The EV sector industrial subsidy figures released last week by @CSIS are inflated by at least ~$80B, mainly from poor assumptions made to calculate the NEV Sales Tax Exemption that (i) don't pass the sanity check and (ii) are out-of-whack with disclosed actuals amounts.
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As disclosed in the CSIS analysis, the Sales Tax Exemption assumption is based on a very simple premise:
To incent purchases of NEVs (new energy vehicles i.e. BEVs+PHEVs) over ICE vehicles, most NEVs are exempt from the sales tax exemption, which is assumed to be 10%.
$39.5B of Sales Tax Exemption in '23 thus implies that there were at least $395B worth of NEVs sold in China based on CSIS assumptions.
Since we know how many NEVs were sold (~7.9M passenger and ~0.3M commercial), we can back out the implied average selling price (ASP).
CSIS discloses ASP assumption of ¥1.2M for large commercial vehicles. This would imply ~$54B in commercial vehicle NEV sales in '23, leaving $341B for light passenger vehicles.
Based on ~7.9M passenger NEVs sold in '23, this implies an ASP of $43k (¥310k).
This does not pass the sanity check, nor is it consistent with CSIS' own assumptions (passenger NEV ASP is ¥250k).
e.g. the best-selling models in China are compact and mid-size NEVs with ASPs in the ¥120-250k range.
In any case, we can also cross-check this assumption with actual disclosed figures.
The Ministry of Finance disclosed last year cumulative NEV Sales Tax Exemptions through 2022 of ~¥200 billion (~$29B) + another ~¥115 billion (~$16B) in 2023.
This suggests the CSIS estimate for Salex Tax Exemptions is overstated by 2.5-2.6x
Factoring in more accurate assumptions that are more in line with these actuals, I have done my own analysis on Chinese EV sector assumptions and arrived at ~$147B, ~$83B lower than the CSIS estimate.
Based on this, more interesting is what happens going forward IMO.
Per below, the NEV Sales Tax Exemption has been extended for 4 more years, but like the Buyer's Rebate before gradually eases out.
For example, the maximum exemption halves in 2026 to ¥15k per NEV.
I've taken the EV sector subsidies analysis out through 2030 assuming the Sales Tax Exemption is retired after this current program ends.
As you can see avg. subsidies per vehicle continue to fall gradually, from $2,700 in '23 to <$200 by '30.
If we take the model even further out to 2040, China will have spent ~$330B in total subsidies on the EV sector.
Paired against ~704M cumulative NEV sales through 2040, this would average out cumulatively to a subsidy of ~$468 per vehicle.
I think the lesson here is pretty clear and does not need overstated subsidy estimates to make the point.
The key to any successful industrial policy subsidy program is providing support to a domestic industry to achieve scale and profitability so subsidies can be gradually withdrawn over time.
The last point is key. If industrial policy and subsidies cannot achieve industry scale and self-sustaining profitability, you end up with a non-competitive sector that continues to suck up fiscal resources indefinitely.
The development of the Chinese EV sector has followed this principle.
Subsidies per car have fallen from >$20k per vehicle to ~$2k per vehicle over the last decade and will be effectively completed by 2027.
The question for Western policymakers is not about the need to develop and retain an EV industry using industrial policy and subsidies, like China has done. That should be pretty clear, the answer is yes.
It is about execution of said industrial policy. Specifically, are we seeing aggregate subsidies per NEV go down over time at a satisfactory pace?
Remember there are other new industries beyond EVs.
That China is a few years away from withdrawing subsidies from EVs just means that those fiscal resources will soon be available to support development of other future industries.
If one is stuck subsidizing old industries indefinitely this just means less fiscal resources available to spur development of new ones.
This is not the first time I’ve seen highly questionable assumptions in CSIS analysis on China.
Its analysis of COMAC development costs was even more egregious and off by 6-14x.
These numbers influence policy and decision-making. Isn’t it important that we get them right?
~830B barrels of proven reserves in the Middle East has effective energy equivalent of around 11,300 GW of solar PV that produce over a 25-year useful life.
At 14 km2/GW, this would take up desert space of ~158,200 km2, which is less than a quarter of China’s portion of the Gobi Desert.
