European NATO countries’ security isn’t separate from that of Ukraine.
The better the war goes for Russia, the more capacity it has free to stir up incidents in other countries - likely below the threshold of armed conflict but it’s a quite direct threat nevertheless.
Example from Finland: we had a peaceful year after submitting the NATO application as Russia was bogged down in Ukraine. Since fall 2023, after the failed Ukrainian counteroffensive, we’ve seen:
- instrumentalized migration
- several attempts at sabotage at water supply
- attempted break-ins (at least one successful) at other critical infrastructure, such as electricity supply.
These are almost daily in the news at the moment.
In Sweden and Norway attempts at photographing security sites and critical infrastructure (often with drones) have been recorded. GPS basically doesn’t work in our region.
So yep there’s a correlation between how the war is going for Russia and the frequency and magnitude
These incidents aren’t even only happening in Russia’s direct vicinity but also in France and Germany - in case I need to list countries that count.
Russian aggressive interference against France’s interests was the reason why Macron did such a volte face in his policy.
Here’s a recent report from our Nordic-Baltic region, in case @hanskundnani is interested in what kind of an actor Russia actually is, instead of making this about some foreign policy analysts’ prestige.
@hanskundnani …and here’s the report. We’re already observing a massive ramping up of all these activities and our report is nowhere near exhaustive.
@hanskundnani And, please note, all of this is happening while the U.S. is still committed to NATO. So this isn’t as simple as “US commitment vs. Ukraine”.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Call me a hopeless idealist but I’d like to think that 80 years of western European integration and 30 years of integration with what was separated by the iron curtain means something.
It’ll be hard to re-learn how to be serious about defence again but unity might prevail
European integration was facilitated by the American security guarantees but it’s nevertheless a unique political process in the world. We Europeans managed to do this one thing right after having messed up pretty much everything imaginable, on a global scale, in the past.
Europeans got very comfortable under the US security blanket and it’ll be brutal to get out into the real world. But I’m not sure that we’re completely doomed.
Just look at defence cooperation in many parts of Europe: the Dutch have integrated their land force with Germany
Suomessa on täysi konsensus siitä, että itäraja pitää turvata kaikkia mahdollisia hyökkäyksiä vastaan.
Edellinen keskusta-vasemmistohallitus aloitti aidan rakentamisen, sääti lain rajan väliaikaisesta sulkemisesta ja aloitti rajamenettelyn valmistelun.
Mikä nyt harmittaa monia tämän hallituksen käännytyslaissa on sen huono valmistelu. Huutia on tullut jo heti alkuvaiheessa ja on alusta asti ollut selvää, että tämä laki on ristiriidassa Suomen muun oikeuskäytännön kanssa. Lopulta se ei ehkä edes mene läpi juuri siitä syystä.
Moni olisi toivonut, että hallitus olisi osannut etsiä keinoja vastata rajan haasteisiin tavalla, joka ei vesitä sääntöperäisen järjestyksen periaatteita - jonka ylläpitäminen on siis Suomen kaltaiselle pienelle valtiolle ehdoton turvallisuusintressi.
Yes, the chancellery seems to be very consistent in its risk assessment that supporting Ukraine remains the riskier option, as it might bring us closer to the nuclear threshold if Ukraine can eliminate Russian ability to attack too effectively.
Conversely, it suggests that if Ukraine were to lose this war, it would be deeply regrettable, but at least a nuclear war would be averted.
Why this logic is flawed is fairly obvious: giving in to nuclear blackmail isn’t going to help non-proliferation efforts
As @drfranksauer & I argued in a response to @tobiaspfella, a risk assessment must consider also the risks of failing to support Ukraine. Apart from Berlin, this concern prevails in most European capitals. At least anywhere close to the Russian border. ipg-journal.de/rubriken/ausse…
Europe has recently woken up to the threat posed by Russian hybrid warfare aiming to weaken the West by different means below the threshold of armed conflict, such as sabotage and GPS jamming.
Russia has been cultivating its hybrid toolbox over the past decade(s) with almost no consequences, as European countries have been reluctant to attribute even blatant cases for the sake of “good relations” until Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine 2022.
The Nordic-Baltic region, due to geographical proximity, has been subjected to Russian interference to a particularly high degree - even to the point where GPS jamming and air space violations have become everyday occurrences and tolerated as such.
It’s possible to understand France even without understanding French (although we should ofc all strive to learn the magnificent language 😉).
Most things about French strategic thinking and nuclear doctrine are pretty straightforward. 🧵
However, the obvious flaw in the system is the same principle that is also its strength: the strong centralisation of decision-making power in the presidency.
Despite all the solid policy work in the ministries, the president can unilaterally undermine France’s credibility.
If the president gets a great idea at 2am and decides to go on national morning radio with it, the people in the administration hear about it on the radio like every other citizen.
Mr. Macron has a lot of ideas that may make sense to him but that appear self-contradictory.
Q about other Nordic CHODs’ warnings about timelines for a Russian attack on NATO & why he isn’t issuing similar warnings: “they say it’s a possibility. Of course it’s always a possibility, but the question is its probability”
Jaakkola continues that he doesn’t think a Russian attack on NATO is *probable* in the near future. He doesn’t consider a similar wake-up call necessary in Finland as Finnish defence thinking has always included the *possibility* of a Russian attack and 🇫🇮 is therefore prepared
On Ukraine, Jaakkola says that the general speculation is a new large summer offensive by Russia to reach an as good as possible military situation to then start pushing for political talks about Ukraine’s and the West’s concessions.