During the Cold War there was a lot of thought given in government to working out how to ensure that if attacked, the UK could strike back.
This led to much soul searching on scenarios, circumstances and likely outcomes by the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Norman Brook. /2
It was clear that the PM and the President needed to speak to each other about nuclear retaliation, but doing so would be challenging - the sheer complexity of 1960s comms arrangements made it very complex to do properly. This map shows the Trans-Atlantic links. /3
This paper shows the conversations that would occur between the PM and President as part of the decision by both of them to authorise nuclear retaliation in the event of war. This assumed there was time to do it and the comms would work as planned... /4
The UK settled on ensuring that during the 1960s it would try to use the PM in London, then Deputies and finally CINC Bomber Command to authorise retaliation if required. This led to a formal 'last resort' order allowing the CINC to authorise a nuclear attack. /5
There were concerns that letting Bomber Command do this could lead to serious consequences - one entirely serious concern seemed to mirror the plot of 'On The Beach' in seeing the RAF start WW3 by accident... /6
To ensure a message got through, alternatives were considered - including the 'Nuclear Deputies' who would take on the role of nuclear release if authorised. This is where misleading suggestions about the PM's car and AA phones comes from. /7
The introduction of the SSBN force changed all this and meant new 'last resort' procedures were required. To start with the continuity of government plans called for the so-called PYTHON / PEBBLE groups to be able to have C2 facilities to exercise control over Polaris/ /8
But it wasn't certain they would survive, so the UK introduced 'letters of last resort' to be held on SSBN's to pass on wishes in the event of a complete 'bolt from the blue' scenario. That said, this was seen as the least likely scenario of all for a variety of reasons.
Ultimately Letters of Last Resort are about ensuring that deterrence works - there is always a plan in place to cope with any scenario, no matter how outlandish it may seem to be. That meant that the UK put in place arrangements, which continue to this day. /10
Deterrence is about ensuring that an aggressor knows the UK will be able to respond regardless of the size of the surprise attack. That is why it is so important that these letters remain in place and valid. It must ensure that 'the Bomber will always get through'. /11
Thread may be of interest to @aaronbateman22 @coldwaruk @JulieAMcDowall @UKDefJournal @NavyLookout @adastral_trader @RoryCormac @CovertShores @IBallantyn among others!
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Blogging is something I enjoy, but have found it increasingly hard to stay on top of as the real world carries on. Additionally as my own understanding of issues diminishes the longer I am away from them, the harder is it to credibly comment on some matters. /2
Social media remains deeply toxic and I retain a love/hate relationship with this site and some of its contributors. I am concerned at the way that a blog done for 'fun' gets serious - e.g. reportedly briefly being subject of a CI investigation over 'security concerns'. /3
HMS CHALLENGER - A long thread and longest ever PSL blog!
Publicly designed for 'research' the CHALLENGER was intended for a variety of highly secret Cold War roles and missions from protecting SSBNs, to supporting SOSUS to recovering nuclear weapons from the seabed.
/1
Designed from a 1975 requirement, the MOD vision for CHALLENGER evolved into a deeply capable seabed operations vessel that could carry out a very diverse range of missions. These are listed below. /2
CHALLENGER would have worked in support of the SSBN force, carrying out surveys of the Clyde 'exit routes' to spot Soviet intelligence devices and weapons, and had the divers and ROVs onboard to handle them all appropriately during peace and transition to war. /3
Between 1980 and 1994 the Royal Navy submarine service conducted over 130 highly classified missions to gather intelligence or covert operations. Even though the files are closed, it is still possible to draw some significant conclusions from the archives. /1
The missions involved both conventional and nuclear submarines operating mostly in the Arctic, North Atlantic, Med and off coast of Argentina. They usually involved intelligence gathering or operating in places they should not have been. /2
The pay off was huge - significant intelligence was generated to support wider operations, protect the nuclear deterrent and gather information to ensure our understanding of the threats could be properly analysed and assessed. This was crucial to winning the Cold War. /3
In July 1984 the Royal Navy, RFA and RAF Nimrods conducted a TOP SECRET UK/US intelligence gathering mission in the Barents Sea. Its goal - to acquire intelligence on Soviet Navy operations, and obtain military hardware where possible. /1
(Blog at ) tinyurl.com/ycyp4na
The month long mission required Ministerial approval, and nearly clashed with a visit to Moscow by the Foreign Sec. Nerves were high as Nimrods practised covert insertion up to within 30 miles of Russian coastline, and the RN hoovered up as much intelligence as possible.
In early August the RN ships 'acquired' Soviet acoustic intelligence buoys in international waters. They 'liberated' two, and sunk others with gunfire, while the Soviet Navy tried, unsuccessfully, to stop them. A formal diplomatic protest was raised. /3
Today, I posted a blog talking about Admiral Nelson and asking whether the RN needed to re-evaluate its attitude to him - bit.ly/3nC4bSF
The response on social media has been, to put it mildly, depressing.
Many people clearly did not read the blog, or its views /1
There have been accusations of 'wokeness' and suggestions that it is silly to question his legacy.
I beg to differ - Nelson was a great naval officer, and it is right that his legacy is remembered. But he was complex, and held views on slavery that today we find challenging. /2
I think it is right to ask if in 21st Century Britain, having a man who opposed efforts to emancipate slaves as the central figure of, at times, near hero worship, is appropriate for the Royal Navy.
Does it send the right message, and how does it help promote diversity? /3