Since the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, drones have slowly taken the front pages. Initially, it was the Bayraktar TB2, which brought a drone directly to the front line for the first time in a large-scale combat operation.
2/n
Analysts across the entire spectrum, from professional and academic to open-source intelligence, have observed the rise of small commercial surveillance drones for reconnaissance and, increasingly, for more kinetic operations.
For the first time in history, we have seen the successful use of naval drones in the role of direct strike assets.
3/n
On the other side, the Russians have strained our belief in modern air defense systems by deploying hundreds of fixed-wing kamikaze drones to saturate the airspace and deplete valuable and scarce missile supplies.
4/n
Last but not least is the advent of FPV drones on the battlefield, which has drastically changed the perception of the battlespace, particularly in static defense and the use of armored vehicles.
Overall, as I often repeat, we are witnessing a continuously evolving scenario where both sides keep chasing each other, developing platforms to overcome the challenges posed by the adversary.
5/n
What is the response of the entire community on this topic, and why is it so important? It is crucial because policymakers rely on analyses to make decisions, and even large organizations like the US or UK Army need answers to start experimenting and eventually implementing lessons learned.
The community is divided roughly into three macro groups: the hardliner believers in drones, who think that drones have changed everything and will replace every asset on the battlefield; the skeptics, who think that air superiority will always be better than any drone and that drones are primarily for reconnaissance; and a large group that shares aspects of both views.
6/n
Drones have changed everything, but what many fail to understand is that they have performed in a certain way in a specific context, like the war in Ukraine. Consider the Shahed drones and their use to saturate air defense systems. What happened in a few months? The answer is visible at Paris EUROSATORY 2024: the return of SPAAG, the introduction of unmanned 12.7mm machine guns on vehicles, and the wide distribution of new programmable rounds. The same applies to naval drones with an increase in defenses against such threats.
7/n
At the same time, drones have removed an important layer of protection in mission planning: being unobserved. Today, when planning missions or troop movements, planners have to minimize their signature: thermal, acoustic, and EM. This was not as important prior to the advent of cheap and dispersed surveillance drones.
Drones have also been pivotal in providing infantry with effective platforms to deter armored assaults, even in the absence of artillery munitions. They can destroy defensive positions with great accuracy and, last but not least, attack groups of infantry during both day and night operations. One aspect that these platforms share is their flexibility in being used in any role, as well as their ease of manufacturing and updating as battlefield conditions change.
8/8
This particular aspect is still not well understood by those who create design criteria to which the industry reacts. Often, I see people mocking companies for presenting drones that are clearly designed for conflicts different from the one we are seeing in Ukraine. This is why these discussions should be taken seriously, always providing information backed by the best data we have.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
1/ Ukrainian Summer Offensive: Assault on the russian hone front
At @tochnyi we investigated Ukraine’s June–October 2025 deep-strike campaign, which represented a structured operational shift from tactical interdiction to systemic infrastructure targeting.
1. At this point, I am becoming a broken disk, but this is NOT a country which is preparing for Peace; this is a country preparing for war, with us. At this pace, they will not need 5 or 10 years... this is just ONE YEAR of work. Thanks to @hizzo_jay for working on this.
2. Perm and Iskra plants are places where weapons to kill more Europeans are made right now, while you sleep and while you order your Latte at the bar. This place produces different types of missiles, and this is just after 1 year.
3. Where, in June 2024, there was a forest, in July 2025 we have flling stations and logistics hubs to fill and ship shells, rockets, and other ordnance.
Alabuga plant: No Chain is stronger than its weakest link
New @tochnyi investigation on Shahed drones and the Alabuga plant, first in a mini-series.
If the Shahed is the arrow and the launch sites the bow, today we cover the blacksmith forging the arrow.
1. If you’d like to dive straight into the full investigation, you’ll find the link below. But for those following along here, this thread offers a summary of our main findings.
2. Over the past 5 months, Russia has tripled its use of Shahed-type drones, now averaging 103 launches per day. Ukraine hasn’t had a single day without attacks. In April 2025, Russia launched 2,485 Shaheds. By July, 6,297. That’s a 1,378% increase compared to July 2024.
Putin’s ears within Europe: Uncovering Kaliningrad’s Hidden Antenna Array
Our latest at @tochnyi investigation into Putin's military expansion in Europe focuses on a new intelligence site under construction in Kaliningrad, just 25km from the Polish border. The site was discovered by @hizzo_jay
2.📍 Hidden in the forests of Kaliningrad, just 25 km from Poland’s border, satellites have spotted something strange: a massive, perfectly circular construction.
Unusual geometry. Huge size. Strategic location.
We decided to investigate. 🛰️
Regarding the challenge of defending against the saturation of drones from an adversary, many advocate for the use of solely “cheaper” mass-produced drones.
Despite this seeming like an obvious solution, it is not.
🧵
2/ The logic goes: if the enemy uses swarms of low-cost drones, the best way to respond is by producing more of your own. Quantity vs. quantity.
But this thinking ignores critical tactical, logistical, and strategic realities.
3/ First, not all drone roles are created equal.
Recon, EW, loitering munitions, and decoys all have different tech, data, and operational demands.
Blindly mass-producing “cheap” drones risks saturating the airspace with ineffective assets.
Un thread in italiano è sempre un po’ doloroso, perché mi ricorda che quando lo scrivo è perché vedo qualcosa in Italia che non va. L’aggressione subita da @Ivan_Grieco non è grave solo per il fatto in sé, ma forse è ancora più grave perché, scavando, si comprende come l’informazione in Italia sia totalmente in mano a incompetenti o propagandisti.
Le manifestazioni per la pace sono sempre qualcosa di giusto e sacrosanto. Ricordo bene quando, all’alba dell’invasione dell’Iraq, il mondo intero provò a dire di no. In quel momento c’era tanta voglia di fare del bene e di evitare una guerra inutile. Io, personalmente, sostenevo l’intervento in Afghanistan, ma non quello in Iraq.
Tuttavia, oggi ciò che si vede è una cieca distorsione della bilancia morale: chi manifesta crede di avere tutta la verità in tasca, di avere ragione, e che la piazza appartenga solo a chi la pensa allo stesso modo.
Tutto questo nasce dalla necessità di semplificare e creare polarizzazione, non appartenenza. Perché quando ci si divide in “noi” e “loro”, si perde ogni occasione per riflettere sui dati e sulla complessità della realtà.