Thread by @Inkvisiit

05JUL24. Nearly two months have passed since Russia began its Kharkiv offensive. In terms of captured land, Russian gains have been limited and bought with very high cost. During the past month or so, most of the heaviest fighting has been in Vovchansk. 1/

In Vochansks a costly urban battle has taken place with both sides actively seeking to control this natural tactical and operational bottleneck. The now completely ruined town has become crowded with both sides committing considerable number of units into the battle. 2/

In my 16MAY24 thread estimated that the Russian operational goals were threefold: create a buffer zone, place Kharkiv under artillery fire and fix Ukrainian reserves before the onset of the Russian summer campaign. 3/

https://x.com/Inkvisiit/status/1791206900198957166I

Of these three goals the first two have failed with Russian forces being unable to advance past their initial gains. However, the third goal of fixing Ukrainian forces seems increasingly more successful. 4/

The Kharkiv offensive was badly coordinated and ill-timed in relation to other Russian operations, with no clearly definable concentrated offensive efforts following it during June. But just as Russians failed to synchronize their actions, 5/

the Ukrainians in turn overcommitted heavily to the battles of northern Kharkiv oblast. Ukraine has sent (either elements or whole units) somewhere upwards to 14 brigades to first stabilize the situation and then push the Russians back to the border. 6/

The costly and difficult battle of Vochansk in particular has drawn in outsized number of Ukrainian units with elements from up to 8 different brigades taking part in it. I fail to see how attempting to push the Russians back from Vovchansk could be a rational course of action 7/

in this highly critical period where Ukraine should instead carefully husband and preserve its reserves. Vochansk is as much a difficult bottleneck for the counterattacking Ukrainians as it is for the Russians. 8/

Meanwhile Ukrainian reserves are running critically low. The 150-154 series brigades established last autumn are some of the last remaining strategic reserves Ukraine has, but their readiness and overall capability is likely to be questionable at best. 9/

Green and untested Ukrainian brigades tend to have terrible track record with their baptism by fire. One of the new Ukrainian brigades (153rd) seems to have been at least partially committed to Kharkiv front, all though it could be just their drone unit at this point. 10/

While the overall Russian progress this summer has so far been abysmally slow and costly, the Ukrainian commanders are constantly being forced to juggle their depleted and tired formations from one crisis sector to the other. 11/

Unit rotations remain the Achilles heel of Ukrainian defence due to miscommunications, bad planning and the general lack of proper reserves. The latest such mishap fell on the 41st Mech Bde being rotated straight from the meatgrinder of Chasiv Yar to Toretsk sector. 12/

So far, such crises have come in one at a time, with Ukraine being able to contain and stabilize the situations with great cost and difficulty. But what happens when these crises eventually start to happen in multiple locations at the same time? 13/13