Is Russian Electronic Warfare successfully jamming the GPS signals on American provided precision guided munitions to the point that Ukraine can no longer effectively employ them?
No. No it is not.
Many people seem to believe so though. So what's really going on?
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1/15
A lot of the public discourse around Russian EW has focused on their efforts at GPS interference and denial. This has arguably been a successful Russian info operation. Lost in the conversation is that the most vulnerable systems to EW are commercial off-the shelf ones.
2/15
These include non-military grade communications and commercial drones. A RUSI report from May 2023 found that Russian EW was jamming Ukrainian comms over Motorolas with 256-bit encryption and was also downing 10,000 Ukrainian UAS per month.
3/15
These are significant problems that require more attention. While the low cost of COTS FPV drones may still make them cost effective, delivering military grade communications and UAS with EW resiliency should still be a high priority.
Now, about the GPS guided munitions.
4/15
GPS guided munitions are not equally impacted. Some are completely compromised, others are degraded but still effective, especially with countermeasures and others remain largely unaffected. The Russians do learn, so this is an ever evolving challenge.
5/15
On one end of the spectrum, the M982 Excalibur 155mm guided artillery shell initially enjoyed a 70% effective rate. Russian adaptations to their GPS jamming efforts were successful in reducing that to just 6% though. Consequentially Ukraine largely abandoned using them.
6/15
Per US Department of Defense figures, Ukraine was only provided with ~7000 of these rounds though, with the last commitment in April 2023. So Ukraine was able to use them for about a year, and their employment has tapered off due to the limited stocks and the GPS denial.
7/15
The impact of EW on GMLRS was first reported in May 2023. Fresh documentation of Ukrainian GMLRS fire missions has continued since then though, so it has clearly not been rendered ineffective. EW impacts can be mitigated by allocating additional missiles for each target.
8/15
Reports of JDAM-ER being impacted by EW also first emerged last spring. As with GMLRS, revised mission planning and continuous software patches from the manufacturers mitigate these impacts. JDAM-ER has maintained a 60% average effective rate for most of 2023 as a result.
9/15
Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb has been one of the failures, both due to EW & other unspecified issues. Boeing is working on resolving the EW vulnerability, though this will take months. It may yet prove to be useful in the future, but right now it's a lesson learned.
10/15
Unlike it’s ground launched derivative, unmodified GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs (SDB) have apparently been 90% effective. This may degrade over time as the Russians make their own improvements to their EW tactics, but so far it has been a very useful addition.
11/15
The arrival of F-16s has the potential to both improve Ukraine's resiliency to Russian EW and improve their counter-EW capabilities. The DoD has already contracted the delivery of Home-On GPS Jam seekers to be integrated onto Ukraine’s JDAM-ERs.
This thread is based on my last column for @InsiderEng. There is more detail available there if you are interested. Note that the focus was on Russian GPS denial efforts. The fight over the electromagnetic spectrum is very complex, so I could not cover all aspects of it.
13/15
While Russia does have an EW advantage, Ukraine has significant capabilities of their own. The details around this are heavily guarded though, so my writing was only based on open-source information. Don't take it as a comprehensive overview of the EW battlespace.
14/15
Finally, I'll remind people that I don't get to write the headlines. No single system, including F-16s has the potential to give Ukraine an advantage in EW. It's a rapidly evolving fight and no advantage that either side has will be permanent.
I should clarify, I'm talking about systems that are relying on GPS or radio communications. Obviously dumb munitions can't be impacted by EW. But if EW can impact your system, you're never going to make it 100% invulnerable. There is always going to be a new electronic attack technology that will change the game, and then new resiliency technologies to counter it.
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🇺🇸🇺🇦 As President Joe Biden serves out his final weeks in office, he still has the opportunity to correct his past mistakes, and put Ukraine on better footing as we start the new year. Here's what should be done. ⬇️
🧵 1/9
If you want to read beyond these highlights, check out my latest for @InsiderEng, which explores this in more length. I also touch on the question of what we might expect from the incoming Trump Admin and the new Congress in the US.
❗🇺🇸🇨🇳 "US Army and Joint Electronic Warfare (EW) forces in the
Indo-Pacific are outnumbered, outranged, and outpowered by those possessed by the People's Liberation Army (PLA)." -Army Science Board White Paper on EW
Let's see what else it has to say?
🧵⬇️ 1/14
"there is no executive agent or proponent [for EW] designated at the highest level of the Army to ensure appropriate resourcing of critical functions, equipment, training, and staffing."
A Deputy Assistant Secretary for EW, reporting to ASA(ALT) could be created for this.
2/14
"The PLA's space capabilities closely match or exceed those of US Army Pacific (USARPAC)."
"The Army makes operational and resourcing decisions based on analytical data that supports value to the warfighter, but its EW discipline lacks this analysis capability."
In 1 week, at the end of Fiscal Year 2024, $5.925 billion in Presidential Drawdown Authority is set to expire. If this happens, it will cripple the US' ability to support Ukraine. We've seen this story before. Will Congress and the Biden Admin manage to avert disaster?
🧵⬇️ 1/20
This is a summary of my latest piece for @InsiderEng, please do check it out. This thread will also include some additional details that have been learned since the column was posted.
If you want additional context before proceeding, read my previous thread quoted below. I will have a second research thread on this topic coming in the future that will provide additional information and make corrections to this previous thread.
🇺🇸 On Friday, the State Department hit RTX (Raytheon) with a $200 million penalty for committing 750 violations of Arms Export Control Act & its associated International Traffic in Arms Regulations, including unauthorized exports to 🇮🇷🇱🇧🇷🇺🇨🇳. The details are shocking. ⬇️
🧵 1/18
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) govern the export of defense articles via commercial transactions. Any company involved in any aspect of the defense industry is very familiar with these lengthy & strict regulations.
2/18
RTX is the third largest defense contractor in the world and the second largest in the United States. They have three main operating divisions:
Better to ask for forgiveness than for permission: Ukraine's Kursk Operation has outmanoeuvred both Russia & United States.
The Biden Administration has been boxed in and forced to give tacit approval to an operation they didn't know of & are still reticent about.
1/22 🧵
If you want my full analysis on Kursk, check out my latest piece for @InsiderEng. It was submitted a week ago, so it predates the latest news. This thread will focus on the key grand strategic outcomes; no tactical or operational analysis here.
Since the beginning of the war, Ukraine has been fighting two fronts: Russia on the battlefields and intransigent western governments in the halls of power. Fear of escalation has severely limited the quantity and quality of weapons willingly provided to Ukraine.
Last month Kongsberg (🇳🇴) unveiled their new Mobile, Short Range Air Defense System (M-SHORAD): NOMADS.
Germany is already considering procuring it for Ukraine.
Here's what NOMADS has to offer.
🧵 1/21
𝗡𝗢𝗠𝗔𝗗𝗦: 𝗡ati𝗢nal 𝗠aneuver 𝗔ir 𝗗efence 𝗦ystem, has been developed following a 2019 contract with the @FMateriell (🇳🇴) to fulfill a mobile, short range air defense requirement for the Army. 6 vehicles were ordered with 3 already delivered & successfully tested.
2/21
NOMADS is actually a vehicle agnostic module and accompanying Command & Control (C2) suite. While Norway operates it (and Kongsberg markets it) on a FFG (🇩🇪) ACSV G5, any vehicle that meets the dimensional & payload requirements could theoretically mount it.