Nigel Farage's claims that the West allegedly provoked the Russian invasion of Ukraine are not coming out of nowhere, and the context behind this picture from a few years ago helps understand his claims. Left: Farage, right: Nadia Borodi (Sass). 1/10
Borodi is originally from Ukraine, and together with her partner Oleh Voloshyn they operated an agent network in Europe on behalf of Ukrainian pro-Russian politician Viktor Medvedchuk. Left: Borodi, right: Voloshyn. 2/10
While still in Ukraine, and when Ukraine still tolerated (mistakenly) agents of Russian influence, both promoted pro-Kremlin politics, and actively used European politicians for their objectives. Here's Borodi with Nicolas Bay of the French National Front/Rally. 3/10
Through Voloshyn/Borodi, Medvedchuk would also cooperate with the German far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD): from left to right, Oleh Voloshyn, Petr Bystron (AfD), Viktor Medvedchuk, Maximilian Krah (AfD) and Ulrich Singer (AfD). 4/10
One special area of interest for Medvedchuk was also the British far right: UKIP/Brexit Party (now Reform UK), and Borodi/Voloshyn actively engaged with members of Nigel Farage's political project: Nathan Gill, David Coburn and Jonathan Arnott. Here's Borodi with Gill. 5/10
Through Voloshyn and Borodi, UKIP/Brexit Party were connected to Viktor Medvedchuk's media projects that were run by Artem Marchevsky. Here's a panel at the European Parliament in Strasbourg in 2019 featuring David Coburn, Nathan Gill, Marchevsky and some others. 6/10
Voloshyn and Borodi fled Ukraine just one month before the beginning of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Medvedchuk failed to flee, was arrested and then exchanged for several Ukrainian PoWs. Marchevsky fled Ukraine and somehow settled in Czechia. 7/10
Neither Medvedchuk nor Marchevsky retired from pro-Russian activism. Medvedchuk started cooperating with the Russian Social Design Agency infamous for “Operation Doppelgänger”: 8/10euobserver.com/news/ar53fd9f38
And as we now know, Medvedchuk and Marchevsky set up the Russian front media organisation "Voice of Europe" that was busted by the Czech intelligence earlier this year: 9/10 bbc.com/news/world-eur…
The "Voice of Europe" promotes Eurosceptic politicians, and especially those who voice ideas close to what Farage said about the West, Russia and Ukraine. Given the many connections between Farage's political project and pro-Kremlin operatives, this is hardly surprising. 10/10
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Ukrainian athlete Olga Kharlan refused to shake her Russian opponent Anna Smirnova’s hand after winning the bout at the Fencing World Championships, and was disqualified by the International Fencing Federation @FIE_fencing. 1/7
The International Fencing Federation (FIE) was, until recently, presided by a Russian Kremlin-linked businessman Alisher Usmanov, here in the right. 2/7
Usmanov was sanctioned by the EU following the Russian full-blown invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and dared to call the EU’s decision “unfair”. He suspended his position at the FIE. 3/7
The latest report on Russian non-Kremlin right-wing extremism suggests that the war and the Kremlin’s pro-war rhetoric have emboldened the Russian far right who had been in crisis for many years. 1/10sova-center.ru/racism-xenopho…
Right-wing extremists are deeply integrated into various civil society structures around the war: they help “refugees”, residents of the regions affected by the war, and the Russian military. 2/10
They also recruit volunteers for the Russian genocidal war and participate in it themselves. 3/10
Since the EU Ambassadors have finally agreed on the 11th package of sanctions against Russia, a Russian "academic" Sergey Karaganov is likely among a dozen of Russian propagandists who are sanctioned by the EU individually. Here's something that one needs to note. 1/7
Karaganov hit the news recently as he suggested to the Russian leadership to target several Western countries with nuclear weapons. 2/7
The knee-jerk reaction now would be to link Karaganov's "nuclear threats" to the sanctions against him, presenting them as the EU's punishment for the "threats". But that would be a mistake. 3/7
A general take on the Russian émigré opposition to the Putin regime, a thread. 1/7
If there's a window of opportunity of post-Putin Russia willing to improve relations with the West, the Russian émigré opposition will be one of several Russian groups of interests that will have a say on the Russia of the future. 2/7
Not the strongest, not the most authoritative group - just one of several. And as much as Ukraine needs to take part in shaping post-Putin Russia, at the moment it can only have some influence on shaping public views of the Russian émigré opposition. 3/7
Russian opposition activist Alexey #Navalny wrote a 15-point programme: meduza.io/feature/2023/0… With the exception of a few disputable arguments, the programme is quite decent and is a good foundation for further discussions with progressive pro-Western Russians. A thread ->
The most important point: Navalny unequivocally acknowledges the internationally recognised borders of #Ukraine (1991). Which clearly implies the need for restoration of Ukraine's sovereignty over #Crimea and all other currently occupied/annexed territories of Ukraine. 2/10
Navalny explicitly opposes #Russia's war against Ukraine, and - unlike many others in the so-called Russian "liberal camp" - does not seek to portray Russian people as victims of "the #Putin war" on a par with Ukrainians. 3/10
As the German edition of RT has been severely damaged by the latest round of the EU sanctions, it’s worth reviewing research our great colleagues did on that edition. 1/5