Fighting continued in the Lyptsi direction on June 1, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Fighting continued near Lyptsi and between Hlyboke (north of Lyptsi) and Lukyantsi (northeast of Lyptsi) on May 31 and June 1.
A Ukrainian commander operating in the Lyptsi direction stated on May 30 that Russian forces are attempting to concentrate infantry near Hlyboke and are transferring infantry to the area with light armored vehicles, motorcycles, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs).
A Russian milblogger claimed on May 31 that the Russian offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast has stalled because Russian forces could not effectively isolate the battlefield, Ukrainian drones have prevented Russian infantry from advancing, and Russian counter-battery warfare has failed to constrain Ukrainian artillery fire.
2/ Fighting continued in the Vovchansk direction on June 1, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian forces continued assaults near and within Vovchansk on May 31 and June 1, and the Russian MoD claimed on June 1 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchansk and Starytsya.
3/ Ukrainian officials continue to warn that Russian forces could launch offensive operations in the Zolochiv direction (northwest of Kharkiv City).
2/ Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US and Singaporean officials and highlighted the upcoming Global Peace Summit during the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on June 2.
3/ Ukrainian field commanders are reportedly compensating for training difficulties that mobilization has exacerbated by training new personnel on the frontline.
Ukrainian field commanders' decisions to train newly-deployed personnel on the front before committing them to combat indicates that the overall quality of Ukrainian forces will likely remain higher than that of Russian forces in the near- to mid-term.
NEW: The current lack of clarity about US restrictions on Ukraine's use of US-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russian territory misses an opportunity to deter further Russian offensive efforts across the border into northern Ukraine. 🧵(1/8)
2/ Recent comments from US officials and media reports suggest there is ambiguity on what the US has explicitly authorized regarding these strikes amid signaling that the US is open to expanding these authorizations to other areas in Ukraine should Russian forces launch offensive operations elsewhere along the international border area. ⬇️
3/ Ukrainian officials have recently warned that Russian forces are also concentrating forces in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts across the border from Sumy Oblast, and ISW has previously assessed that even a limited grouping would achieve its desired effect of drawing and fixing Ukrainian forces to this area.
More Key Takeaways from the May 31, 2024 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment (🧵1/7):
Ukraine signed long-term bilateral security agreements with Sweden, Iceland, and Norway on May 31.
2/ Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against a Russian long-range radar system in occupied Crimea and an oil depot in Krasnodar Krai on May 31 following the May 30 Ukrainian strike against the Kerch Strait ferry crossing.
3/ Although Russian forces made significant tactical gains in northern Kharkiv Oblast in early May 2024, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov heavily overestimated Russian advances in Ukraine since the start of 2024.
NEW: US and German officials confirmed that the United States and Germany have changed their policies to allow Ukraine to use their provided weapons to strike Russian territory with some restrictions but did not offer precise details. (🧵1/7)
2/ Western media reported that the Biden administration gave Ukraine permission to use US-provided weapons, including GMLRS rockets, for "counter-fire purposes" against the Russian forces conducting assaults in northern Kharkiv Oblast but has not changed its policy restricting Ukraine from using US-provided weapons to conduct long-range strikes elsewhere into Russia
3/ It is unclear if the United States will allow Ukraine to strike Russian forces that are massing across the border but have not yet attacked into Ukrainian territory.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continued efforts to address Russia’s ongoing demographic crisis as part of the “Year of the Family” 2024 domestic policy initiative.
2/ French officials reportedly may soon announce that France is sending military trainers to Ukraine.
Western countries continue efforts to increase artillery production and procurement for Ukraine.
3/ NATO member states reportedly lack sufficient air defense capabilities to protect members of the Alliance in Central and Eastern Europe in the event of a full-scale attack.
Senior Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces are transferring forces to northern Kharkiv Oblast from other sectors of the frontline, indicating that the Russian military continues to prioritize efforts to draw and fix Ukrainian forces in northern Kharkiv. (1/5)
2/ The Russian military's transfer of reinforcements to Kharkiv indicates that the Russian military likely continues to prioritize efforts to draw and fix Ukrainian forces from critical sectors of the frontline in eastern Ukraine and establish a "buffer zone" in northern Kharkiv.
3/ Russian forces likely intend to launch the second phase of their offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast following their intended seizure of Vovchansk, although positional fighting and possible Ukrainian counterattacks could require Russian forces to conduct another wave of intensified assaults in the area to complete the seizure of the settlement.