Thread by @TayfunOzberk

Today, the problems experienced by the Hellenic Navy's Meko 200HN class HS Hydra frigate during its Red Sea mission have become a trending topic on Twitter. I will address these based on my own experience. 🧵
ieidiseis.gr/ellada/251828/…

1-According to the reports, the commander of the Hydra was warned by the Larissa NATO Operations Center of an incoming ballistic missile, which then exploded 150 meters away. There is an irrationality here.

2-NATO-affiliated ships involved in joint operations use a Link-11 network, where each ship (or its helicopter, etc.) broadcasts detected contacts via this network, providing a comprehensive surface/air tactical picture visible to all ships in the area. This picture is also sent via satellite to NATO operations centers, disseminating the final tactical picture back to the ships.

3-Therefore, if the Larissa operations center received this information, the Hydra should have already received it as well. If the claim is true and the ship did not react to the incoming missile, it would imply that all ships in the area were unaware, which is highly unlikely.

4-There is intense air coordination in such areas, and the first ship to detect the missile would broadcast it with the code "WAMPIRE," prompting all ships to initiate ZIPPO reactions, to counter incoming missilesl. Even if Hydra's radar failed to detect the missile, it should have initiated countermeasures based on the Link-11 information.

5-Another claim is that the Phalanx CIWS was ineffective against drones. It's important to note that the Phalanx is a "close-in weapon system" rather than an air defense system. Hydra is equipped with a Phalanx Block 1, which, when operating in standalone mode (as it would in a threat zone), only targets air contacts diving towards the ship.

6-The Phalanx will not target a drone orbiting in the area unless the contact's approach angle is close to zero.

Newer versions of the Phalanx integrated into the CMS can be launched from fire control consoles, but given its effective range of around 2 km, it is not expected to be effective against non-diving drones.

The weapons that should be used in this scenario are the Sea Sparrow air defense missiles and the 127mm naval gun.

6- Another allegation is that drones were mistaken for stars. Knowing that radars cannot make such errors, it seems the confusion arose either from optical systems or personnel on watch duty.

7-This indicates an organizational issue within the ship. Identifying air contacts is a process: the ship detects them with radar, verifies them with electro-optics and ESM, and personnel on watch report visual detections to the combat operations center. If the lookouts panicked and mistook stars for drones, this should have been corrected by radar verification.

8-The Meko-200HNs have the MW-08 air surveillance radar, a 3D radar, and one of the better PESA radars. Under normal conditions (with proper maintenance), this radar should detect drones.

Additionally, confirmation can be sought from other ships via Link-11. Although momentary inaccuracies can occur, the contact is usually correctly identified through this process. If such an issue occurs, it suggests a incoherence between the Combat Information Center (CIC) and other stations.

9-It is stated that there is no counter-drone system on board.

The drone threat is relatively new in naval warfare, and many ships do not yet have dedicated anti-drone systems. While some ships have begun installing anti-drone radars, those operating in the Red Sea generally counter this threat with existing air defense systems.

10-Many ships have been criticized for engaging $10,000-cost drones with $2 million-cost missiles. Before deploying the ship on this mission, the Hellenic Navy should have established and trained procedures for defense against drones based on the ship's capabilities.

It is unclear if this was done, but even if it was, the measures do not appear to have been effective.

11-The Red Sea mission is exceptionally challenging. When the mission first began, detailed preparations were lacking, and many procedures had to be established during the mission itself.

Unlike many other missions, this one presents a constant and immediate real threat, requiring the ship's personnel to be on high alert 24/7. A ship is at its highest combat readiness when all personnel are at their combat posts.

However, due to human limitations, maintaining this state over extended periods is not feasible. As a result, watchkeeping personnel take on the responsibility of safeguarding the ship, a practice known as combat guard posts. This continuous state of vigilance makes the Red Sea mission particularly exhausting for the crew.

12-Furthermore, the region's high temperatures, above-average seawater temperatures, and reliance on seawater for cooling many devices complicate maintenance efforts.

13-This mission is a serious test for all involved. We often read in the media about how Arleigh Burke-class destroyers frequently intercept ballistic missiles or drones, but while it may seem straightforward on a screen, the reality on the ground is vastly different and far from easy.

Allegedly, HS Hydra may have struggled to meet the demands of this mission. The best course of action now would be for NATO-affiliated navies to learn from these experiences and enhance their preparedness for this evolving threat in naval warfare.