The publication recorded an interview with a Russian occupier who fled to the West. “We really are fucking orcs”: the story of a grenade launcher deserter from “Storm Z”, who is now seeking political asylum. He told them what is happening in these
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units. Even during training in the Kirov region, there were problems with equipment - “Everything is f*ked up there. They should have provided us with the basics. At least one set of clothes. By the time they registered us, by the time they took us to the clothing
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warehouse... And all the workers there were drunk as skunks. The officers were 50/50, but the senior staff was just a little short of Yeltsin’s level. All the clothes were from the 60s and did not fit. Extortion began immediately. 500 rubles here, 500 rubles there. We
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chipped in two or three thousand for spare parts for the equipment. They made up some stupid story, like because our reserve battalion is stationed in Kaliningrad, there are problems with delivering spare parts here, so we have to chip in for them ourselves. What kind of
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nonsense is this, guys? " Anton (name changed at the narrator's request) is indignant. Anton managed to get the things he was supposed to get. Among them were the "Kolpak-20" - a repurposed Soviet helmet from the 1960s, a uniform ten sizes too big for him, and combat boots
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four sizes too big. In the end, he bought the ammunition at his own expense. Resellers would come to the unit and sell him everything he needed. Of the six hundred people in his unit, forty remained alive after two months of assaults. "I spent two months in that s*ithole
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near Kupyansk. It was just some kind of extermination. Only five or six people from one squad return alive. They also fu*ked up all the equipment. By the end, they simply mixed us up with the prisoners and just drove, drove, drove. How I survived is a good question.
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I was just a grenade launcher, not an assault soldier, I didn’t go in. We worked from closed positions. Direct fire is not an option in these fields,” Anton recalls. According to him, in an ideal scenario, an assault occurs in several stages. First, the artillery processes
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the terrain, then the infantry storms the positions, followed by a fortification group, and then come the evacuation and supply groups, which must carry out the wounded and dead and deliver ammunition, water and food. But as a rule, they all get mixed up at the front lines,
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and the infantry often scatters on the approaches to enemy positions. “The composition of the assault squad varies. It depends on how many people are added to the prisoners. On average, from 90 to 120 people. Sometimes they drive equipment. We go to storm a forest belt.
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Somewhere there are dugouts and everything is prepared, somewhere everything is hastily. If you get into the "Storm" infantry, you are fu*ked. "In 9 cases out of 10, the infantry gets fu*ked up on the approach." "We heard our comrades talking, but we couldn't answer.
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There was a breakthrough in their area. It wasn't just the "Storm" there, but also the remnants of the border guards. In the meantime, it turned out that an entire platoon had been dismantled in the forest regiment. Four 200s. We were sent there for evacuation. Another
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wounded man later died in the hospital, I personally carried him out. About a week later, two 500s were brought in, they got away under the noise," Anton recalls. Later that day, they went to evacuate the wounded and dead from the battlefield. Anton had not been in the
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evacuation group before, but he replaced his dead comrade. The medics couldn't handle it. After the evacuation, the group abandoned their weapons and armor, which weighed up to 50 kg, on the battlefield and walked five kilometers back to school. There, a space had already
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been equipped for them in the basement, where there was a canteen. They slept off and went back to get weapons where the fighting had recently taken place. Anton marked the location of his grenade launcher on the map with an asterisk. “If you screw up the grenade launcher,
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you’ll be transferred to the infantry, and the infantry is certain death. There are machine guns and assault rifles like garbage, and it’s hard to give birth to something heavier. The commander once opened up and said: “I don’t give a s*it about you, pencils, they’ll
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send me as many of you as I need, and they’ll seriously fu*k me for the equipment I screwed up, a bunch of paperwork.” It’s generally visible. In “Storms,” losses reach 90%,” says Anton.
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So, this interview paints a picture of what’s happening in the Russian troops, supplementing the known facts.
