A lot of Western analysts haven't noticed Iran has both deployed & exported a jet powered drone as an anti-drone munition against high altitude long endurance drones.
This is utter bad news for Western airborne/helicopter assault/marine infantry.
The Iranian 358 loitering drone that can kill a MQ-1 at up 25,000 altitude, can also kill a UH-60 or a V-22 delivering troops or a C-130 dropping paratroopers.
100% of all Western VTOL or fixed wing troop carriers will need a blinding laser infrared countermeasures system.
2/
The Iranian 358 loitering munition debuted in 2020 in numbers with a highly publicized specific anti-US Special Forces MV-22 Osprey mission in the marketing.
_BEFORE_ the jet powered US Coyote Block 2 anti-drone munition was deployed.
Iranian "358" loitering munition certainly has the kinematic legs to run down Western troop carriers while deploying troops & with a man-in-the-loop for the thermal sensor, traditional IR flares are marginal to useless.
Although Iran _is_ trying to sell the 358 loitering munitions to Russia in a SAM canister form, rather than a on-a-rail "technical" version the Houthi and pro-Iranian Iraqi & Syrian militia's use.
The 358 "technical version" has simply proven superior against Western intelligence surveillance & reconnaissance (ISR) in avoiding detection before launch.
I view this Iranian container technological wrinkle as a Persian marketing ploy to get gullible Russians to bite.
I mean, have you all seen the per unit price of the Shaheds the Persians negotiated with the Russians?🤣🤣🤣
8/
Admittedly the Russians are more concerned/fearful about needing deep launcher magazines against Ukrainian OWA Drone/propeller cruise missile streams than nailing a Western troop transport on a guerilla basis.🤔
Traditional suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) and Offensive Counter air operations are not geared to counter a 350 knot anti-aircraft loitering munition with a passive 'man-in-the-loop' sensor and passive target acquisition.
11/
USAF cargo planes are usually the last in line for advanced blinding laser IR missile countermeasures.
Using C-17's for Ranger/82nd Airborne Division paradrops simply won't happen in contested airspace until after this threat is fully and comprehensively addressed.
12/
The mass emergence of anti-aircraft loitering drone munitions likely means the end of current generation cargo aircraft/VTOL delivered intervention infantry in medium intensity combat in the 21st Century.
New generation low observable aerial troop carriers are needed.
13/13 End
@threadreaderapp unroll please
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
The industrial manpower hours of resurrecting a 1960's T-62M with a 40 years dead OEM industrial base are just🤯
Reset/rebuilding tactical vehicle fleets gets more and more expensive towards the end as the oldest vehicles with the fewest spares are all that's left.
2/
And Turtle Tank/Shed Tanks/Blyat Mobiles like that T-72B @AndrewPerpetua listed are built because they lack traverse and elevation parts for the main gun.
Making a shed tank means a number, a production metric, for which T & E parts are not needed.
The 2016 era planned Ukrainian A2AD munitions capabilities were to be as follows:
Vilkha 300mm GMLRS 180 km,
Neptun derivative GLCM/ALCM 300+ km,
Hrim 2 TBM ~400 km,
Korshun GLCM [a Tomahawk GLCM lookalike] at 1000+ km.
3/
The PSU Su-24MR [FENCER E] was to be given a long range Shtyk side looking radar (SLAR) to play "Mini-JSTARS," as well as 100 km long range visual band cameras, to be a "ISR-strike complex."
The Russo-Ukrainian War cycle time between drone control frequency changes and jammers for the new frequencies had been two weeks.
It used to take something like 20 weeks for a US theater commander to properly staff out such a EW procurement request with all the Congressional bells and whistles.
1/
US Electronic warfare used to be better:
"In all, over 300 quick reaction capability efforts were initiated during the Vietnam War. The U. S. counter-countermeasure systems developed and installed in 1966 and 1967...
...included radar and missile guidance warning receivers, jammers and deception repeaters, standoff jamming by support aircraft, chaff, and anti-radiation missiles."
3/
It utterly sickens me that senior US Army flag ranks got rid of 4,500 MRAPs in 2013 because they thought there was no conceivable use for a fast wheeled troop transport, armored against mines, in a medium intensity war.
Flag rank leadership in medium intensity warfare🧵 1/
We have a generation of "forward operating base" flag ranks running the US Army like UK had "Imperial policing" army flag ranks vs Japanese bicycle logistics at Malaya in 1942.
Medium intensity war was outside both their frames of reference.
Calo Kopp's "Parasitism as an Abstraction for Organisational Dysfunctions" makes for bracing reading on the Flag rank organizational dysfunction leading to the UK surrender at Singapore
I've seen a lot of accounts touting this Bain and Company consulting report Sky News is publicizing about Russians beating the West 3-to-1 shell production.
I don't buy it because the text shows a lot of typical consulting tricks (See text⬇️) ...
...aiming to get non-technically educated reporters and policy makers to reach a conclusion that open source data on the Russian shell supply chain simply doesn't support.
Bain & Company is a global consulting firm like McKenzie group.
As a retired US DoD Quality auditor who spent about 40-to-50 hours piecing together the open source State Dept, DTRA & declassified CIA data for the Soviet/Russian shell supply chain in August 2022...