Thread by @GresselGustav

1/ So, as my quote in @newsweek is touring around, I may add a 🧶 on the context.
The topic of the whole debate centered around high 🇷🇺 losses of materiel, armoured vehicles in particular, and whether or not Moscow can replace it.
newsweek.com/satellite-data…

2/ The article in newsweek quotes this article in @SZ, which is behind paywall and in 🇩🇪. So I guess no one has read it.
Unfortunately the German title is "Putin is running out of tanks", which is not exactly what the article is abut. sueddeutsche.de/projekte/artik…

2/ "Panzer" in 🇩🇪 also can mean "armured vehicle", and that is what we talked about specifically: APCs, IFVs, SPGs and MBTs;
Süddeutsche did an interview with me and @HighMarsed, also included work from @Jonpy99 and @kalenskyj on depleting Russian vehicle stockpiles.

3/ Yes, tanks (particularly T80s) deplete as well, but armoured transport (MT-LB, BMP-1/2) are depleting the fastest. Self-propelled guns deplete, especially their barrels at an extraordinary rate.
I don't know why everyone debates MBT again, the support arms deplete faster.

4/ And for all the Putinversteher trolls, the depleting depots can be observed from space, and the accounts mentioned above have put out enough good threads on this. Won't repeat it.

5/ While we already see some shortages of armoured vehicles on the 🇷🇺 side, particularly on the #Kharkiv front, this may become more critical for Russia maybe already in 2025 but certainly in 2026.

6/ But what it means for the war, is a much less straigt forward issue. It depends on the operative tasks for the 🇷🇺 Army in 2024/25 and supplies from 🇨🇳🇰🇵.
Will they be tasked with another large offensive? That is what is driving up losses now.

7/ Or will Russia dial down ground offensives and see what it can gain politically from Trump et al?
Also will 🇷🇺 be able to source armoured vehicles from 🇰🇵 or 🇨🇳 at sufficient quantity? 🇨🇳 has larger stocks of surplused vehicles from troop reductions in the 2000s & 2010s.

8/ But given the threat of sanctions, Beijing does not provide whole systems (only subcomponents).
The credibility of the sanctions threat very much depends on the domestic unity on the matter in 🇺🇸&🇪🇺. So nothing carved in stone, unfortunately.

9/ But at least in D.C. 🇺🇸-🇨🇳 relations are the rare exception of bipartisan agreement. So I am not too pesimist either.
For 🇺🇦 increasing lethality and desrtoying as much 🇷🇺 equipment as possible is the no-brainer now.

10/ But will high casualties and material shortages alone force Putin into real negotiation? I don't think so.
He could dial down the offense, conduct a missile-war against 🇺🇦 to reode morale, combine this with Minsk type fake negotiations to keep the West busy.

11/ Without additional pressure, he will not cede his ambition. Pressure can be economic, military, etc.
The 2026 to 2027 timeline shuld give Western planners and defence industry a task: to exploit Russia's weakness then, 🇺🇦 needs to be stronger & better than 2023.

12/ Ukraine has been through two mass casualty events: one the counter-offensive of 2023, the second the artillery ammunition slump in 2024.
Recovering and re-constituting forces will take considerable time. This time 🇺🇦 will need to stay on the defensive, attritting 🇷🇺.

13/ 🇺🇦 also needs time to absorb tactical lessons of the then offensive, and drive technological innovation in force-integration and uncrewed systems in areas necessary to resume offensive action.
I tried to map this for @ecfr here: ecfr.eu/publication/be…

14/ Defence alone will not end the war. As I argued in my @EuroResilience #battlefieldbreakdown, we need to synchronise diplomatic & economic pressure with 🇺🇦 military support and preparation to achieve strategic results.

15/ We debate a lot of tactic these days. But after the 🇺🇸 presidential elections, we need to strategise.
For good or bad ...

Sorry for the typos, in a hurry