NEW: The interplay between ongoing Russian offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Avdiivka directions indicates that the Russian military command may intend to leverage the ongoing Toretsk push to create operational opportunities for advances in either the Chasiv Yar or Avdiivka areas. (1/3)
2/ Russian preparations that can support multiple future branch plans suggest a more developed level of operational planning and foresight than the Russian command has proven capable of executing thus far in the war since early 2022.
3/ The ability of this operational planning to come to fruition, however, will be bounded by the overall poor tactical-level capabilities of Russian forces currently fighting in these areas.
NEW: Putin explicitly rejected Russian participation in any meaningful negotiations on a ceasefire agreement, instead demanding Ukraine's "irreversible" "demilitarization" as a precondition for any ceasefire agreement. Putin is thus demanding that Ukraine effectively surrender in advance of any ceasefire.
Key Takeaways🧵 (1/6)
2/ Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers reportedly detained the commander of the Russian 83rd Guards Airborne Assault (VDV) Brigade, Colonel Artyom Gorodilov, on fraud charges on July 3 following reports of the brigade suffering heavy losses in the Kharkiv direction in June 2024.
3/ Russian President Vladimir Putin supported the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's (SCO) efforts to expand its presence in Central Asia and will likely use an increased SCO presence as one of its levers to expand Russian influence in the region.
Russian forces recently advanced within easternmost Chasiv Yar, in the Toretsk direction, and near Avdiivka, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced within Vovchansk, near Kreminna, and southeast of Chasiv Yar.
2/ Ukrainian forces recently made marginal gains within Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) amid continued fighting in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 3. Geolocated footage published on July 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along Soborna Street in central Vovchansk.
3/ Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Kreminna amid continued Russian ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on July 3. Geolocated footage published on July 2 shows that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced southeast of Novoyehorivka (northwest of Kreminna). Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced into Makiivka (northwest of Kreminna) and that Ukrainian forces conducted two unsuccessful counterattacks in the area. However, ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.
Russian command may have chosen to escalate offensive operations near Toretsk in mid-June exactly because this area offers Russian forces a flexible point of departure from which they can either attack north towards Chasiv Yar or west/southwest in the Avdiivka direction, depending on whatever route of attack the Russian command deems the most immediately promising. (1/4)
2/ The apparent decision to attack near Toretsk emphasizes that the Russian command may be planning operations with more foresight and understanding of the operational situation than previously, when the Russian command pushed for incoherent offensive operations on unrelated parts of the front.
3/ The ability of the Russian command to actually bring these operational plans to bear, however, is contingent on the tactical-level performance of the troops in the Toretsk area and their ability to exploit tactical successes into operationally-significant breakthroughs.
NEW: Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs Head Vladimir Kolokoltsev boasted that Russian authorities have increased detentions and prosecutions related to illegal migration into Russia while calling for intensified Russian government crackdowns against illegal migration. (1/5)
2/ Russia assumed its one-month-long rotating presidency of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on July 1 for the first time since April 2023 and will likely use this position as a power projection base within the international system as it historically has.
3/ South Korea's Ministry of Unification announced on July 1 that North Korean state TV channel Korean Central TV switched to transmitting broadcasts via Russian satellites instead of Chinese satellites, reportedly affecting South Korea's ability to monitor North Korean state TV.
A protracted war will likely incentivize Putin to explicitly set new territorial objectives as long as he assesses that Ukrainian forces can neither stop his advances nor conduct meaningful counteroffensives. 🧵(1/7)
2/ Putin has articulated a theory of victory that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces.
3/ The Russian military command is currently prioritizing consistent offensive operations that achieve gradual tactical gains over conducting a large-scale discrete offensive operation that aims to make operationally significant gains through rapid maneuver.
NEW: Two prominent Russian officials appear to be spearheading divergent paths for addressing religious extremism in Russia as ethnic and religious tension in Russia continues to rise.
More key takeaways ⬇️(1/5)
2/ Russian ultranationalists continue to express growing doubt in Russian authorities' ability to prevent another terrorist attack and to address ethnic and religious tensions within Russia following the June 23 terrorist attacks in the Republic of Dagestan.
3/ Ten Ukrainian civilians whom Russian and Belarusian authorities arrested and held in captivity or prison, including individuals detained before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, returned to Ukraine.