Pekka Kallioniemi Profile picture
Jun 14, 2024 20 tweets 13 min read Read on X
In today’s #vatniksoup, I’ll talk about the recent EU elections and what are their implications for both the Kremlin and Ukraine. Right-wing political parties, some pro-Kremlin, won a lot of seats around Europe, and this result can also change the EU’s stance on Ukraine.

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EU’s support of Ukraine is essential for their survival against genocidal Russia. So far,this support has been delayed mostly by Orban’s Hungary (& to some degree, Fico’s Slovakia). Now, this support will probably be challenged by many new members of the European Parliament.
3/19
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Let’s start with some good news: many well-known vatniks failed to go through, including Mick Wallace, Clare Daly, Tatjana Zdanoka & Marcel de Graaff. Thierry Mariani & Maximilian Krah continue their "work" in the European Parliament.

All souped at:

4/19vatniksoup.com/?fuck=putin
First of all, the whole of EU took a hard right turn – the so-called “hard-right” got close to a quarter of all seats, and right-wing parties won big in France, Germany, Austria, Belgium and Italy. In Nordic countries, “hard-right” lost support to left-wing parties.

5/19
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Many successful campaigns can be attributed to effective use of social media. For example Fidias Panayiotou, a man with no political experience but who has 2.6 million YouTube followers, won a seat in the European Parliament representing Cyprus.

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And as we know, Russia and its allies Iran and the CCP thrive in these online environments, where their disinformation campaigns promote anti-Ukraine, euroskeptic narratives that try to undermine any support for Ukraine.

The success of right-wing parties...

7/19
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...can be attributed to many everyday issues. Probably the biggest of these is immigration, and it’s also one of the most common narratives where Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns thrive:



Another strongly dividing issue is…

8/19

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…the liberal versus conservative debate, where the Kremlin also uses division to sow unrest, while falsely showing themselves as the conservative and traditional safe haven. In the EU, worries over climate change has led to the proposal of environmental regulations…

9/19
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…such as carbon tax and restrictions on land use, which has, to some degree, led to price hikes. Naturally, all these themes are also closely connected to each other: rapid changes in climate drive immigration and affects farming.

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My theory is that people didn’t really even consider Russia or Ukraine while voting, rather than just looking for people who could potentially solve problems that affect their day-to-day life. Issues like illegal immigration and asylum-seeking have been a great concern…

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…to some since the 1990s, and employment, inflation & price increases are affecting almost everyone’s lives. Many conservatist parties rallied around these issues, praising traditionalism, nostalgia & “the good old times”, after seeing how well it worked for Viktor Orbán.

12/19

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And this can also be seen from the campaigns of the successful parties: many on the right rallied against “wokeism”, the “global elites”, the EU becoming a “federal state”, EU immigration policies, “15 minute cities”, climate policies and the green transition.

13/19


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Incidentally, all of these themes are very prominent in the Kremlin’s propaganda and disinformation campaigns in the West, and they’ve also started rallying around them long before the elections, going back over ten years. And this is what we in the West often fail to…

14/19
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…understand when it comes to Russian active measures – they’re usually trying to change societies with long-term campaigning and information operations. And since we don’t fully understand their strategy, we’re usually reactive when we should be proactive.

15/19

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But what does all of this mean for Ukraine?The European Parliament still remains very much pro-Ukraine, but over time,we’ll probably see some MEPs suggesting a softer stance on Russia. For example, since there’s money to be made,some will suggest easing up on the sanctions.
16/19


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With groups like Sahra Wagenknecht’s party gaining momentum in Germany, the far-left gang will also constantly talk about peace negotiations, probably suggesting that Ukraine should agree to concessions to Russia:



17/19

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Finnish MEP Li Andersson has shared her concerns over this far-left, pro-Kremlin bloc, even stating that Sahra Wagenknecht’s party (along with Wallace & Daly, who weren't elected) is not welcome in the The Left group unless they show their full support for Ukraine.

18/19
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To conclude – as in 2019, several pro-Kremlin politicians were elected to the European Parliament. For now, this shouldn’t change support for Ukraine, but we will most probably see some softer stances in the Parliament on Russia in the near future.

