Russian 🇷🇺 invasion map 10 march 22, when they controlled the biggest proportion of Ukraine 🇺🇦 (23%)
Unlike some say, their main axis was Kyiv and if they stepped back, it's because they lost at Irpin, Tchernihiv, Nova Busan and Sumy. There was no "diversion".
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When they attacked on february 24th 2022, unlike their "diversion" propaganda, their main force was positionned north of the country.
5th, 35th, 36th, 41st, 6th and 2nd CAA aimed at Kiev + 29th CAA to divert Ukrainian forces near Rivne-Lutsk.
1st GTA army is aimed at Kiev and Poltava but can't take Sumy and Okhtyrka.
6th CAA (other part) is attacking Kharkiv while 20th CAA targets northern Donbass.
Apart from 8th CAA aimed at Marioupol, there are no new Russian units in Donbass.
LPR and DPR army corps won't attack until 150th Motor Rifle Division from 8th CAA break through Popasna in middle april.
Southern Ukraine is attacked mainly with 58th CAA and elements of 49th CAA. Some units of 49th CAA and 22nd AC waited to be landed near Odessa.
This was probaby the plan :
5th, 35th = take Kiev (west + south)
36th, 41st take Tchernihiv + Kiev (east)
2nd = take Sumy -> Kiev
1st = take Poltava -> Dnipro
6th = take Kharkiv -> Dnipro
20th/8th = encircle Donbass
58th = take Marioupol, Zaporijia + Odessa
On the Ukrainian side, the majority of units are in the Donbass on rotation. Some are in Kiev, 1 st TB is encircled between Nizhyn and Tchernihiv.
58th, 93rd and 92nd defend Kharkiv-Sumy axis.
Many units in Odessa/Mukolaiv.
Why did they lost in Kyiv ?
They broke through ukrainian line between Pryluky and Nizhyn. However, they failed to controll both big and small urban areas like Sumy, Konotop, Mena...
They were always attacked on the supply roads (400km).
When they failed to enter Kyiv in Brovary, they tried many times in the countryside. However, at the end of march, 72nd mecanized brigade counterattacked and regained positions including Nova Busan, pushing back Russian army far from Kyiv.
It was the same on the other side of Kyiv, Ukrainian counterattacked near Makariv and Borodianka, pushed back the Russian from Irpine. It was unecessary to continue fighting there.
And finally, 93rd mecanized brigade lifted the siege of Sumy by taking back Trostianets. It was a clear Russian defeat and their supply lines north of Sumy were endengered.
So there were no goodwill gesture or Istanbul aggreement. Then they took Sievierodonetsk and Marioupol, they sustained a blow at Kharkiv and Kherson and began a new Donbass campain, Bakhmout, Avdiivka and now Toretsk and Tchasiv Yar.
« It is normal that russian 🇷🇺 forces are not making big progress, they focus on destroying the Ukrainian 🇺🇦 army »
I disagree with this narrative. The Russian strategy is neither attrition nor an attempt at a breakthrough; it is a mixture of both.
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When failing to explain why an army isn't advancing, we try to look away, talking about a battle of attrition where the objective would be to destroy the opponent.
However, since 3 years, Russia has failed to destroy the ukrainian army.
To explain the failure of the Ukrainian counter-offensive in 2023, many have argued that the goal would be to undermine the Russian army by destroying its assets before attempting a breakthrough.
Of course it was false, the offensive just failed with russian army doing attrition
Vers un accord de paix entre la RDC 🇨🇩 et le Rwanda 🇷🇼 sous l'égide des Etats-Unis 🇺🇸?
Alors que le conflit meurtrier entre le M23 soutenu par le Rwanda et la RDC se poursuit dans l'est du Congo, les Etats-Unis font une entrée en scène inattendue.
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Le ministre des affaires étrangères rwandais a dévoilé le 6 mai un calendrier pour le processus de paix avec la République démocratique du Congo (RDC), ajoutant que l’accord final devrait être signé à la mi-juin à Washington.
Pour autant, difficile d'évaluer l'impact sur le M23
Un accord sur les minerais devrait être signé entre les Etats-Unis et les deux belligérants, prévoyant des facilités d'investissement d'entreprises américaines dans les mines congolaises et des projets d’infrastructure pour soutenir l’exploitation minière dans les deux pays, y compris la transformation des minerais au Rwanda.
I already visited this particular region, which is home to Ruthenes, Ukrainians, Romanians, Poles and Hungarians. It is very diverse and isolated from the main part of Ukraine.
However, i could still see numerous ukrainian flags.
La visite du président syrien Ahmed Al Charaa est instrumentalisée. L'on y dénonce, à des fins politiques, l'accueil d'un ancien djihadiste à l'Elysée.
Mais du point de vue diplomatique, qu'est-ce qui justifie cet accueil ?
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C'est une constance, la France a rejeté depuis 2011, le régime sanguinaire de Bachar Al Assad, soutenant une société civile et une opposition en exil et refusant la compromission avec Al Assad.
Pour beaucoup, Assad fut le protecteur des minorités, ce qui en réalité est faux.
Des personnalités politiques françaises, qui n'ont pas sourcillées pendant les 14 ans d'envoi des jeunes alaouites, chrétiens, druzes et autres au front pour massacrer des sunnites (rebelles ou djihadistes) dans la guerre civile se réveillent finalement quand le régime tombe.
Russian 🇷🇺 forces managed to breakthrough the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka line and start fightings inside the trenches of the line.
For the first time, russian forces can hope reaching Kostiantynivka from the south after pushing back ukrainians 🇺🇦 from Toretsk.
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On this long video, a ukrainian VAB 🇫🇷🇺🇦 is targeted at the entrance of a large trench network with few dugouts.
Ukrainian soldiers jump in and start fighting against russian soldiers who took control of the fortified position, they also face constant drone attacks.
As I already said many times, those kinds of positions are not suitable for defense, in the open with not enough dugout positions, despite stong fondations (woods).
Russian observation drones can see everything and FPV drones can strike soldiers in the open.
Dans l'est de l'Ukraine 🇺🇦, après 2 ans et demi de présence ukrainienne à l'est de l'Oskil, l'armée russe tente d'isoler le dispositif ukrainien.
Analyse d'un objectif stratégique pour Moscou.
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Sur le front de Dvorichna, l'armée russe est parvenue à traverser l'Oskil en plusieurs points et tente d'agrandir la tête de pont (infanterie uniquement) vers l'ouest et le nord, pour la connecter à la frontière russe.
Une zone qui présente un danger de plus en plus important.
Au sud, la capture de Dvorichna permettra un point de franchissement sur l'Oskil.
De manière générale, l'armée russe pousse vers le sud est, avec comme objectif final l'encerclement de Koupiansk, point clé de la région libéré en septembre 2022.