Moreover, regular maintenance and replacement means this infrastructure would produce energy in perpetuity, while the Middle East oil fields run out or become more costly/difficult to extract (even with improved extraction technology).
China is currently deploying solar PV at a run rate of 300+ GW per annum, which means at just current run rates it can deploy this volume of solar PV in 37 years.
Remember it also took multiple decades to develop the vast oil fields in the Middle East starting in the 30s and 40s.
I think foreigners — especially Americans — do not fully appreciate China's predilection for large, capital-intensive infrastructure projects because most do not know what it was like to live in a place starved of God-given natural endowments.
While we marvel at the economic benefits of a navigable Mississippi River system, bountiful arable land enabling "amber waves of grain", and "purple mountain majesties above the fruited plain" and rich stores of oil & gas + other useful commodities ...
... China trudged through the 20th century in relative poverty, cursed by a dearth of natural endowments like arable land and commodities relative to its huge population.
But it recognized the potential for capital-intensive infrastructure development to convert non-productive regions to productive ones.
I had written a deep dive on known issues in the measurement of China’s GDP and how misleading it was to frame the discussion around the GDP accounting identity, especially if the way those numbers are calculated differed wildly from country to country.
In light of the recent discussion of China’s under-counted consumption 👇, it was worth re-upping these pieces.
Part I provided relevant background on the technicalities of GDP measurement and the historical development of Pettis’ “Over-investment Thesis” and the critical role of the GDP accounting identity on determining “imbalances” in China’s economy.
Essentially, the key takeaway of this study is something many have already long known/suspected:
China’s per capita consumption of real goods and services is very much in line with countries at a similar level of per capita GDP + the reason why it is low as a % of GDP is because it is measured more conservatively.
(This is also suggests that China’s overall GDP is also under-counted, in direct contradiction to what many believe)
Even though Chinese households are verifiably consuming everything from food to cars to education services in real per capita terms at or higher to comparable economies like Mexico + sometimes close to or even exceeding fully developed economies like Japan, cultists will insist that consumption is lagging on the basis of flimsy accounting identities.
These are some key comparison charts that show the consumption measurement distortion.
You can see how despite official measured per capita GDP in nominal terms at roughly half, real per capita consumption of most categories in China exceeds Mexico.
Others have now raised this topic a few times, so allow me to share some thoughts on the BYD (and broader) supply chain financing story:
1⃣ BYD's high payables number actually reflects the strength of its underlying business model and market dominance for two key reasons (ability to extract favorable supplier terms; how that number is driven in part by rapid expansion in production capacity)
2⃣ Establishing industry norms that forces larger players like BYD to adhere to standard payment terms (voluntarily or involuntarily) is a positive step forward for the whole industry, leading to more efficient overall financing approach.
3⃣ BYD and other market leaders that also run large negative working capital balances are generally not a risk of insolvency by adhering to new industry norms as they are generally under-leveraged (with traditional debt financing) and will simply plug the financing hole with more traditional debt and equity financing. In BYD's case, I expect all or most of it to be to replaced with debt (long-term bonds).
1⃣ BYD's high payables figure reflects strength of its underlying business model and is in part a reflection of its rapid growth in production capacity
While the high payables figure has been portrayed as a potential weakness (with some even raising the idea that BYD is insolvent), actually it reflects the opposite.
BYD uses its scale to extract favorable terms from its suppliers. It trades volume for pricing as well as non-pricing advantages, like extended payment terms. It does this because that's what extremely competitive companies do: they try to exploit every advantage they have over the competition.
As BYD has only gotten bigger and more powerful, it has maintained its ability to sustain structural negative working capital state on its balance sheet.
Companies that can maintain negative working capital are often extremely competitive. This is a very desirable business model to run for rapidly growing companies because as revenue grows, working capital becomes a source of funding.
Amazon's marketplace business was an example of this. Amazon collects payment upfront and then pays out sellers later. This leads to a negative working capital balance, which is effectively a very low-cost form of growth financing for its marketplace business.
Ability to maintain negative working capital is even more rare in a capital-intensive businesses like the car sector. That reflects just how dominant BYD has become.
This doesn't mean it's a good thing for the industry overall (and I'll touch on this in the next point), but it does reflect on the increasing dominance of BYD individually.