The publication recorded an interview with a Russian occupier who fled to the West. “We really are fucking orcs”: the story of a grenade launcher deserter from “Storm Z”, who is now seeking political asylum. He told them what is happening in these
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units. Even during training in the Kirov region, there were problems with equipment - “Everything is f*ked up there. They should have provided us with the basics. At least one set of clothes. By the time they registered us, by the time they took us to the clothing
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warehouse... And all the workers there were drunk as skunks. The officers were 50/50, but the senior staff was just a little short of Yeltsin’s level. All the clothes were from the 60s and did not fit. Extortion began immediately. 500 rubles here, 500 rubles there. We
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chipped in two or three thousand for spare parts for the equipment. They made up some stupid story, like because our reserve battalion is stationed in Kaliningrad, there are problems with delivering spare parts here, so we have to chip in for them ourselves. What kind of
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nonsense is this, guys? " Anton (name changed at the narrator's request) is indignant. Anton managed to get the things he was supposed to get. Among them were the "Kolpak-20" - a repurposed Soviet helmet from the 1960s, a uniform ten sizes too big for him, and combat boots
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four sizes too big. In the end, he bought the ammunition at his own expense. Resellers would come to the unit and sell him everything he needed. Of the six hundred people in his unit, forty remained alive after two months of assaults. "I spent two months in that s*ithole
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near Kupyansk. It was just some kind of extermination. Only five or six people from one squad return alive. They also fu*ked up all the equipment. By the end, they simply mixed us up with the prisoners and just drove, drove, drove. How I survived is a good question.
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I was just a grenade launcher, not an assault soldier, I didn’t go in. We worked from closed positions. Direct fire is not an option in these fields,” Anton recalls. According to him, in an ideal scenario, an assault occurs in several stages. First, the artillery processes
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the terrain, then the infantry storms the positions, followed by a fortification group, and then come the evacuation and supply groups, which must carry out the wounded and dead and deliver ammunition, water and food. But as a rule, they all get mixed up at the front lines,
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and the infantry often scatters on the approaches to enemy positions. “The composition of the assault squad varies. It depends on how many people are added to the prisoners. On average, from 90 to 120 people. Sometimes they drive equipment. We go to storm a forest belt.
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Somewhere there are dugouts and everything is prepared, somewhere everything is hastily. If you get into the "Storm" infantry, you are fu*ked. "In 9 cases out of 10, the infantry gets fu*ked up on the approach." "We heard our comrades talking, but we couldn't answer.
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There was a breakthrough in their area. It wasn't just the "Storm" there, but also the remnants of the border guards. In the meantime, it turned out that an entire platoon had been dismantled in the forest regiment. Four 200s. We were sent there for evacuation. Another
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wounded man later died in the hospital, I personally carried him out. About a week later, two 500s were brought in, they got away under the noise," Anton recalls. Later that day, they went to evacuate the wounded and dead from the battlefield. Anton had not been in the
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evacuation group before, but he replaced his dead comrade. The medics couldn't handle it. After the evacuation, the group abandoned their weapons and armor, which weighed up to 50 kg, on the battlefield and walked five kilometers back to school. There, a space had already
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been equipped for them in the basement, where there was a canteen. They slept off and went back to get weapons where the fighting had recently taken place. Anton marked the location of his grenade launcher on the map with an asterisk. “If you screw up the grenade launcher,
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you’ll be transferred to the infantry, and the infantry is certain death. There are machine guns and assault rifles like garbage, and it’s hard to give birth to something heavier. The commander once opened up and said: “I don’t give a s*it about you, pencils, they’ll
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send me as many of you as I need, and they’ll seriously fu*k me for the equipment I screwed up, a bunch of paperwork.” It’s generally visible. In “Storms,” losses reach 90%,” says Anton.
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So, this interview paints a picture of what’s happening in the Russian troops, supplementing the known facts.
Source:
18/18verstka.media/istoriya-grana…
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The discussed cancellation of tourist visas for Russians in the new package of European sanctions has caused a wave of outrage among the so-called Russian opposition. Yulia Navalnaya and her team submitted a petition to Brussels, calling to distinguish between “ordinary
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Russians” and the “regime.” The Russian opposition should have long ago stopped being taken seriously. They are not concerned with the fate of Ukraine and they have no sense of responsibility for what is happening in their own country. The only thing that worries them is
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the loss of the ability to live in Europe and enjoy the benefits of the civilized world. Alexei Navalny, it should be reminded, was not against the occupation of Crimea. In fact, the main regret of the Russian opposition is that it is not they who are in power. They are not
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The Russian army is facing a gasoline shortage in the occupied regions of Ukraine. About two weeks ago, a shortage of gasoline at gas stations began, and sales to private individuals were restricted. However, the Russian army in these areas often uses civilian gas stations,
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frequently even refueling at its own expense. The reason is constant Ukrainian strikes on logistics. When a fuel truck arrives at the rear, a rush and crowd form, which Ukrainian reconnaissance drones detect and coordinate strikes on. On top of this, there are frequent cases
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of fuel theft and resale on the black market. Resellers take advantage of the gasoline shortage and sell “under the table” for more than 200 rubles per liter, while the usual price at gas stations is 60–70 rubles per liter. The occupation authorities happily integrated into
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The economic crisis in Russia is worsening. The budget deficit already amounts to 5 trillion rubles for the first seven months of the year, or 3.4% of GDP. This figure is twice the planned value for the entire year, 1.7% of GDP. Today or tomorrow, data for August will be
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published, and the number will be even higher. The main reason is the decline in oil and gas revenues. For the second month in a row, revenues remain at a record minimum of about 500 billion rubles per month, while 1 trillion rubles are needed to cover planned expenditures.
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The Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit has shown that a power capable of posing an economic challenge to the US and the EU has taken shape in the world, and it is directed from Beijing. Putin arrived in China for a four-day visit. Such a long trip by the Russian
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dictator is called, on the one hand, a triumph after his return from Alaska, where US President Trump solemnly welcomed him on the red carpet and did not impose sanctions. On the other hand, relations between Beijing and Moscow are not equal: China benefits from preventing
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rapprochement between Putin and Trump, but Xi also does not want Russia to grow stronger. The SCO is seen as China’s attempt to contain the US in the Indo-Pacific region and as Russia’s response to NATO expansion. However, experts acknowledge that this is not an alliance or
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Europe once again demonstrates its toothlessness towards Russia. The incident with von der Leyen’s plane is a serious event, where the lives of everyone on board were put at risk. An excellent comment on this matter was written by Former Foreign Minister of Lithuania
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Gabrielius Landsbergis: "Deeply concerned to hear about the deeply concerning GPS interference that diverted @vonderleyen 's flight. Europe stands united in expression of deep concerns and must commit to the deployment of ever-deepening concerns moving forward." Expressing
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deep concern is the main tactic of the EU in times when decisive action is needed. I feel like a parrot repeating the same phrase – a tough response to Russia is needed. It understands only the language of force, and if this force is demonstrated, Russia will retreat. It is
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in June has triggered a new problem—a sharp increase in household debt. Russian consumers typically lack financial literacy, and in hard times they don’t cut back or save; instead, they live day to day, as if it’s their last, without thinking of the future. It’s the classic
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Russian “avos’” mentality. Once the key rate fell from 21% to 18%, people snapped up new loans without much concern about how they’d repay them later. Everyone irrationally hopes that it’s temporary and will somehow resolve itself. This is all before even accounting for the
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