The publication recorded an interview with a Russian occupier who fled to the West. “We really are fucking orcs”: the story of a grenade launcher deserter from “Storm Z”, who is now seeking political asylum. He told them what is happening in these
1/18 Verstka.ru
units. Even during training in the Kirov region, there were problems with equipment - “Everything is f*ked up there. They should have provided us with the basics. At least one set of clothes. By the time they registered us, by the time they took us to the clothing
2/18
warehouse... And all the workers there were drunk as skunks. The officers were 50/50, but the senior staff was just a little short of Yeltsin’s level. All the clothes were from the 60s and did not fit. Extortion began immediately. 500 rubles here, 500 rubles there. We
3/18
chipped in two or three thousand for spare parts for the equipment. They made up some stupid story, like because our reserve battalion is stationed in Kaliningrad, there are problems with delivering spare parts here, so we have to chip in for them ourselves. What kind of
4/18
nonsense is this, guys? " Anton (name changed at the narrator's request) is indignant. Anton managed to get the things he was supposed to get. Among them were the "Kolpak-20" - a repurposed Soviet helmet from the 1960s, a uniform ten sizes too big for him, and combat boots
5/18
four sizes too big. In the end, he bought the ammunition at his own expense. Resellers would come to the unit and sell him everything he needed. Of the six hundred people in his unit, forty remained alive after two months of assaults. "I spent two months in that s*ithole
6/18
near Kupyansk. It was just some kind of extermination. Only five or six people from one squad return alive. They also fu*ked up all the equipment. By the end, they simply mixed us up with the prisoners and just drove, drove, drove. How I survived is a good question.
7/18
I was just a grenade launcher, not an assault soldier, I didn’t go in. We worked from closed positions. Direct fire is not an option in these fields,” Anton recalls. According to him, in an ideal scenario, an assault occurs in several stages. First, the artillery processes
8/18
the terrain, then the infantry storms the positions, followed by a fortification group, and then come the evacuation and supply groups, which must carry out the wounded and dead and deliver ammunition, water and food. But as a rule, they all get mixed up at the front lines,
9/18
and the infantry often scatters on the approaches to enemy positions. “The composition of the assault squad varies. It depends on how many people are added to the prisoners. On average, from 90 to 120 people. Sometimes they drive equipment. We go to storm a forest belt.
10/18
Somewhere there are dugouts and everything is prepared, somewhere everything is hastily. If you get into the "Storm" infantry, you are fu*ked. "In 9 cases out of 10, the infantry gets fu*ked up on the approach." "We heard our comrades talking, but we couldn't answer.
11/18
There was a breakthrough in their area. It wasn't just the "Storm" there, but also the remnants of the border guards. In the meantime, it turned out that an entire platoon had been dismantled in the forest regiment. Four 200s. We were sent there for evacuation. Another
12/18
wounded man later died in the hospital, I personally carried him out. About a week later, two 500s were brought in, they got away under the noise," Anton recalls. Later that day, they went to evacuate the wounded and dead from the battlefield. Anton had not been in the
13/18
evacuation group before, but he replaced his dead comrade. The medics couldn't handle it. After the evacuation, the group abandoned their weapons and armor, which weighed up to 50 kg, on the battlefield and walked five kilometers back to school. There, a space had already
14/18
been equipped for them in the basement, where there was a canteen. They slept off and went back to get weapons where the fighting had recently taken place. Anton marked the location of his grenade launcher on the map with an asterisk. “If you screw up the grenade launcher,
15/18
you’ll be transferred to the infantry, and the infantry is certain death. There are machine guns and assault rifles like garbage, and it’s hard to give birth to something heavier. The commander once opened up and said: “I don’t give a s*it about you, pencils, they’ll
16/18
send me as many of you as I need, and they’ll seriously fu*k me for the equipment I screwed up, a bunch of paperwork.” It’s generally visible. In “Storms,” losses reach 90%,” says Anton.
