What the Su-57 fighter can do and its destruction can tell us about the general state of the Russian army. Like the T-14 tank, the Armata is simply a PR project of the Russian army, the purpose of which is not to build a fifth-generation aircraft, which it never was, but
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to get the state budget and steal the money. In fact, the Su-57 is not a new platform, but a regular Su-35 with a modified appearance and some new systems. Sharp angles were added to give the impression of using stealth technology. The shapes of the wings and tail unit were
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changed. The Su-57 is equipped with AL-41F1 engines. This is a modernization of the AL-41F engine, developed in the 1970s. According to official data, 60 billion rubles were spent on development. These figures were cited by Putin, so in reality the cost may be much higher.
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The result is a very expensive aircraft, but not much different from the cheaper Su-35, so its purchase does not make sense for the Russian army. From the beginning of development in 2001 to the first flight in 2010, 15 aircraft have been assembled to this day, including
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prototypes. Now there are 14 left. The newest Russian aircraft was destroyed by a cheap drone. Another example of Russian sloppiness and reliance on chance. In Russia, money was allocated for the construction of hangars for aircraft, but, surprise, it was stolen. There was
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only enough for an anti-drone net. Again, this is an indicator of how the army is organized. An order and money come from above to build protection for aircraft. The money goes into the pockets of officials, the order goes further - protection for aircraft is needed.
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The rest of the funds go into the pockets of the airfield management, the order is passed on - Ivan and a team of airfield workers must build protection for the aircraft from what is on site. A dome is built from a fence mesh, paperwork is drawn up - the protection is built.
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Documents and reports go to the top that the aircraft is protected. On paper, everything looks good. The boss can rest easy. And what about the Ukrainian drones? No, they won't come. But they did come. Who's to blame? Ivan and his comrades. And Shoigu, of course. They say,
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this is his legacy. Russians hope that something will change under Andrei Belousov, but the Russian system cannot change, which is, of course, good for Ukraine. Russia needs smart generals, but a smart general will not carry out Putin's criminal orders and serve under a
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dictatorship. It's a vicious circle. No matter what changes there are in the government, when the system is built on lies, theft and deception, only liars, thieves and cheaters can work in it.
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Ukraine is systematically destroying Russian air defense systems, creating more and more holes for possible attacks, and we will see even more in the future.
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Ultimately, the main achievement of both Putin and Trump is that NATO has now committed to increasing annual defense spending to at least 5% of GDP by no later than 2035 — a level unseen since the Cold War. Previously, the target was just 2%. Some countries, like Estonia, 1/7
are already set to reach this threshold as early as next year. Spain opposed the move, but it is geographically the farthest from the main threat — Russia. At least, that’s how it seems to them. But one should not forget that Russia’s core strategy revolves around hybrid 2/7
threats, which have no borders. For major European countries — France, Germany, and others — the decisive factor was pressure from Trump. The war in Ukraine, ongoing since 2014, had not pushed Europe toward a more serious approach to security. While the Baltic states, Poland, 3/7
NATO suggests that Russia can sustain the war at its current pace until 2027. Of course, I may be accused of being sympathetic to Ukraine and having a biased opinion, but let’s look at the facts—what’s wrong with this statement? The Russian war machine currently relies on
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Soviet-era equipment reserves, a large number of soldiers, and the National Wealth Fund. Let’s start with the first point. Soviet equipment reserves are almost completely depleted. The offensive on Sumy is carried out mainly through infantry assaults, and the amount of
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destroyed Russian equipment in recent weeks is two to three times lower than during the same period in previous years. If Russia continues the war at the same pace, by 2027 almost all of its equipment will be gone—perhaps even the few donkeys they have. As for soldiers,
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The appointment of Robert Brovdi, known by his call sign "Madyar," as head of the Unmanned Systems Forces of Ukraine has already yielded noticeable results, according to Russian military bloggers. They report that Ukrainian drone strikes are now primarily aimed at eliminating
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Russian UAV operators. Madyar has openly declared his goal of building a "drone wall" along the entire front line and destroying up to 35,000 Russian soldiers per month—the estimated number that the Russian army can mobilize on a monthly basis. He advocates for establishing
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dedicated UAV units for each section of the front line, with operators who are intimately familiar with their own sector, rather than deploying UAV teams as a mobile reserve shuffled between hotspots. His concept is to create a continuous "kill zone" across the whole
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The war in Iran benefits Russia in the short term, but in the long run, the loss of Iran would be a major defeat for Moscow in the region, further weakening its already diminished position in the Middle East. The fall of Syria has significantly undermined Russia’s influence
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there, and Iran remains its last major ally in the region. Russia is trying to squeeze every possible advantage out of this unfavorable situation. The war in Iran distracts the West and its allies from the conflict in Ukraine, but the main gain for Russia is the rise in oil
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prices. Russia’s 2025 budget is under enormous strain because it was planned based on an oil price of $80 per barrel. However, since the summer of 2024, oil prices have been steadily falling, reaching around $50 per barrel for Urals crude in the spring of 2025. The war in
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British intelligence notes that the conflict between Israel and Iran may put Russia in a difficult position; however, the Kremlin also sees the escalation as an opportunity for its own benefit. The agency recalled that Russia has no formal obligations to provide Iran with any 1/5
military assistance in its conflict with Israel. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement signed between Russia and Iran in January 2025 covers cooperation in a number of areas, including defense and security, but does not include a mutual defense clause. 2/5
This contrasts with agreements between Russia and Belarus or North Korea. As noted in the review, Russia almost certainly sees some benefit in this conflict, as it diverts the attention of the international community from the war it has unleashed against Ukraine. "However, 3/5
Israel has demonstrated what it truly means to possess powerful air power — something Ukraine unfortunately still critically lacks. What else do Israel's strikes in the war with Iran reveal? Russia’s weakness. In January 2025, Russia signed a military cooperation agreement
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with Iran, in which both sides promised mutual military support in case of "security threats." But Russia's air defense systems did not work — nor did the agreement itself. The air defenses were neutralized in advance by Mossad agents during an operation similar to Ukraine’s
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Spiderweb. Israeli agents launched drones at numerous targets, including air defense systems, with these drones assembled inside Iran and launched from within the country. Now we have two countries — Russia and Iran — both bogged down in their own wars and unable to help
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