1/8 One more miserable failure: the window of opportunity for russia to achieve anything on the front in 2024 is steadily narrowing. Analysis by @joni_askola
2/8 russia had its prime opportunity in a long time, from October 2023 to the autumn of 2024, to make gains on the front, as Ukraine faced shortages in manpower, shells, and fortifications.
3/8 Despite its best efforts, russia miserably failed to achieve anything significant while Ukraine was at its weakest. Its only accomplishment was the capture of Avdiivka, at the expense of tens of thousands of casualties.
4/8 russia's diversionary offensive north of Kharkiv did not achieve its objectives, but it compelled Ukraine's allies to permit Ukraine to launch strikes into russian territory.
5/8 As russia squandered its opportunity, Ukraine has been mobilizing, fortifying, boosting production, targeting russian energy infrastructure, and ultimately receiving shells and equipment from its allies.
6/8 russia has yet to capture the small but important town of Chasiv Yar, and its time for launching a decisive offensive is running out. By the year's end, Ukraine will have become too formidable for russia to achieve significant successes on the front.
7/8 For Ukraine to maintain its advantage in this war, the best approach is to refrain from large-scale offensives and concentrate primarily on defense. Ukraine's success will not come from reclaiming territory, but from conveying to the russians that the war is unwinnable.
8/8 It may take years for the average russian to recognize in their imperialistic, revanchist, and materialistic mindset that the war is unwinnable and futile, but that realization will eventually occur. For that day to arrive sooner, Ukraine needs to defend itself.
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The discussed cancellation of tourist visas for Russians in the new package of European sanctions has caused a wave of outrage among the so-called Russian opposition. Yulia Navalnaya and her team submitted a petition to Brussels, calling to distinguish between “ordinary
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Russians” and the “regime.” The Russian opposition should have long ago stopped being taken seriously. They are not concerned with the fate of Ukraine and they have no sense of responsibility for what is happening in their own country. The only thing that worries them is
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the loss of the ability to live in Europe and enjoy the benefits of the civilized world. Alexei Navalny, it should be reminded, was not against the occupation of Crimea. In fact, the main regret of the Russian opposition is that it is not they who are in power. They are not
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frequently even refueling at its own expense. The reason is constant Ukrainian strikes on logistics. When a fuel truck arrives at the rear, a rush and crowd form, which Ukrainian reconnaissance drones detect and coordinate strikes on. On top of this, there are frequent cases
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of fuel theft and resale on the black market. Resellers take advantage of the gasoline shortage and sell “under the table” for more than 200 rubles per liter, while the usual price at gas stations is 60–70 rubles per liter. The occupation authorities happily integrated into
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published, and the number will be even higher. The main reason is the decline in oil and gas revenues. For the second month in a row, revenues remain at a record minimum of about 500 billion rubles per month, while 1 trillion rubles are needed to cover planned expenditures.
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