My latest work is now on @tochnyi website, it wouldn't be possible without the support of the entire team, a special mention to @wendy_dyers for his proofreading, and to @clockworkChris for his marvellous graphics.
1/n Introduction
Understanding the impact of FPV drones on tanks in the Ukrainian war is complex due to several factors. Reliable and comprehensive data is essential but currently limited, with most data coming from Andrew Perpetua and his OSINT team, providing valuable but not exhaustive insights.
The evolving FPV drone technology and tactics by Ukrainian and Russian forces add complexity. Each side continuously develops and refines these drones, making it challenging to assess their impact accurately. Different drone models with various capabilities influence their effectiveness against tanks, leading to constant adaptation of strategies in response to drone threats.
Moreover, the quality of visual data, often from video footage, affects the accurate identification and counting of damaged or destroyed tanks. Poor video quality can lead to misidentification or underreporting, further complicating the assessment.
2/n Toll on Russian tank fleet
The totals amounted to 582 tanks damaged, making this the largest category and indicating that most FPV strikes result in damage rather than destruction or abandonment; 86 tanks were found to be abandoned, a smaller but notable portion, and 148 tanks destroyed; showing that while destruction is less common than damage, it is still a significant result.
The general trend indicates an increase in the number of FPV strikes over time, especially from January to March 2024. Damaged tanks consistently represent the majority of strikes each month. The number of destroyed tanks remains relatively steady, while abandoned tanks vary but also show an increase towards the later months.
3/n In support of the total tank losses, a breakdown of the financial impact of FPV drone strikes on Russian tanks from September 2023 to March 2024 is given by the following figure. The data is segmented into three categories: destroyed, abandoned, and damaged tanks, each represented by a different colour (black, rose and red respectively). These should be considered as estimates, since each model fielded may have a different production cost. Furthermore, is difficult to judge the cost of a damaged tank since most of the time this is lost due to subsequent destruction via drone-dropped munition. For this reason, we decided to count 50% of the average cost when the tank is damaged, and 100% in the other cases. In September 2023, the total cost amounted to $117.5 million, with the majority of losses associated with damaged tanks and smaller proportions attributed to destroyed and abandoned tanks. In October 2023, the estimated costs increased significantly to $178.3 million, with damaged tanks still representing most of these. There was also a noticeable rise in losses related to destroyed and abandoned tanks. The estimated costs remained relatively stable in November 2023 at $179.8 million, maintaining a similar distribution among damaged, destroyed, and abandoned tanks.
4/n By looking at this chart, it becomes clear that the T-72 and T-80 are the tanks most affected by FPV strikes. This should not be surprising since these are two of the most abundant tanks in the Russian army [1] and have been widely used since the start of the conflict. Of the 393 damaged tanks, 321 fall into these two categories, making up 81.7% of the overall total.
5/n On several occasions, analysts and public opinion have been divided when discussing the impact of drones, and, more specifically, FPV drones. One school of thought has remained persistent yet unverified: that most strikes on vehicles, particularly tanks, were conducted after the vehicle was incapacitated or in a stationary position. This is mostly true when considering strikes on tanks from drone dropped munition.
However, by analyzing the available footage of FPV strikes on Russian T-72 tanks, it is possible to get a more representative picture of reality. Except for October 2023, the overall share between damaged stationary and moving T-72s is similar, and the overall count slightly favours moving targets. This leads to the conclusion that, based on the data available, FPV drones are not used solely on stationary targets. Due to their agility and speed, they are commonly used on moving targets.
6/n Analyzing the footage of FPV drone strikes on T-72 tanks provides crucial insights into their tactical applications and the resulting damage patterns. Notably, 71.7% of all attacks on T-72 tanks occur in the rear and turret/rear hull areas. This high percentage highlights a strategic targeting approach, aiming at the tank’s vulnerabilities.
The rear and turret/rear hull areas of a tank, including the T-72, often need to be more armoured compared to the front and sides (Figure 5). This makes these sections prime targets for FPV drone strikes. Specifically, attacks on the turret and rear hull account for approximately 33% of all documented strikes. This focus on the turret/rear hull is critical as it often houses the tank’s ammunition storage.
