Nigel Farage's claims that the West allegedly provoked the Russian invasion of Ukraine are not coming out of nowhere, and the context behind this picture from a few years ago helps understand his claims. Left: Farage, right: Nadia Borodi (Sass). 1/10
Borodi is originally from Ukraine, and together with her partner Oleh Voloshyn they operated an agent network in Europe on behalf of Ukrainian pro-Russian politician Viktor Medvedchuk. Left: Borodi, right: Voloshyn. 2/10
While still in Ukraine, and when Ukraine still tolerated (mistakenly) agents of Russian influence, both promoted pro-Kremlin politics, and actively used European politicians for their objectives. Here's Borodi with Nicolas Bay of the French National Front/Rally. 3/10
Through Voloshyn/Borodi, Medvedchuk would also cooperate with the German far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD): from left to right, Oleh Voloshyn, Petr Bystron (AfD), Viktor Medvedchuk, Maximilian Krah (AfD) and Ulrich Singer (AfD). 4/10
One special area of interest for Medvedchuk was also the British far right: UKIP/Brexit Party (now Reform UK), and Borodi/Voloshyn actively engaged with members of Nigel Farage's political project: Nathan Gill, David Coburn and Jonathan Arnott. Here's Borodi with Gill. 5/10
Through Voloshyn and Borodi, UKIP/Brexit Party were connected to Viktor Medvedchuk's media projects that were run by Artem Marchevsky. Here's a panel at the European Parliament in Strasbourg in 2019 featuring David Coburn, Nathan Gill, Marchevsky and some others. 6/10
Voloshyn and Borodi fled Ukraine just one month before the beginning of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Medvedchuk failed to flee, was arrested and then exchanged for several Ukrainian PoWs. Marchevsky fled Ukraine and somehow settled in Czechia. 7/10
Neither Medvedchuk nor Marchevsky retired from pro-Russian activism. Medvedchuk started cooperating with the Russian Social Design Agency infamous for “Operation Doppelgänger”: 8/10euobserver.com/news/ar53fd9f38
And as we now know, Medvedchuk and Marchevsky set up the Russian front media organisation "Voice of Europe" that was busted by the Czech intelligence earlier this year: 9/10 bbc.com/news/world-eur…
The "Voice of Europe" promotes Eurosceptic politicians, and especially those who voice ideas close to what Farage said about the West, Russia and Ukraine. Given the many connections between Farage's political project and pro-Kremlin operatives, this is hardly surprising. 10/10
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The Russian fake news story about Ukraine’s alleged attack on Putin’s residence near Lake Valdai appears to have been a spontaneous response to reports of a positive outcome from the Trump–Zelensky meeting at Mar-a-Lago last Sunday. 1/6
The Kremlin had clearly hoped that the meeting would go awry. In an attempt to contribute to such an outcome, Putin held a phone conversation with Trump shortly before the latter met Zelensky, obviously to predispose the US president against Ukraine. 2/6
When it became clear that the meeting had produced no dramatic rupture between Trump and Zelensky, the Kremlin moved to improvise. The disinformation campaign was put together so hastily that the Russian authorities failed to construct even a minimally plausible façade. 3/6
In Western democracies, intelligence services increasingly buy data and analyses from private firms. These companies provide OSINT reports, satellite imagery, and cybersecurity expertise, allowing governments to boost capabilities without permanently expanding bureaucracies. 1/11
In Russia, this outsourcing logic found an analogue in the fusion of state propaganda and private enterprise. Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Internet Research Agency (IRA) pioneered commercialised political warfare, blurring lines between business interests and Kremlin objectives. 2/11
The IRA served both Prigozhin’s and state aims, attacking Russian opposition figures, supporting Assad, and targeting Ukraine. Its hybrid model of influence showed how private actors could profit from and reinforce Kremlin foreign policy agendas. 3/11
Since 2010, when Viktor Orbán returned to power, he and Fidesz have been steadily checking off the boxes for building a mafia state in Hungary. At some point, Orbán seems to have decided never to leave power again. 1/11
With the opposition weak, the EU unwilling to act, and cheap Russian energy fuelling populism, Orbán’s model appeared flawless. But since early 2025, that illusion has begun to unravel. 2/11
The rise of former Fidesz member Péter Magyar has shaken the regime. His new party, Tisza, has led independent polls for the 2026 elections, marking the first real challenge to Orbán in over a decade. 3/11
As Russia grows concerned about the resumption of US arms deliveries to Ukraine and the introduction of new, more damaging sanctions by the US, it is playing yet another trick to delay Washington’s measures. 1/5
This latest ploy is the so-called “new and different approach” allegedly proposed to Marco Rubio by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during their meeting in Malaysia earlier today. 2/5
What exactly this “approach” entails remains unclear. Rubio himself said he “wouldn’t characterise it as something that guarantees peace, but it’s a concept [he] will take back to the president today”. 3/5
Putin’s daughter, Katerina Tikhonova, is rumoured to be under consideration as a potential successor to her father as Russia’s leader. This idea is presumably being pushed by the Kovalchuk brothers, who are close to Putin. 1/5
I still don’t really see Putin vacating his position before his physical demise – although, of course, he could remain the major power broker behind whoever he selects to succeed him. 2/5
Western mainstream media have played a major and deeply disturbing role in amplifying the ideas of Russian fascist ideologue Alexander Dugin, both in the West and beyond. 1/10
By falsely portraying Dugin as having considerable – if not definitive – influence on Kremlin thinking, they encouraged far-right as well as non-far-right sympathisers of the Putin regime around the world to regard his fascist ideas as legitimate critiques of Western liberal democracy. 2/10
The warped logic underpinning this is as follows: if one agrees with Putin’s view of the West, and if Putin is presumed to be influenced by Dugin (as Western media often claim), then it appears reasonable to turn to Dugin’s work as the supposed source of Putin’s anti-Western outlook. 3/10