Colby Badhwar Profile picture
Jun 18, 2024 16 tweets 5 min read Read on X
Is Russian Electronic Warfare successfully jamming the GPS signals on American provided precision guided munitions to the point that Ukraine can no longer effectively employ them?

No. No it is not.

Many people seem to believe so though. So what's really going on?

🧵

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A lot of the public discourse around Russian EW has focused on their efforts at GPS interference and denial. This has arguably been a successful Russian info operation. Lost in the conversation is that the most vulnerable systems to EW are commercial off-the shelf ones.

2/15
These include non-military grade communications and commercial drones. A RUSI report from May 2023 found that Russian EW was jamming Ukrainian comms over Motorolas with 256-bit encryption and was also downing 10,000 Ukrainian UAS per month.

3/15
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These are significant problems that require more attention. While the low cost of COTS FPV drones may still make them cost effective, delivering military grade communications and UAS with EW resiliency should still be a high priority.

Now, about the GPS guided munitions.

4/15
GPS guided munitions are not equally impacted. Some are completely compromised, others are degraded but still effective, especially with countermeasures and others remain largely unaffected. The Russians do learn, so this is an ever evolving challenge.

5/15
On one end of the spectrum, the M982 Excalibur 155mm guided artillery shell initially enjoyed a 70% effective rate. Russian adaptations to their GPS jamming efforts were successful in reducing that to just 6% though. Consequentially Ukraine largely abandoned using them.

6/15 Image
Per US Department of Defense figures, Ukraine was only provided with ~7000 of these rounds though, with the last commitment in April 2023. So Ukraine was able to use them for about a year, and their employment has tapered off due to the limited stocks and the GPS denial.

7/15
The impact of EW on GMLRS was first reported in May 2023. Fresh documentation of Ukrainian GMLRS fire missions has continued since then though, so it has clearly not been rendered ineffective. EW impacts can be mitigated by allocating additional missiles for each target.

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Reports of JDAM-ER being impacted by EW also first emerged last spring. As with GMLRS, revised mission planning and continuous software patches from the manufacturers mitigate these impacts. JDAM-ER has maintained a 60% average effective rate for most of 2023 as a result.

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Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb has been one of the failures, both due to EW & other unspecified issues. Boeing is working on resolving the EW vulnerability, though this will take months. It may yet prove to be useful in the future, but right now it's a lesson learned.

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Unlike it’s ground launched derivative, unmodified GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs (SDB) have apparently been 90% effective. This may degrade over time as the Russians make their own improvements to their EW tactics, but so far it has been a very useful addition.

11/15 Image
The arrival of F-16s has the potential to both improve Ukraine's resiliency to Russian EW and improve their counter-EW capabilities. The DoD has already contracted the delivery of Home-On GPS Jam seekers to be integrated onto Ukraine’s JDAM-ERs.

12/15
This thread is based on my last column for @InsiderEng. There is more detail available there if you are interested. Note that the focus was on Russian GPS denial efforts. The fight over the electromagnetic spectrum is very complex, so I could not cover all aspects of it.

13/15
While Russia does have an EW advantage, Ukraine has significant capabilities of their own. The details around this are heavily guarded though, so my writing was only based on open-source information. Don't take it as a comprehensive overview of the EW battlespace.

14/15
Finally, I'll remind people that I don't get to write the headlines. No single system, including F-16s has the potential to give Ukraine an advantage in EW. It's a rapidly evolving fight and no advantage that either side has will be permanent.

15/15

theins.press/en/opinion/col…
I should clarify, I'm talking about systems that are relying on GPS or radio communications. Obviously dumb munitions can't be impacted by EW. But if EW can impact your system, you're never going to make it 100% invulnerable. There is always going to be a new electronic attack technology that will change the game, and then new resiliency technologies to counter it.

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More from @ColbyBadhwar

Apr 6
The defeatists say the United States (and the west more broadly) are incapable of producing the weapons needed to confront adversaries. They say that the defense industrial base can't do it.

Is this true?

No, no it is not.

Enter Talon (THAAD): a case study. 🧵⬇️

1/16 THAAD. Lockheed Martin image.
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) covers the ballistic missile defense battlespace between lower tier terminal defense systems like PATRIOT & SM-6 and exoatmospheric systems like SM-3. It's a critical capability for the US Army and allied partners.

2/16 2016 THAAD Overview. Missile Defense Agency.
Despite its significant importance, which has only continued to grow since coming into service in 2012, the program has been starved of funding. In this thread I will focus solely on its Talon interceptor missile, but I could write much more about the overall program.