The agility and speed of FPV drones allow them to approach and strike tanks from these vulnerable angles effectively.
7/n An example video footage shows the tank in motion, with the FPV drone initially trailing it undetected. The drone's high speed allows it to rapidly close the distance to the tank. This phase, which can be named the approaching phase, is critical as it sets up the conditions for a successful strike. During this phase, the drone pilot adjusts the drone’s tilt to gain additional speed and enhance manoeuvrability, which is crucial for maintaining control during the high-speed chase.
As the drone nears its target, the pilot makes further adjustments to the drone's angle of attack. This involves tilting the drone to approximately 30 degrees relative to the plane of the tank. This final adjustment ensures that the drone strikes the target with the maximum chance of penetration. The increased angle not only optimises the speed and control of the drone but also aligns the warhead for an effective top-down impact, targeting the tank's weaker armor.
8/n This vulnerability is critical because top-attack weapons, like the RBS 56 BILL anti-tank guided missile, are designed specifically to exploit this weakness. The notorious example of the BILL missile system features a warhead that is angled downwards, designed to detonate above the tank, directing its explosive force downward to penetrate the thinner top armor, which resembles the attack procedure of FPV drones. This design choice is particularly effective against the T-72 and similar tanks, as it can bypass the more heavily armored sections and strike where the armor is less robust. The missile's warhead detonates at an optimal angle to maximize the penetration potential against the relatively thinner top armor, thereby increasing the likelihood of achieving a catastrophic kill.
9/n It's important to investigate the locations where Russian tanks have been attacked. One significant scenario is the flat area on the outskirts of Avdiivka, composed of multiple fields separated by three lines. Figure 9 presents a map with geolocated tanks and pictures of the strikes taken from associated videos. The tanks have been struck mostly on streets and in open fields, particularly close to tree lines. This aligns with the current situation on the ground, where Russians attempt to move rapidly on roads to cover long distances. However, once halted, they try to advance through fields, putting the tank crews in additional danger from artillery, minefields, and FPV drone strikes.
The Russian response: The Turtle Tank
The tanks have primarily been used to transport infantry closer to enemy positions, leveraging their enhanced drone protection to maintain operational capability in contested areas. This role highlights the adaptive nature of the Turtle Tank in meeting the immediate tactical needs of Russian forces [5].
The introduction of Turtle Tanks underscores the evolving nature of modern warfare, where traditional armored vehicles must adapt to new threats like drones. However, the effectiveness of these tanks have been short-lived as Ukraine continued to receive more advanced weaponry from Western allies, including artillery shells and Javelin missiles. These threats will render the Turtle Tanks' drone-specific adaptations insufficient, challenging their continued viability on the battlefield [5].
In addition, as depicted in the graphics, Ukrainian FPV drone pilots showcased how additional layers of protection can be penetrated using more drones and exploiting the exceptional accuracy of the drones. In a specific strike, a turtle tank was targeted three times. The initial two hits targeted the sides, but due to the multiple layers of protection, they were ineffective. However, the third strike targeted the tank tracks, which effectively immobilised the Turtle Tank, forcing the crew to abandon the vehicle. This is just one example of several situations where these "new" weapon systems have been overcome.
Conclusions
The use of FPV drones in the Ukrainian war against Russian tanks demonstrates the evolving nature of modern warfare. Financially, FPV drone strikes have amounted to an estimated $1.52 billion over the analyzed period, causing substantial damage to T-72 and T-80 tanks. The drones have exhibited precision and agility in targeting vulnerabilities, leading to catastrophic internal explosions and showing versatility in various combat scenarios.
1. At this point, I am becoming a broken disk, but this is NOT a country which is preparing for Peace; this is a country preparing for war, with us. At this pace, they will not need 5 or 10 years... this is just ONE YEAR of work. Thanks to @hizzo_jay for working on this.