17/18
So, this interview paints a picture of what’s happening in the Russian troops, supplementing the known facts.
Source:
18/18verstka.media/istoriya-grana…
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Investigative journalists, together with European security services, have established that Russian leader Vladimir Putin instructed a group of political technologists and Russia’s military intelligence to interfere in Hungary’s parliamentary elections in April in order to
🧵
secure the victory of incumbent Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Putin assigned responsibility for "handling" Hungary to Sergei Kiriyenko, the first deputy head of the presidential administration, who is considered the architect of Russia’s entire infrastructure of political
influence, both domestically and abroad. Kiriyenko was also behind the Russian interference campaign during Moldova’s 2024 presidential election. At that time, Russia used vote-buying networks, troll farms, and local activists to shape public opinion against the pro-Western
Another large anti-corruption operation is underway in Ukraine. Law enforcement officers exposed the Commander of Logistics of the Ukrainian Air Force, Andrii Ukrainets, and the head of the Security Service department in Zhytomyr region, Volodymyr Kompanichenko, over
🧵
corruption during the construction of aircraft shelters. This was announced by Ukraine’s Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko. "This was the largest special operation in recent years. Documentation of the criminal activity lasted about two months. The most difficult task was
ensuring full confidentiality of the process. One of the suspects - a high-ranking SBU official - had a deep understanding of the tactics and algorithms of investigative and covert investigative actions. Given this, it was necessary to act with maximum caution, using methods
In Russia, "import substitution," like many other things, has long turned not into technological development but into a convenient way to siphon off budget funds. The state allocates money for the creation of "domestic developments," after which companies take ready-made
🧵
Western solutions, slightly adapt them, and present them as their own innovations, keeping subsidies and reporting an alleged technological breakthrough. A telling example is the case of the company Newco. The Ministry of Industry and Trade attempted in court to recover
177.6 million rubles, arguing that hearing aids developed with state funding were in fact based on technology from the Danish company Oticon and did not constitute an independent development. However, the Moscow Arbitration Court sided with the business, ruling that
A wave of property confiscations that swept across the regions and affected officials, security officers, and judges has brought the state an amount comparable to the annual budget of a small region. In total, over the past 5-7 years, property worth 100 billion rubles has been
🧵
seized in corruption cases, Accounts Chamber auditor Andrei Baturkin reported in the State Duma. The confiscations have reached such a scale that, according to Baturkin, a “road map” is now required to coordinate the relevant agencies that will have to deal with seized companies,
houses, land plots, and collections of luxury cars and watches. It is necessary to “establish communication between the power bloc and Rosimushchestvo so that there is more feedback regarding what property is to be transferred into the ownership of the Russian Federation,”
Bloomberg reported, citing sources, that Greece and Malta have become the main obstacles to an EU proposal to replace the price cap on Russian oil with a ban on services necessary for transporting fuel. According to the agency’s interlocutors, the two southern European
🧵
countries raised concerns about this step at a meeting of EU ambassadors on Monday, where the latest sanctions package against Russia was presented. They warned that such a shift could affect Europe’s shipping industry and energy prices. Both countries also requested
clarifications regarding proposals to impose sanctions on foreign ports handling Russian oil and to strengthen oversight of ship sellers in order to reduce the number of vessels entering Moscow’s fleet. A representative of the Greek government declined to comment.
The most unpleasant forecasts regarding the Russian economy are beginning to materialize. What analysts cautiously spoke about a year ago is now being discussed openly even by the most pro-government Russian economists: the safety margin is rapidly shrinking. While Putin talks
🧵
about “stability” and “growth,” the reality looks far more prosaic: a country that unleashed a war of aggression against Ukraine is methodically burning through its own financial system. According to estimates by Germany’s BND intelligence service, Russia’s real military spending
reaches around 10% of GDP and nearly half of the federal budget. In fact, actual expenditures are 66% higher than officially declared, due to hidden budget lines, Defense Ministry construction projects, military IT infrastructure, and social payments to servicemen. In simple