact site. The location matches satellite imagery, confirming social media reports that the Elektropribor plant in Penza was targeted by a drone. Impact coordinates: 53.224696, 44.966005
3/ Elektropribor supplies a range of electronic products to both the Russian military and law enforcement: automated control systems, encrypted communications equipment, radar technology, and more. Construction of the targeted facility began around 2018.
What we know about today's ambush on Russian mercenaries in Mali.
🧵Thread: 1/ The attack likely took place on August 1st in the Mopti/Segou region, central Mali. At least 3 mercenaries were killed, though the actual toll is likely to be 4 KIA and 8 WIA from the African Corps:
2/ The perpetrators are JNIM, an Al-Qaeda branch in Sahel. There are currently no indicators suggesting Tuareg separatist involvement.
Equipment was damaged as well. In the video, our team identified what appears to be a Ural-4320 MTP-A2.1, delivered to Mali earlier this year
3/ In January 2025, our team documented hundreds of Russian vehicles moved to Mali via Guinea. Since then, at least two more shipments have followed. Based on visual comparison, we’re confident is the same Ural MTP - a mobile workshops that helps to recover and repair vehicles
Early Damage Assessment of Drone Attack on Penza Radio Plant - July 31, 2025
Preliminary analysis of imagery reveals multiple buildings suffered damage ranging from light to severe. One building appears likely to be completely inoperable. Frontelligence Insight reports. Thread:
2/ Based on high-resolution imagery, unavailable for public release due to license, our team concluded: at least one building sustained severe damage; another has signs of penetration and fire, a third likely suffered penetration but no fire; and a fourth appears lightly damaged
3/ Overall, this attack appears to have been more successful than several others on larger facilities, primarily due to the significant fire damage inflicted on at least one building. The strike’s depth is also notable - approximately 600 km from Ukrainian-controlled territory.