2. Perm and Iskra plants are places where weapons to kill more Europeans are made right now, while you sleep and while you order your Latte at the bar. This place produces different types of missiles, and this is just after 1 year.
3. Where, in June 2024, there was a forest, in July 2025 we have flling stations and logistics hubs to fill and ship shells, rockets, and other ordnance.
Alabuga plant: No Chain is stronger than its weakest link
New @tochnyi investigation on Shahed drones and the Alabuga plant, first in a mini-series.
If the Shahed is the arrow and the launch sites the bow, today we cover the blacksmith forging the arrow.
1. If you’d like to dive straight into the full investigation, you’ll find the link below. But for those following along here, this thread offers a summary of our main findings.
2. Over the past 5 months, Russia has tripled its use of Shahed-type drones, now averaging 103 launches per day. Ukraine hasn’t had a single day without attacks. In April 2025, Russia launched 2,485 Shaheds. By July, 6,297. That’s a 1,378% increase compared to July 2024.
Putin’s ears within Europe: Uncovering Kaliningrad’s Hidden Antenna Array
Our latest at @tochnyi investigation into Putin's military expansion in Europe focuses on a new intelligence site under construction in Kaliningrad, just 25km from the Polish border. The site was discovered by @hizzo_jay
2.📍 Hidden in the forests of Kaliningrad, just 25 km from Poland’s border, satellites have spotted something strange: a massive, perfectly circular construction.
Unusual geometry. Huge size. Strategic location.
We decided to investigate. 🛰️
Regarding the challenge of defending against the saturation of drones from an adversary, many advocate for the use of solely “cheaper” mass-produced drones.
Despite this seeming like an obvious solution, it is not.
🧵
2/ The logic goes: if the enemy uses swarms of low-cost drones, the best way to respond is by producing more of your own. Quantity vs. quantity.
But this thinking ignores critical tactical, logistical, and strategic realities.
3/ First, not all drone roles are created equal.
Recon, EW, loitering munitions, and decoys all have different tech, data, and operational demands.
Blindly mass-producing “cheap” drones risks saturating the airspace with ineffective assets.
Un thread in italiano è sempre un po’ doloroso, perché mi ricorda che quando lo scrivo è perché vedo qualcosa in Italia che non va. L’aggressione subita da @Ivan_Grieco non è grave solo per il fatto in sé, ma forse è ancora più grave perché, scavando, si comprende come l’informazione in Italia sia totalmente in mano a incompetenti o propagandisti.
Le manifestazioni per la pace sono sempre qualcosa di giusto e sacrosanto. Ricordo bene quando, all’alba dell’invasione dell’Iraq, il mondo intero provò a dire di no. In quel momento c’era tanta voglia di fare del bene e di evitare una guerra inutile. Io, personalmente, sostenevo l’intervento in Afghanistan, ma non quello in Iraq.
Tuttavia, oggi ciò che si vede è una cieca distorsione della bilancia morale: chi manifesta crede di avere tutta la verità in tasca, di avere ragione, e che la piazza appartenga solo a chi la pensa allo stesso modo.
Tutto questo nasce dalla necessità di semplificare e creare polarizzazione, non appartenenza. Perché quando ci si divide in “noi” e “loro”, si perde ogni occasione per riflettere sui dati e sulla complessità della realtà.
🕷️🧵 “Operation Spider's Web”: Ukraine’s bold and precision-engineered drone strike on Russian strategic air bases.
This thread will explore the more intriguing aspects of Ukraine’s recent drone strike on Russian airbases.
On June 1, 2025, Ukraine executed meticulously planned, multi-pronged, and most advanced FPV drone missions to date operation targeting airbases that house long-range bombers. For a thorough analysis, refer to our linked main article. 1/6tochnyi.info/2025/06/a-deep…
At Olenya Airbase (68.14549, 33.45028), the Tu-95 bombers had KH-101 missiles mounted, cockpit ladders extended, and maintenance gear scattered nearby; clear signs these aircraft were operational and being serviced at the time of the strike. 2/6