For a little while now I have wanted to write about the Russian turtle tanks. These weird and unwieldy beasts provide a discrete solution to a contemporary battlefield problem - generating successful offensive operations. 1/10 🧵🇺🇦🇺🇦
2/ On the weekend, the Ukrainian ground forces were able to capture one of these Russian turtle tanks. It will be a useful source of intelligence, particularly the EW suite that it is equipped with. But it will also provide insights into weaknesses that can be attacked with FPV.
3/ These turtle tanks have already appeared in several 'generations': Gen 1: tank with metal tortise shell; Gen 2: tank with metal tortise shell and EW suite; and, Gen 3: tank with metal tortise shell, EW suite, additional cages and mine roller.
4/ They are a particular solution to a particular problem. After 26 months of war, adaptations on both sides have led to an increasingly difficult environment for the conduct of offensive operations. In particular, closing with the enemy and breaking into their defences is difficult.
5/ The turtle tanks are therefore testbeds for new tactics and tech. They provide the following: 1. Survivability against drones, loitering munitions & FPV; 2. electronic breaching operations as part of ground assault; 3. integration of drone & EW defences into combined arms operations; 4. integration of physical and electronic breaching in a single platform.
6/ While a useful demonstration of different capabilities to support offensive operations, the turtle tank itself is probably an evolutionary dead end. The vehicles are large, slow-moving and unwieldy, with limited crew visibility.
7/ The array of tasks currently undertaken by turtle tanks are likely to be distributed to many smaller, lower signature uncrewed vehicles as both sides experiment with new tactics and technologies for offensive operations. Both Russia & Ukraine appreciate that successfully returning to offensive operations is key to their respective theories of victory.
8/ The turtle tank is a weird-looking beast. But it is an adaptation for a particular battlefield problem for a particular environment in one theatre of war. It will probably be neutralised by Ukrainian adaptation in the near term, and is unlikely to be suitable for other operational theatres.
9/ The turtle tank is also a demonstration of the adaptive capacity of the Russian Army. While they have been generally slower at learning than the Ukrainian military, they have managed to learn and adapt throughout the war. Read my full assessment here: mickryan.substack.com/p/ode-to-the-t…
10/ Thanks to the following for images used in the thread and article: @JayinKyiv @thewarzonewire @666_mancer @RALee85 @ukraine_map @bayraktar_1love @DefenceU
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There are many lessons from the war in #Ukraine. But to be most useful, these lessons need to be considered through the context of different regions and political environments beyond eastern Europe. 1/7 🧵🇺🇦
2/ Sir Michael Howard wrote in The Use and Abuse of Military History, "without some such knowledge of the broader background to military operations one is likely to reach totally erroneous conclusions about their nature, and the reasons for their failure and success." Context matters.
3/ As such, I am starting a new series to translate the lessons from #Ukraine for application in the #Pacific. The method I will use in this study includes consideration of three key elements.
In the past 48 hours, the U.S. and Ukraine signed a new security agreement on the sidelines of the G7 meeting being held in Italy. What is the nature of the new agreement between Ukraine and the U.S. and what are the potential implications over the next decade? 1/9 🧵 🇺🇦
2/ There are four key elements of the agreement.
3/ First, the agreement sets out a ten-year horizon. But, the deal won’t be ratified by the US Congress. And hopefully, Ukraine will be in NATO well before the ten year period ends.
I wanted to talk a little more about this great thread from @sambendett One of the interesting aspects of this thread is how it recognises the cycle of adaptation in military affairs. 1/8 🧵 🇺🇦
2/ Richard Simpkin wrote about the 50 year cycle in Race to the Swift - a great book which is still relevant after 40 years. I have also published multiple articles about the ongoing adaptation battle in this war.
3/ But we have also seen much faster adaptation cycles during this war in #Ukraine. As the thread points out, the drone-on-drone fights are happening regularly but we did not adequately prepare for this in western military organisations.
After two years of war, and some early successes in offensive operations, adaptations on both sides have led to an increasingly difficult environment for the conduct of offensive operations. The defence is now the stronger form of war – at least in Ukraine. 1/14 (Image: @DefenceU)
2/ As the Ukrainian counteroffensive last year, and the lack of significant progress in Russia’s 2024 offensives against a much weaker Ukrainian force demonstrate, successful offensive operations are very difficult in the current environment.
3/ This phenomenon has been explored by military theorists in recent years. Brilliant articles by the late Dave Johnson, T.X. Hammes, Frank Hoffman, & Alex Verhinin since the start of Russia’s large-scale invasion have examined the shift to defensive dominance in military operations. I recommend them all.
Is there an ongoing revolution in military affairs in Ukraine? This is a topic I have been pondering for a while. So, a short thread (and an accompanying article), that explores the issue. 1/8 (Image: @DefenceU)
2/ First, it is important to differentiate between “military revolutions” and “revolutions in military affairs (RMA).” A military revolution “recasts the nature of society & the state as well as of military organizations. By so doing they alter the capacity of states to project military power.”
3/ RMAs however are a more limited phenomenon requiring the aggregation of different tactical, organizational, doctrinal, and technological innovations to construct a new conceptual paradigm in military affairs. Indeed, it is the conceptual element rather than the technological aspects that is fundamental.
The US has relaxed its restrictions on the use of its weapons on Russian soil. While these changes are geographically constrained, there are some important implications. A quick assessment. 1/12 🧵edition.cnn.com/2024/05/30/pol…
2/ Apparently the new direction on U.S. weapons will allow Ukraine to employ American weapons to intercept Russian missiles that are targeting Kharkiv, and to attack concentrations of Russian troops just over the border in the vicinity of the city.
3/ Permitted targets also apparently include Russian air force bombers, which launch many of the long-range missiles that attack Ukrainian civil infrastructure and civilian targets.