Rather depressing that new Defence Minister Belousov is sporting a uniform now for Security Council, even if he has the silver stars of a civil servant, not gold of a general. Performative dress does matter though – a short thread 1/
Until Shoigu, civilian defence ministers wore suits – even Sergei Ivanov, who as a former FSB general did have the legit right to go uniformed. Apart from just being less tacky, it also symbolised civilian control of the military 2/
Shoigu is something of a master of spin (to terrible effect considering how far he fooled Putin as to the state of the Russian military), and his decision to affect a uniform was done for reasons 3/
1. To try and convince generals who were v unhappy after the Serdyukov/Makarov reforms, that he was on their side. In fairness, he did do a good job of rebuilding bridges 4/
2. To try and play on his MChS Emergencies Ministry background – which is a uniformed service – to present himself as state servant rather than just another grey-suited politico. (He was happy to be grey-suited politico when it was useful, of course) 5/
3. Later, subliminally to hammer home the “Russia at war” message and his position at the fore (esp important as he had counselled against annexation of Crimea in 2014 and had been lukewarm about sending troops to Donbas) 6/
(A retired soldier once said to me in 2015 he suspected “the less Shoigu is happy with what’s going on, and the Kremlin suspects it, the more he’s in uniform”) 7/
Belousov has no military/uniformed experience, but in the modern equivalent of Peter the Great’s Table of Ranks, a State Councillor 1st class (like Belousov) corresponds to the military rank of General 8/
The tell is in his epaulets, with the silver star and ministry crest. So *technically* this is OK. But… 9/
Wearing a suit would have been both classy and a sign of independence from the generals – whose incompetence and corruption he is there to fix. It would again have symbolised that even now, civilian power takes precedence 10/
Instead, while it is still too early to know how he will do, I fear his decision to don uniform for a meeting, not even Victory Day parade or the like, suggests a degree of cringe, of trying to accommodate all those scary military men 11/
I'm sure this will be an unpopular opinion, but while the text of the US plan for Ukraine is poorly drafted and incomplete, it is not a simple call for Ukrainian capitulation. As a starting point for something that could stop the killing, it has some promise. A few thoughts 1/
By sticking to acknowledging Russia’s de facto control of the occupied territories, it sidesteps the need for a Ukrainian constitutional referendum or even EU formal acceptance. This doesn’t preclude some peaceful future reunification, Germany-style 2/
Capping the Ukrainian army to 600,000 isn’t as draconian as I imagine the Russians wanted. When I talked to some British MOD analysts a couple of months back, they expressed doubts Kyiv could afford more than 500,000 long-term 3/
Assuming this does convey the real tenor of the current proposals, there is so much that is delusional. Let me just pick on 2 specific elements: the 'line of contact' and the 'negotiations on the governance of occupied territories' 1/
What 'line of contact'? Just ask all those OSINTers trying to draw their maps. This is a messy, scrappy war, where both sides 'lines' overlap and interpenetrate, because they are often made up of handfuls of guys trying to dodge drones and hold a treeline here, a dugout there 2/
It sounds easy to say both sides just freeze in place, but disentangling these snarls would be anything but. What happens when there is a Russian fireteam deeper in than a Ukrainian one? It may sound trivial, but half the frontline will be determined by these dilemmas. 3/
7 October – Putin’s 73rd birthday. I won’t wish him many happy returns, but let’s just spend a moment pondering the dilemmas that will likely face him in the coming year 1/
Obviously, there’s the war. He seems to have chosen to squander the chance to fix the current front line with a deal negotiated through Trump, so the meatgrinder continues. His gamble is clearly that he can get a better deal yet but… 2/
…while he doesn’t have to fight a forever war, just be able to last longer than Ukraine, what may be a costly but viable military strategy also has serious economic and political costs at home. Is that last bit of Donetsk oblast really worth it? He seems to think so. 3/
It’s easy (and not wholly untrue) to slam Vladimir Medinsky, leading the Russian delegation to Istanbul as a nobody, but perversely, although I think it monstrously unlikely anything meaningful will come from the talks, the composition of the delegation is encouraging. A 🧵 1/
Putin was never likely to attend, not least as he wasn’t going to allow it to look as if he had been manipulated and dared by Zelensky. Besides… 2/
Sometimes, it can help break a logjam (think Reagan/Gorbachev), but leaders usually turn up to seal the deal at the end of the process, after experts have done all the hard preparatory work away from the cameras. 3/
Moscow is still noncommittal on the Ukraine ceasefire proposal. Why? A short thread 1/
Putin wants Kursk recaptured first. If there is any chance the ceasefire front line ends up freezing as a de facto border, he doesn't feel he can leave any Russian territory in Ukrainian hands. 2/
Putin doesn't make tough decisions quickly. He wants to slow the pace, so that he has time to mull and consult - and anyway, he tends to shy away from big decisions. 3/
Leaving #MSC2025 (exhausted!) there’s been lots of bullish comment about Europe getting its act together and “the resistance begins” (how telling that its resistance to the USA, not Russia or China…). But… 1/
How far will it last outside the hothouse atmosphere of the MSC, and the competitive, performative desire to out-bluster the last speaker? I don’t doubt the sentiment it’s that I honestly don’t know what happens when faced with the costs and transposed into the real world 2/
But also… what does it mean? Military and geopolitical capacity cannot be spun up overnight or even overyear, and all means potentially substantial costs. Who is going to start talking about considerable tax hikes? In particular, I’m worried… 3/