One reason why this argument is nonsense is that in Feb 2022 there was zero prospect of Ukraine joining NATO or the EU, as Putin and everyone else knew.
One widely acknowledged reason why Ukraine had zero chance of joining NATO in Feb 2022 was that Russia had been occupying parts of it for 8 years. Again, everyone including Putin knew this made NATO accession impossible - that was probably part of the reason Putin did it.
Even before 2014, Ukrainian accession to NATO would have been unthinkable while the Russian Black Sea Fleet was based on Ukrainian territory, as it had been since the collapse of the USSR.
The closest Ukraine got to NATO accession was in 2008, when the Bush administration backed it, but key European members (France and Germany in particular) opposed it. Even if it had been agreed, it was very hard to see how it would have happened until the Russian navy left Crimea
The idea that Russia needed to invade Ukraine because of NATO expansion when Ukraine had no chance of joining NATO (or the EU) is ludicrous. It's like saying you had to stab someone because you think someone else in a different pub spilled your pint.
Anyone who claims that Russia was provoked into invading Ukraine in 2022 because of fears about NATO expansion is either ignorant or lying, or both.
Of course, Ukraine is now much closer to both NATO and EU accession than it's ever been before, precisely because of Russia's invasion. It's the most striking example so far of Putin's strategic ineptitude.
I'd be interested to know why Reform's policy is that the UK should continue to have 'a lead role' in NATO when its leader thinks NATO has been such a disaster for our continent's security.
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Since Kremlin-friendly voices have once again dragged out the claim that NATO expansion provoked Russia into invading Ukraine, I thought it was worth explaining a couple of things in addition to this earlier thread. 🧵
To repeat: there was no chance at all of Ukraine joining either NATO or the EU in the years before Russia decided to start its latest colonial campaign of stealing Ukrainian land and torturing, raping, and murdering Ukrainians.
This is from February 2021. The language is diplomatic, but it means Ukraine are about as likely to join NATO at this point as Turkey is to join the EU (i.e. it’s not going to happen):
Now that the party manifestos are out, I thought I’d take a look at what they have to say about support for Ukraine and the Russian threat to the UK. What the parties say about Ukraine and Russia tells us a perhaps surprising amount about them. A very long 🧵
First up: the Conservative manifesto. Unsurprisingly, it highlights the Sunak/Truss/Johnson government’s Ukraine policy – widely understood to be one of their major achievements:
The importance (both substance and optics) for the Conservatives of a successful Ukraine policy is also evident from the fact that this is at the top of their ‘Security’ page of their website:
There needs to be much better public understanding about this in the UK (and, I suspect elsewhere in NATO) in the context of debates about defence spending, anxieties about escalation, and wishful thinking about any cessation of war in Ukraine ending hostilities with Russia.
The idea that the West (its states, institutions, political culture, values) are Russia's main enemy and an existential threat is now built in to Putin's presidency. There's no way back from that as long as post-Feb 2022 Putinism is the structuring principle of the Russian state.
Russia is engaging in what some people call hybrid war against the West. This is something that needs to be acknowledged by Western political elites and communicated to Western citizens. Downplaying or misunderstanding what's happening only benefits Russia.
David Lammy is right about the critical importance for the UK of the relationship with the US, but implying that he's more focused on it than on the relationship with the rest of Europe ("I've been to America more times than I've been to France") is not ideal.
European NATO members (the ones that don't have pro-Putin leaderships) need to think urgently about how they cooperate to ensure their security if Trump is re-elected in November. This message doesn't help with that.
One of the things that worries me most at the moment are the hints of complacency in the UK about a return to the White House by Trump. There's an idea in some quarters that, yes, it will be less than ideal but things will essentially be business as usual.
Since it’s that time of year again, 12 end-of-year and start-of-new-year thoughts about Russia’s war against Ukraine and its implications. A long 🧵
1. Russia can’t win. In recent months, there’s been a lot of discussion in the West about Russian victory, but the Russian govt’s objectives were unrealistic from the start, and impossible to achieve almost as soon as the fighting started.
The explicit aims of the invasion were: reset the strategic map of Europe in Russia’s favour; stop “genocide” in Eastern Ukraine; create a pro-Russian Ukraine, including a puppet govt in Kyiv (i.e. “denazify” Ukraine).
By encouraging Georgia to seek NATO admission in 2008 without the necessary support from members, the US created a strong incentive for Russia - with its delusions of rights over its "near abroad" - to act to stop it before reluctant members changed their minds.
If the Bush administration had either paid enough attention to the region or been more realistic about the limits of US power, this wouldn't have happened. It was obvious at the time that France and Germany wouldn't approve Georgia and Ukraine's accession to NATO.