Rather depressing that new Defence Minister Belousov is sporting a uniform now for Security Council, even if he has the silver stars of a civil servant, not gold of a general. Performative dress does matter though – a short thread 1/
Until Shoigu, civilian defence ministers wore suits – even Sergei Ivanov, who as a former FSB general did have the legit right to go uniformed. Apart from just being less tacky, it also symbolised civilian control of the military 2/
Shoigu is something of a master of spin (to terrible effect considering how far he fooled Putin as to the state of the Russian military), and his decision to affect a uniform was done for reasons 3/
1. To try and convince generals who were v unhappy after the Serdyukov/Makarov reforms, that he was on their side. In fairness, he did do a good job of rebuilding bridges 4/
2. To try and play on his MChS Emergencies Ministry background – which is a uniformed service – to present himself as state servant rather than just another grey-suited politico. (He was happy to be grey-suited politico when it was useful, of course) 5/
3. Later, subliminally to hammer home the “Russia at war” message and his position at the fore (esp important as he had counselled against annexation of Crimea in 2014 and had been lukewarm about sending troops to Donbas) 6/
(A retired soldier once said to me in 2015 he suspected “the less Shoigu is happy with what’s going on, and the Kremlin suspects it, the more he’s in uniform”) 7/
Belousov has no military/uniformed experience, but in the modern equivalent of Peter the Great’s Table of Ranks, a State Councillor 1st class (like Belousov) corresponds to the military rank of General 8/
The tell is in his epaulets, with the silver star and ministry crest. So *technically* this is OK. But… 9/
Wearing a suit would have been both classy and a sign of independence from the generals – whose incompetence and corruption he is there to fix. It would again have symbolised that even now, civilian power takes precedence 10/
Instead, while it is still too early to know how he will do, I fear his decision to don uniform for a meeting, not even Victory Day parade or the like, suggests a degree of cringe, of trying to accommodate all those scary military men 11/
Nikolai Patrushev becomes a Presidential Aide
We were all wondering where he would go - this is an interesting move, sideways and a little downward, but the exact angle of that downward slide remains to be seen. A few thoughts... 1/ meduza.io/en/news/2024/0…
The position of Presidential Aide (henceforth PrA) is an ambiguous one. It doesn't mean the person who fetches Putin's tea and arranges his pencils (unless that's what Putin wants done!), so much as once of his general purpose henchmen 2/
Former Education Minister Fursenko, for example, seems to spend most of time deputising for his boss at a university event here, a science festival there. He's more a teleoperated factotum than demonstrating any substantive role. 3/
At great threat to my mental wellbeing, another dip into today’s Russian press around the Crocus City terrorist attack. A thread. 1/
The high-circulation Argumenty i Fakty (incidentally where Patrushev most often gives his interviews) has no doubts, as shown by this front page. Islamic State? No, it was the Collective West and their Ukrainian puppets 2/
FSB director Bortnikov has no doubts the terrorists were headed to Ukraine: “And I’ll tell you a little secret: on the other side they wanted to greet them as heroes.” 3/
Reading today's government newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta in many ways illustrates the key dynamics around the Crocus terrorist attack. A short thread 1/
We have Putin's remote (in every sense) meeting, at which he reluctantly admits jihadists committed the attack but repeats his claim that it connects to "a whole series of attempts by those who have been fighting our country since 2014 at the hands of the neo-Nazi Kyiv regime" 2/
Insulting, inaccurate and tone deaf, but that's Putin these days. Glancing at social media, the 'jihadists+Ukrainian' scenario isn't landing well 3/ rg.ru/2024/03/25/kto…
Sudden excitement from some quarters: ‘OMG, Russia now admitting war in Ukraine is a war, not a “special military op”’. The truth, as ever, is rather less exciting, but an interesting semantic-political tale 1/
The source is an interview with presidential spox Peskov in AiF in which he does indeed say ‘we are at war…’ 2/ aif.ru/politics/world…
“…Yes, it began as a SMO, but… when the collective West became a participant on the side of Ukraine, for us it became a war. I am convinced of this. And everyone should understand this for their own internal mobilization’ 3/
“Start with yourself, Comrade Dugin”
A broadside attack on Alexander Dugin appears in Moskovsky Komsomolets. A couple of quotes and thoughts... 1/ mk.ru/social/2024/03…
"People want to have an income, a pension and peace of mind in the future. And they are offered an eternal battle and endless belt-tightening in a dystopian society literally divided along Brahminical lines. There is an elite - and everyone else." 2/
It's not the first time Ekaterina Sazhneva has attacked the nationalist-weirdo philosopher in MK, but that's significant in itself, that no "hands off" warning was given. For all the "Putin's Brain" nonsense, Dugin is clearly not under a Kremlin krysha 3/ mk.ru/social/2023/11…
I was very pleased to be able to play a small, small role in this fascinating expose of Presidential Administration files on various political projects. Read the article (more to come, I understand), but a couple of other points... 1/
Firstly, it is a reminder of the power and scope of the Presidential Administration. I think its position at the heart of the Russian state is often under-rated. In many ways, to put it in Soviet terms, it's the Central Committee Secretariat to the Council of Ministries... 2/
Now, as then, the ministries do the day to day admin, but it's the PA that doesn't just set policy and monitor compliance, it also runs a whole range of essentially political operations and projects, as the exposé details. 3/