Institute for the Study of War Profile picture
Jul 5 2 tweets 1 min read Read on X
Putin has now labeled all Ukrainian governing institutions illegitimate or unsuitable for negotiations and has dismissed the idea of third parties participating in negotiations — de facto rejecting any realistic process for meaningfully negotiating a ceasefire agreement. (1/2)
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2/ Putin's rejection of any ceasefire agreement short of Ukrainian capitulation further illustrates that he is confident in his assessment that Russia can pursue victory by continuing creeping advances in Ukraine, outlasting Western support for Ukraine, and winning a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces.Image

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More from @TheStudyofWar

Jul 6
Ukrainian counteroffensive operations that liberate operationally significant territory remain the soundest course of action for degrading Putin's confidence in and commitment to his desired end state for his war of aggression against Ukraine. (🧵1/5)

2/ Putin's rejection of any ceasefire indicates that he is increasingly confident in his assessment that Russia can pursue victory by continuing creeping advances in Ukraine, outlasting Western support for Ukraine, and winning a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces.
3/ Putin's demands, achieved through either Ukraine's capitulation or the protracted war he assesses Russian forces can successfully wage, are not consistent with the survival of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people, nor are they compatible with NATO's vital security interests.
Read 5 tweets
Jul 6
Putin is demanding both the surrender of a significant portion of Ukraine's territory and people to Russian occupation and Ukrainian military capitulation in advance of any negotiations on an end-state to the war. (🧵1/7)

2/ Putin called for the complete Ukrainian withdrawal from "Donbas and Novorossiya" as a prerequisite for ending the war during his press conference with Orban.
3/ This is a reference to Putin's June 14 demand for Ukraine to recognize the Russian occupation of occupied Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts and for Ukraine to surrender all territory that Russia does not currently hold in the four oblasts.
Read 7 tweets
Jul 6
NEW: Putin used a meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban on July 5 to oppose a negotiated ceasefire altogether and expressed his commitment to pursuing a "final" end to the war that would achieve his goal of destroying Ukrainian statehood. (🧵1/4)Image
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2/ Putin explicitly rejected Russian participation in any meaningful negotiations on a ceasefire agreement on July 4 in a departure from his usual feigned interest in negotiations, and Putin notably outright rejected any negotiated ceasefire in a July 5 press conference w/Orban.
3/ Putin stated that an agreement between Russia and Ukraine should not result in a temporary ceasefire since this would allow Ukraine to regroup and rearm and that Russia instead favors a "complete" and "final" end to the conflict.
Read 4 tweets
Jul 5
NEW: Putin explicitly rejected Russian participation in any meaningful negotiations on a ceasefire agreement, instead demanding Ukraine's "irreversible" "demilitarization" as a precondition for any ceasefire agreement. Putin is thus demanding that Ukraine effectively surrender in advance of any ceasefire.

Key Takeaways🧵 (1/6)Image
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2/ Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers reportedly detained the commander of the Russian 83rd Guards Airborne Assault (VDV) Brigade, Colonel Artyom Gorodilov, on fraud charges on July 3 following reports of the brigade suffering heavy losses in the Kharkiv direction in June 2024.
3/ Russian President Vladimir Putin supported the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's (SCO) efforts to expand its presence in Central Asia and will likely use an increased SCO presence as one of its levers to expand Russian influence in the region.
Read 6 tweets
Jul 4
Map Updates🧵(1/6)

Russian forces recently advanced within easternmost Chasiv Yar, in the Toretsk direction, and near Avdiivka, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced within Vovchansk, near Kreminna, and southeast of Chasiv Yar.



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2/ Ukrainian forces recently made marginal gains within Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) amid continued fighting in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 3. Geolocated footage published on July 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along Soborna Street in central Vovchansk.Image
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3/ Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Kreminna amid continued Russian ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on July 3. Geolocated footage published on July 2 shows that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced southeast of Novoyehorivka (northwest of Kreminna). Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced into Makiivka (northwest of Kreminna) and that Ukrainian forces conducted two unsuccessful counterattacks in the area. However, ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.Image
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Read 6 tweets
Jul 3
Russian command may have chosen to escalate offensive operations near Toretsk in mid-June exactly because this area offers Russian forces a flexible point of departure from which they can either attack north towards Chasiv Yar or west/southwest in the Avdiivka direction, depending on whatever route of attack the Russian command deems the most immediately promising. (1/4)
2/ The apparent decision to attack near Toretsk emphasizes that the Russian command may be planning operations with more foresight and understanding of the operational situation than previously, when the Russian command pushed for incoherent offensive operations on unrelated parts of the front.
3/ The ability of the Russian command to actually bring these operational plans to bear, however, is contingent on the tactical-level performance of the troops in the Toretsk area and their ability to exploit tactical successes into operationally-significant breakthroughs.
Read 4 tweets

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