Heavy fighting continues in Vovchansk and Chasovy Yar. Meanwhile, Russia continues to suffer from a shortage of manpower, although the meat storm tactics continue. A Russian war correspondent has published a video in which he filmed Russian soldiers "in a basement."
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A "basement" in the occupied territories is a place of punishment. Before the full-scale invasion, Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilians were held there, tortured to extract false confessions, but now these basements are filled with Russian soldiers who refuse to go back
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to the front, before being sent to penal battalions. At least 16 such special places are known. The published video shows terrible unsanitary conditions. Almost all the soldiers have untreated wounds. Sending the wounded to meat storms has been known for a long time.
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The Russian army has a special regiment that they call "crippled." This is the 371st regiment of the Kantemirovskaya division. Most of those who were wounded or were deemed only partially fit are taken there. After 2-3 months in the regiment, they are sent to the assault
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squads. Those who refuse are sent "to the basement", after which they also end up in the assault squads. So, a man who had his fingers torn off was told to relearn how to shoot with the other hand and sent to the assault. In this regiment and "in the basement" medical care
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is minimal. People are kept for up to three months, they are documented as fit for service and several people are taken from the division per day to the assault brigades. So people with a shot knee, a shrapnel near the heart, a shot bladder and other serious wounds were
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sent to the assault. This material is not written to evoke sympathy for these people. These are occupation troops who came to Ukrainian land to kill innocent citizens of this country. This situation simply shows once again that Russia has a huge problem with personnel,
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and the data that Russia is recruiting 30,000 volunteers monthly is not correct and based on numbers from Russia. One-time payments for signing a contract are also growing. In some regions, authorities are already paying 1.3 million rubles. Since the beginning of the war,
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payments from regions for signing a contract with the Ministry of Defense have increased 80 times, and increases occur approximately every four days. There are fewer and fewer people willing to go to the front. Those mobilized by Putin's decree have not been rotated for
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2 years. The Russian side's data on volunteers to the front is not based on reality. The goal is to create the appearance of a huge number of willing people to recruit more new ones. There are also mercenaries from other countries. Often people are recruited through lies.
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The Russian economy is losing momentum. Sberbank chief German Gref warned that the country is entering a period of serious challenges. Speaking at the bank’s annual shareholders’ meeting, Gref pointed to military spending, inflation, and high interest rates as key factors
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that will continue to weigh on the economy through 2026. He noted that loan quality is declining, and more individuals and businesses are seeking to restructure their debts. Meanwhile, Bloomberg reports that senior bank executives see the risk of a banking crisis within
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the next 12 months. Unpaid loans are quietly piling up, though this has yet to show in official figures. The agency estimates that bad loans could hit 3.7 trillion rubles — about 20% of the banking sector’s capital. Much of this traces back to the war. Many soldiers received
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According to BILD, "Russia is expected to emerge stronger after the war in Ukraine, and the Kremlin is actively preparing for a potential invasion of NATO countries." While the Russian threat remains real, and it must not be dismissed — and we must indeed prepare for it — at
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this stage, nearly all statements about a potential Russian attack on NATO countries are nothing more than attempts to divert NATO’s attention and resources away from the war in Ukraine. Let’s look at the facts. The so-called “grand” summer offensive in the Sumy region
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stalled after just a month. Russia gathered 50,000 troops, but it has no more equipment. Its reserves are nearly depleted, while Ukraine’s arsenal is expanding — its range of weapons is growing, and its capabilities are increasing despite all the challenges with manpower.
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Ultimately, the main achievement of both Putin and Trump is that NATO has now committed to increasing annual defense spending to at least 5% of GDP by no later than 2035 — a level unseen since the Cold War. Previously, the target was just 2%. Some countries, like Estonia, 1/7
are already set to reach this threshold as early as next year. Spain opposed the move, but it is geographically the farthest from the main threat — Russia. At least, that’s how it seems to them. But one should not forget that Russia’s core strategy revolves around hybrid 2/7
threats, which have no borders. For major European countries — France, Germany, and others — the decisive factor was pressure from Trump. The war in Ukraine, ongoing since 2014, had not pushed Europe toward a more serious approach to security. While the Baltic states, Poland, 3/7
NATO suggests that Russia can sustain the war at its current pace until 2027. Of course, I may be accused of being sympathetic to Ukraine and having a biased opinion, but let’s look at the facts—what’s wrong with this statement? The Russian war machine currently relies on
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Soviet-era equipment reserves, a large number of soldiers, and the National Wealth Fund. Let’s start with the first point. Soviet equipment reserves are almost completely depleted. The offensive on Sumy is carried out mainly through infantry assaults, and the amount of
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destroyed Russian equipment in recent weeks is two to three times lower than during the same period in previous years. If Russia continues the war at the same pace, by 2027 almost all of its equipment will be gone—perhaps even the few donkeys they have. As for soldiers,
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The appointment of Robert Brovdi, known by his call sign "Madyar," as head of the Unmanned Systems Forces of Ukraine has already yielded noticeable results, according to Russian military bloggers. They report that Ukrainian drone strikes are now primarily aimed at eliminating
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Russian UAV operators. Madyar has openly declared his goal of building a "drone wall" along the entire front line and destroying up to 35,000 Russian soldiers per month—the estimated number that the Russian army can mobilize on a monthly basis. He advocates for establishing
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dedicated UAV units for each section of the front line, with operators who are intimately familiar with their own sector, rather than deploying UAV teams as a mobile reserve shuffled between hotspots. His concept is to create a continuous "kill zone" across the whole
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The war in Iran benefits Russia in the short term, but in the long run, the loss of Iran would be a major defeat for Moscow in the region, further weakening its already diminished position in the Middle East. The fall of Syria has significantly undermined Russia’s influence
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there, and Iran remains its last major ally in the region. Russia is trying to squeeze every possible advantage out of this unfavorable situation. The war in Iran distracts the West and its allies from the conflict in Ukraine, but the main gain for Russia is the rise in oil
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prices. Russia’s 2025 budget is under enormous strain because it was planned based on an oil price of $80 per barrel. However, since the summer of 2024, oil prices have been steadily falling, reaching around $50 per barrel for Urals crude in the spring of 2025. The war in
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