19/19

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More from @P_Kallioniemi

Jun 20
In today’s Vatnik Soup REBREW, I’ll re-introduce a Latvian politician and former MEP, Tatjana Ždanoka. She’s best-known for her history in the Communist Party of Latvia, for her pro-Russian politics in the country, and her connections to Russian intelligence.

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Based on Ždanoka’s speeches and social media posts, she has a deep hatred towards the people of Latvia. The reason for this can only be speculated, but part of it could be due to her paternal family being killed by the Latvian Auxiliary Police,…

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…a paramilitary force supported by the Nazis, during the early 1940s. Ždanoka became politically active in the late 80s. She was one of the leaders of Interfront, a political party that supported Latvia remaining part of the USSR.

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Read 23 tweets
Jun 16
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll introduce the main themes of Russian disinformation on TikTok. Each day, there are thousands of new videos promoting pro-Kremlin narratives and propaganda.

It’s worth noting that Russians can only access European TikTok via VPN.

1/10
There is currently a massive TikTok campaign aimed at promoting a positive image of Russia. The videos typically feature relatively attractive young women and focus on themes of nationalism and cultural heritage.

2/10
Ironically, many of these videos from Moscow or St. Petersburg are deceptively edited to portray Ukraine in a false light — claiming there is no war and that international aid is being funneled to corrupt elites.

3/10
Read 11 tweets
Jun 8
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll talk about Finland and how pro-Kremlin propagandists have become more active in the Finnish political space since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. For the first time since 2022, they’ve gained some political power in Finland.

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Russia’s political strategy in countries with Russian-speaking minorities (such as Finland and the Baltics) is typically quite similar: it seeks to rally these minorities around issues like language and minority rights, and then frames the situation as oppression.

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At the same time, Russian speakers are extremely wary and skeptical of local media, and instead tend to follow Russian domestic outlets like Russia-1 and NTV, thereby reinforcing an almost impenetrable information bubble.

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Read 17 tweets
Jun 2
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll discuss the Ukrainian SBU’s “Spiderweb” operation and the main disinformation narrative vatniks have been spreading during the afterfall. While domestic Russian media stays silent, the vatniks and Russian milbloggers have been extremely loud.

1/20
This operation was probably the most impactful strike since the drowning of the Moskva, massively reducing Russia’s capability to bomb Ukrainian cities (or anyone else’s). It involved smuggling 117 FPV drones hidden in trucks into Russia. Once near airbases,…

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…the roofs opened remotely, launching drones in synchronized waves to strike targets up to 4,000 km away. The mission took 18 months to plan. The unsuspecting Russian truck drivers who transported them had no idea they were delivering weapons deep behind their own lines.

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Read 21 tweets
May 28
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll introduce a Russian movie director, propagandist, and former priest: Ivan Okhlobystin. He’s best known for his strong support for the war on Ukraine and for his radical views, which are often used as a testbed for the domestic Russian audience.

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Ivan was born in 1966 from a short-lived marriage between a 62-year-old chief physician and a 19-year-old engineering student. She later remarried, and the family moved from Kaluga province to Moscow. Ivan kept the surname Okhlobystin from his biological father.

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After moving to Moscow, Ivan began studying at VGIK film school. He soon became a playwright for theatre productions and also wrote for Stolitsa magazine, which he later left because, as he put it, “it had become a brothel.”

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Read 21 tweets
May 22
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll introduce a Ukrainian-born former State Duma deputy, Vladimir Medinsky. He is best known as one of the ideologues of the “Russkiy Mir”, for his close ties to Vladimir Putin, and for leading the “peace talks” in Turkey in 2022 and 2025.

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During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Medinsky interned as a correspondent on the international desk of the TASS news agency, learning the ways of propaganda at an early age. Some time later, he earned two PhDs – one in political science and the other in history.

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As is tradition in Russia, Medinsky’s academic work was largely pseudo-scientific and plagiarized. Dissernet found that 87 of 120 pages in his dissertation were copied from his supervisor’s thesis. His second dissertation was also heavily plagiarized.

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Read 21 tweets

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