Perhaps the most important poll you've never heard of came out today: the Pew NPORS study, a large mail survey with financial incentives and a 30% response rate. It's important enough that I had to open it when the email arrived. pewresearch.org/methods/fact-s…
The survey is important because it's used as a 'benchmark' -- its results are used as targets for weighting by other polls. Pew uses it to weight their usual surveys, and other polls (like CNN/SSRS, KFF, Ipsos) do too.
(We don't use it, but I do compare it to NYT/Siena data)
The headline: NPORS found leaned party identification at R+1. That's the first time NPORS gives the GOP a party ID edge. Last year, it was D+2.
That's significant in its own right, given the quality of the survey. But it will effect other polls -- like that Ipsos poll that recently showed Trump/Biden tied.
By subgroup, the headline is age: NPORS found the GOP ahead on leaned party ID among 18 to 29 year olds, even though the sample was Biden+20 on 2020 recall vote. The sample size is fairly large (n=496) and it hasn't shown anything like this in previous cycles
There were fewer shifts by race, though the Dem share of major party leaning nonwhite voters kept edging downward, from 68 to 65%. They did show a GOP edge among registered nonvoters
The results overall and by subgroups RVs come very close to a compilation of the last five NYT/Siena polls, which add up to a similar n=5000 sample size.
And no, they don't ask Biden v. Trump. It's sad for me, too
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Donald Trump leads Joe Biden by 6 points among likely voters nationwide in a New York Times/Siena College poll taken after the debate. He leads by 9 points among registered voters. nytimes.com/2024/07/03/ups…
This is a 3 point shift from the Times/Siena poll taken pre-debate -- that's almost exactly the average shift toward the winner of a presidential debate over the last few decades.
The bigger shift in the polling is the one that's been unfolding slowly for four years
Of note given history of debate bounces and our last poll: Democrats and Republicans were essentially identically likely to respond to the survey, controlling for race. It's right in line with our average response rates by party x race for the year.
Previous respondents to recent NYT/Siena surveys shift 2 points toward Biden in post-verdict re-interviews nytimes.com/2024/06/05/ups…
A recontacting study involves a trade off: it's less representative, but it confirms shifts at the individual-level.
The folks we recontacted were relatively engaged, educated, whiter, and older than the electorate as a whole -- which may underestimate the swing to Biden
If you model those we couldn't recontact based on those we did, we'd estimate a 2.6 point shift -- a bit more than the 2.1 we observed. Whether that's true IRL depends on whether those we couldn't reach shifted like those who did, controlling for demographics etc.
I won't be able to go to @AAPOR (a polling conference) this year, so I want to mention here what I would have liked to have discussed had if I attended:
Vote history.
Pollsters have long known that vote history is a strong predictor of propensity to respond to surveys. What's new (at least in Times/Siena data this year) is that it's now an extremely powerful predictor of vote choice, controlling for other variables used in weighting
At least in our data, Biden excels among primary voters and still wins the midterm electorate, but gets pummeled among the most irregular voters who are typically underrepresented in political surveys.
One thing I've been experimenting with since our GOP oversample this summer: weighting our polls by each partisanship subgroup, which has the consequence of ensuring that each subgroup used in weighting has the right number of Dems and Republicans
The main downside is that our estimates for self-reported education by voter file party are modeled, and that's something I've had pause about. I'm gradually getting more comfortable with it, as the party x edu tallies for the typically weighted sample seem consistent with subgroup
Perhaps surprisingly, there's essentially no difference in our topline results between polls weighted by party and those weighted across the full population. The differences by subgroup are surprisingly minor, as well
I happened to be looking a lot at Pew data last few weeks, even before this most recent partisanship study, so I wanted to share a few interesting observations about trends I noticed in their data pewresearch.org/politics/2024/…
One thing I noticed: subtle but persistent, multi-year differences between the partisan splits by demographic on the Pew ATP -- the mostly mail-to-web panel they use for this study -- and the Pew NPORS study (the one-off high-incentie mail survey they use for weighting the ATP
The most striking thing, IMO, is that the Pew ATP consistently has more age and racial polarization than the NPORS
A few outtakes:
-- By our (rough and preliminary) estimates, this looks to be yet another zero-persuasion (off Biden '20) special. We'll have to see final vote history, but at least in Nassau it looks just as we'd expect given the party reg turnout
-- We'll see how the dust settles, but I do think it could be significant if the result is interpreted as showing Dem strength on the border messaging. If that narrative takes hold + Dems are emboldened to follow on, that's quite helpful on their worst issue