Within a decade, hybrid warfare against the West and Ukraine escalated into the largest war in Europe since WWII. To grasp how a demographically and economically smaller Russia achieved this, we need to look at the underlying processes, including escalation management. 🧵Thread
2/ We need to start with the concept known as "reflexive control" - a method to shape an opponent's mindset, steering their behavior towards the initiator's desired outcome. Russia used it to influence the West's mindset, suggesting that any aid could lead to nuclear escalation
3/ These tactics were also influential in 2014-2015, leading European leaders like Angela Merkel to pursue peace resolutions in Ukraine on Russia’s terms. Fearing conventional or nuclear escalation, many leaders embraced what they deemed "responsible" politics.
4/ Until recently, Russia avoided direct political confrontation with NATO. Instead, it employed tactics known as "Salami slicing tactics" - limited expansionist actions, where Russia's small territorial gains may initially seem insignificant compared to the risk of nuclear war
5/ Despite de-escalatory efforts, limited aid to Ukraine, and the normalization of relations between Russia and many Western countries after 2014, including the restoration of trade despite sanctions, Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022.
6/ The escalations are mainly caused by Russia's perception of the Western approach as overly cautious, interpreting it as a weakness. Consequently, Russia sees an opportunity to exploit the situation until the Western response outweighs the potential benefits of its actions.
/7 The narrative continues to limit the quantity and quality of aid received by Ukraine, as well as the timing of such aid. While threats turned out to be bluffs, they resulted in the loss of Ukrainian lives and territories nonetheless, further escalating the war.
8/ Is Russia likely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine? In 2020, Russia released a document on nuclear use and deterrence principles; however, most scenarios outlined in it do not apply to the situation in Ukraine. Nonetheless, relying solely on such documents would be naive
9/ Before considering the use of tactical nuclear weapons, Russia will assess potential benefits and whether it would improve its position. From a battlefield perspective, such strikes will not yield significant results. Politically, they are unlikely to be received positively
10/ First and foremost, China is unlikely to react positively. This isn't due to opposition to Russia's military ambitions but rather reflects a pragmatic approach by the Chinese leadership. A regional nuclear escalation triggered by Russia isn't in China's interests
11/ Putin's recent visit to China on May 16-17, 2024, showed the growing dependence of his regime on China. A nuclear strike in continental Europe would likely force China to halt many cooperations with Russia, considering China's significant economic ties with Europe and the US.
12/ The solution lies in deterring adversaries by demonstrating resolve and preparedness to counter any escalation. Russia needs to understand that the consequences of escalation would be unfavorable, dissuading it from initiating such actions.
13/ Nuclear threats must be countered by reminding Russia that it's not the sole nuclear-capable country. The West should fully leverage its capacity to provide Ukraine with resources to shift the balance on the battlefield, rather than merely providing limited support
14/ The Kremlin shouldn't dominate public discourse on nuclear matters. This includes issues beyond nuclear weapons; any blackmail or threats linked to the captured Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plants should prompt an immediate response, such as very strict enforcement of sanctions
15/ Until Russia faces a firm and decisive response, they will continue to escalate, as demonstrated by the past decade's de-escalation, leading us to this situation. For a detailed analysis, you can find my full report on the topic:
In this war, timely aid and permission to strike are playing a key role. Ukraine must not be limited by weapon types or target locations. Delays or restrictions risk missing a critical window of opportunity, prolonging the war.🧵Thread about consequences and missed opportunities:
2/ These images show Russian concentrations of forces, camps, and field repair bases on the border with Ukraine. All these images have two things in common: by 2024, these sites have moved and dispersed, and none were targeted before their deployment to the frontlines
3/ It's fair to assume that many of these forces have been destroyed or damaged by now. However, the extent of casualties and damage they caused beforehand is unknown. This could have been avoided in 2022 and 2023 if Ukraine had permission and weaponry for strikes.
The Frontelligence Insight assesses that Russia is very close to launching the new railroad line between Burne and Malovodne (Donetsk Oblast), likely within weeks or days. The satellite imagery confirms limited train movement
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2/ The construction of an 80km railroad in Donetsk Oblast, approximately initiated around June 2023, aimed to establish a direct link between occupied southern Ukraine and the rest of Russia as a partial alternative to the Crimean Bridge.
3/ According to Mariupol mayoral advisor Petro Andriushchenko's statement on May 8th, operations are expected to commence by late May or early June. Additionally, in April and early May, three test trains traveled from Volnovakha in Donetsk Oblast to Mariupol's port and back.
Investigation by Frontelligence Insight reveals that since 2022, despite sanctions, Russian cruise missile manufacturer Raduga has not only continued to operate but also expanded production, thanks to imported Western and Chinese machinery
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2/ "Raduga" is a design bureau located in Dubna, Moscow Oblast, specializing in the production of missile systems, which are now used against Ukraine. This includes various modifications of the Kh-55, Kh-59, and Kh-101 missiles, as well as other missile types and models.
3/ The Raduga State Machine Building Design Bureau was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury on March 24, 2022. Despite these sanctions, the enterprise has continued its operations. However, the production of high-precision missiles isn't entirely reliant on domestic resources alone.
The frontline remains dynamic despite appearing static. Ukrainian forces reinforced Kharkiv to halt the Russian advance. The situation is still risky considering the thinned defenses. 🧵Thread
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2/ Chasiv Yar
Russia identified weak points in the Kanal quarter, deploying infantry deep but failed to establish a foothold, and assaulting forces were eliminated by Ukrainian forces. Another attempt can be more successful, as Russians have additional forces available.
3/ Russian troops made minor tactical gains in the northern axis towards Chasiv Yar, from the Kalynivka area. Progress on the northern flank is still slow, despite initial efforts to reach the area quickly with a land bridge over the canal.
I am not an authorized person or official representative to make statements on behalf of the military or the entire country, but I want to share the concerns expressed by many on the frontlines, from privates to colonels. They often ask me: where is the promised aid?
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2/ Considering that I talk to many analysts and experts worldwide, many of my friends and acquaintances hope I can provide them with comprehensive knowledge and answers in private. However, the truth is, I don't have an answer.
3/ I might criticize my President for his mistakes, but he's right on multiple issues. One of them is foreign aid— it's too little, too late. It causes an effect that I coined as the "vaccination effect," where small weapon deliveries don't tip the balance but let the enemy adapt
Yesterday, The Economist published an article stating that, according to military plans shared with them, Russian forces aimed to get within artillery range of Kharkiv within 72 hours and were probing to see if they could partially encircle the city. Here is why I am skeptical:
2/ First and foremost, if you examine the composition of forces Russia has used in this direction, the core of the advance consisted of motor rifle regiments with limited vehicle presence. These units were advancing in the form of dispersed small tactical groups on foot mostly
3/ Any deep and swift advance would require mechanized units ready to exploit breaches in defenses. Considering the article's claim that Russian forces had 72 hours to complete their task, the absence of a capable force to execute such a strike is rather puzzling.