Source:
18/18verstka.media/istoriya-grana…
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The Russian economy is losing momentum. Sberbank chief German Gref warned that the country is entering a period of serious challenges. Speaking at the bank’s annual shareholders’ meeting, Gref pointed to military spending, inflation, and high interest rates as key factors
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that will continue to weigh on the economy through 2026. He noted that loan quality is declining, and more individuals and businesses are seeking to restructure their debts. Meanwhile, Bloomberg reports that senior bank executives see the risk of a banking crisis within
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the next 12 months. Unpaid loans are quietly piling up, though this has yet to show in official figures. The agency estimates that bad loans could hit 3.7 trillion rubles — about 20% of the banking sector’s capital. Much of this traces back to the war. Many soldiers received
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According to BILD, "Russia is expected to emerge stronger after the war in Ukraine, and the Kremlin is actively preparing for a potential invasion of NATO countries." While the Russian threat remains real, and it must not be dismissed — and we must indeed prepare for it — at
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this stage, nearly all statements about a potential Russian attack on NATO countries are nothing more than attempts to divert NATO’s attention and resources away from the war in Ukraine. Let’s look at the facts. The so-called “grand” summer offensive in the Sumy region
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stalled after just a month. Russia gathered 50,000 troops, but it has no more equipment. Its reserves are nearly depleted, while Ukraine’s arsenal is expanding — its range of weapons is growing, and its capabilities are increasing despite all the challenges with manpower.
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Ultimately, the main achievement of both Putin and Trump is that NATO has now committed to increasing annual defense spending to at least 5% of GDP by no later than 2035 — a level unseen since the Cold War. Previously, the target was just 2%. Some countries, like Estonia, 1/7
are already set to reach this threshold as early as next year. Spain opposed the move, but it is geographically the farthest from the main threat — Russia. At least, that’s how it seems to them. But one should not forget that Russia’s core strategy revolves around hybrid 2/7
threats, which have no borders. For major European countries — France, Germany, and others — the decisive factor was pressure from Trump. The war in Ukraine, ongoing since 2014, had not pushed Europe toward a more serious approach to security. While the Baltic states, Poland, 3/7
NATO suggests that Russia can sustain the war at its current pace until 2027. Of course, I may be accused of being sympathetic to Ukraine and having a biased opinion, but let’s look at the facts—what’s wrong with this statement? The Russian war machine currently relies on
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Soviet-era equipment reserves, a large number of soldiers, and the National Wealth Fund. Let’s start with the first point. Soviet equipment reserves are almost completely depleted. The offensive on Sumy is carried out mainly through infantry assaults, and the amount of
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destroyed Russian equipment in recent weeks is two to three times lower than during the same period in previous years. If Russia continues the war at the same pace, by 2027 almost all of its equipment will be gone—perhaps even the few donkeys they have. As for soldiers,
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The appointment of Robert Brovdi, known by his call sign "Madyar," as head of the Unmanned Systems Forces of Ukraine has already yielded noticeable results, according to Russian military bloggers. They report that Ukrainian drone strikes are now primarily aimed at eliminating
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Russian UAV operators. Madyar has openly declared his goal of building a "drone wall" along the entire front line and destroying up to 35,000 Russian soldiers per month—the estimated number that the Russian army can mobilize on a monthly basis. He advocates for establishing
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dedicated UAV units for each section of the front line, with operators who are intimately familiar with their own sector, rather than deploying UAV teams as a mobile reserve shuffled between hotspots. His concept is to create a continuous "kill zone" across the whole
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The war in Iran benefits Russia in the short term, but in the long run, the loss of Iran would be a major defeat for Moscow in the region, further weakening its already diminished position in the Middle East. The fall of Syria has significantly undermined Russia’s influence
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there, and Iran remains its last major ally in the region. Russia is trying to squeeze every possible advantage out of this unfavorable situation. The war in Iran distracts the West and its allies from the conflict in Ukraine, but the main gain for Russia is the rise in oil
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prices. Russia’s 2025 budget is under enormous strain because it was planned based on an oil price of $80 per barrel. However, since the summer of 2024, oil prices have been steadily falling, reaching around $50 per barrel for Urals crude in the spring of 2025. The war in
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