Australian government just axed substantial parts of the LOTE (life extension) efforts for Collins submarines, while going ahead with the overall program. A few thoughts on the matter. Official statement here. 1/9 minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases…
Key aspects: 1) Government received advice from Defence in consultation with US that adding Tomahawk to Collins is not viable and does not represent money for value.
No details. But torpedo tube launched Tomahawk is currently out of production. 2/9
In order for any production restart to make economic sense AU would have had to sign up for a group buy. Possible partners were RN, which uses tube-launched Tomahawk on Astute, and the Netherlands, who wanted to add capability to Walrus & also use it on Orka successor. 3/9
Dynamics are speculative. If RN showed no interest to commit in time, the buy shrinks. NL are currently engaged in troublesome procurement of French-produced Orka SSK, where US signaled they may be unwilling to nod off integration of Tomahawk at least (no word on Mk 48 yet). 4/9
The AU announcement has immediate repercussions on NL not getting Tomahawk for Walrus either. In their case same as with AU ambition of integrating land attack capability for a handful of very old SSK always looked IMO very dubious beyond the likely significant cost. 5/9
Whether NL Orka was one driver sinking this idea or whether it became collateral damage to shaky economics as outlined above is now an IMO very interesting question. Tomahawk for Walrus is likely dead either way.
Where this leaves RN Astute going forward is another question. 6/9
2) Announcement also axes Safran optronic masts for Collins LOTE. This is a holdover from the Attack-program meant to go into Collins. Bit of an extra sting for the French I guess. My guess is this is simply a collateral of the overall LOTE now looking very shaky on scope. 7/9
In this context recent reporting on much more extensive than anticipated corrosion on at least two boats may or may not be an additional driver re other integration of pricey new gear.
Where this leaves Collins capability for bridging to Virginia/AUKUS SSN is tbc. 8/9
Tl;dr: Collins LOTE one way or another may die a slow death here. Further reductions (propulsion) are conceivable.
This may even be a blessing in disguise given worst case RAN would have to manage three different submarine designs at the same time, IMO an absurd idea. 9/9/end.
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A few thoughts on the issue of China's new corvette/light frigate sized combatant and what its point is, may be, and pertinently, has been stated to be, going off this article in TWZ.
We do have one image from the yard giving this design an official purpose. Text declares the celebration of the launch of a project for a "comprehensive test platform". The design is partially visible in the graphic (minor differences but its clearly intended to be the same ship)
That issue should make the nature of this effort less mysterious. Now, in the context of PLAN testing of weapons, sensors etc its worth noting the service does operate more bespoke test ships, specifically the Type 909/A/910-series (designation somewhat blurry AFAIK).
Thankfully the actual report by the German audit office is free to read, so I just looked at that instead. Link can be found here (pdf). Bullet points follow, as a comedy in eight acts: 1/ bundesrechnungshof.de/SharedDocs/Dow…
Effort to replace MCM capability by 2027 dates back to 2014. A standing commitment to NATO is to provide 11 boats with improved capability by 2031. Navy estimated original funding requirement at 2.7 bln Euros. 2/
For that cost Navy wanted 11 new, boats capable of long range deployments (current boats designed for Baltic/North Sea), improved C2 for multinational ops, wider USV/UUV integration. Despite all this obviously requiring larger boats, Nayv claimed it did not. 3/
"According to the US Congressional Research Service, the US navy has 9,000 missile vertical launch tubes to deliver long-range cruise missiles, compared with China’s 1,000."
Actual source for these 1,000 cells for PLAN is Nick Childs, of IISS, himself cited in a CNN piece linked here. It is not immediately clear from that piece how Childs arrives at his claim, but it demonstrably wrong, unless "or so" is doing a lot of work. edition.cnn.com/2021/03/05/chi…
Caveat straight up: PLAN is not at present confirmed to use LACMs on their surface combatants. But thats neither here nor there, the issue is missile cell count. Also PLA of course has a lot of land based land attack capability the USN does not have.
Mal ein🧵auf Deutsch, weil es nun wild durch die lokale Diskussion geht bzgl "neuer" Eroeffnungen, angeblicher oder tatsaechlicher Skandale zum Thema F-35, Triebwerkproblemen, Block 4-Modernisierung. Was sind die Fakten?
Teil 1 - Die Bloecke: F-35 ist ein Programm, das, wie viele vorherigen Entwicklungen in Evolutionen stattfindet. Strukturelles Kern-Element hier sind die "Blocks", die neue Faehigkeiten integrieren. Das ist nicht unaehnlich zu Eurofighter mit seinen "Tranchen", siehe EF T1 vs T4.
Manche Bloecke sind relativ milde Neuerungen, mit entsprechend geringer Kostensteigerung. Andere sind allerdings fundamentale Erweiterungen. Block 4 ist mit Abstand die bedeutenste Modernisierung, die zahllose neue Faehigkeiten einruestet. Das erfordert mehr Triebwerks-Leistung.
Rheinmetall announces they will in collaboration with Ukroboronprom start to refurbish Fuchs APC for delivery to Ukrainian forces. Related joint venture will commence work by July. In second step full local production is intended. esut.de/2023/06/meldun…
Rheinmetall & Ukroboronprom previously announced signing strategic cooperation agreement for local manufacture of defence materiel. While observers (and CEO Papperger) named MBT, assembly of Fuchs may be more logical first step. UA said to have "four to five digit"-requirement.
Fuchs APC-production could be quick to implement both because the design is mature & required processes established, and because Rheinmetall already has significant experience establishing foreign production. Company most prominently sold a full assembly to Algeria back in 2014.
Still not a fan of "MBT are outdated."-take on Russian tank losses.
Yes, the Russian Army lost a metric shit ton of them.
Because they threw a dramatic amount of materiel, clearly without coherent operational plans, into a grinding war of attrition. Not because tanks dont work.
Problem with such analysis tends to be that people fixate on "popular" weapon systems vs all the other stuff the Russians also lost immense amounts of.
Quite similar to the eternal "aircraft carriers are obsolete"-takes in naval discussions. Far less often a case for IFV or DDG.
This is doubly true for Soviet MBT. Which were designed for a very specific way of assault. As soon as you move outside of that CONOP, you get punished far more than with Western designs, which by nature had a broader field of roles in mind. But the broader point applies equally.