3/16 Talon. Lockheed Martin image.
Read 16 tweets
Mar 30
🇺🇸 In Dec 2025, the US revealed the new Government-to-Government Only List: all their most sensitive military systems only available for export via the Foreign Military Sales Program. Reforming this list has long been desired by US customers. Here it is, from A to Z:

1/24 🧵⬇️ AIM-120D-3 AMRAAM
F-35
IBCS
Virginia Class
The old "Foreign Military Sales Only List" consisted of broad and duplicate categories, and has long been a point of frustration for US customers; with a desire for more systems to be eligible for the Direct Commercial Sales Program. These changes do just that.

2/24 Image
A/R/UGM-84 Harpoon/Standoff Land Attack Missile - Expanded Response AURs and Select Command and Launch-Control System Components

Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System - Guidance Section Components

Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasures System

AEGIS Combat System

3/24 Image
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Read 24 tweets
Mar 25
Operationally, Epic Fury has been a success, but not without fault. Losses incurred by US & partner forces could have been minimized had the Trump Admin been more open to Ukrainian support; and the US Army more nimble in reforms.

Here are the receipts to prove it. 🧵 ⬇️

1/25 Infographic with satellite images showing damage at a selection of four US military sites, or sites hosting US personnel, in the Middle East in the context of Iranian strikes since February 28, 2026, using images from Planet Labs. Credit: Graphic by Nalini Lepetit-Chella and Sabrina Blanchard/AFP via Getty Images)/© 2026 Planet Labs/AFP
Last August the Ukrainians pitched the White House on a defense industrial cooperation deal focused on Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and counter-UAS (cUAS). Ukraine has immense technical and operational expertise in this area. They made this presentation, obtained by Axios.

2/25 Ukrainian presentation to White House, obtained by Axios.
Ukraine even emphasized the threat Iran posed to US forces in CENTCOM. After meeting with Zelensky, Trump told his team to work on it, but they did not follow through. US officials have told Axios that this was a big mistake on the Administration's part.

3/25 Ukrainian presentation to White House, obtained by Axios.
Read 27 tweets
Mar 16
🇺🇸🇺🇦 "You don't have the cards right now," Pres Trump told Pres Zelensky.

Turns out, he has some cards after all.

Trump can deny it, but things are in motion behind the scenes, and now even Israel wants to talk drones with Kyiv.

Brief summary of my latest for CEPA.

1/10 🧵⬇️
After ignoring Ukraine's Aug 2025 pitch to bolster US cUAS capabilities in CENTCOM, US officials are quietly admitting they made a big mistake. Now Ukraine is deploying teams to assist US forces, and the Gulf States in countering the drone threat. Even Bibi is calling now.

2/10 https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/4101690-netanyahu-seeks-call-with-zelensky-on-countering-iranian-drones-media.html
Ukraine has much to share. It goes beyond any one particular system, its all the tactics, techniques and procedures that Ukraine has. It's how they integrate everything together. It's valuable knowledge born of experience, and they know what its worth.

3/10
Read 10 tweets
Mar 12
🇮🇱 I keep seeing a lot of incorrect information about Iron Beam, so here's a short explanation. It isn't just one system, it's a family of systems, some of which are operational, and some not, including:

▶️ Iron Beam
▶️ Iron Beam-Mobile
▶️ Lite Beam
▶️ Naval Iron Beam

1/7 🧵
Iron Beam is a 100-120 Kilowatt High Energy Laser, deployed via a 20ft container, with *advertised* capability vs UAS, mortars, rockets, artillery, and cruise missiles. It is not ballistic missile defense capable.

It is possibly in "Early Operational Capability".

2/7 Image
Iron Beam-M(obile) is a 50-60 kW High Energy Laser (HEL), transportable via a Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT). Its reference threats are UAS & loitering munitions.

I would describe Iron Beam-M as being in Initial Operational Capability (more on this later).

3/7 Image
Read 7 tweets
Mar 2
What is the actual purpose of theater missile defense (TMD)?

I keep seeing people who work in defense policy get this question completely wrong.

It isn't "cost effective" interception of 100% of enemy threats.

So what is it?

An explanatory thread. 🧵⬇️

1/17 US Army Air and Missile Defense Vision 2028
A fundamental challenge in TMD is that interceptors are generally more expensive than their targets. This is compounded by the fact that most air defense doctrine calls for 2 interceptors to be expended per target to help ensure a probable kill.

2/17
At face value, this isn't cost effective, but we need to consider the cost of *not* intercepting the incoming threat, rather than just the cost of the engagement. Those who detract from or don't understand TMD seldom seem to consider this question of opportunity cost.

3/17
Read 17 tweets

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