1/ ArbitrumDAO governance has reached a critical juncture with three new proposals that could significantly shape the DAO's future:
- ARB staking
- New transaction ordering policy
- Increasing the base gas fee
What is Blockworks' research perspective on these proposals? A 🧵
2/ It's important to understand the gravity of these proposals. Staking would allocate 50% of surplus sequencer fees to ARB stakers. In the post, it is assumed that with 12,000 ETH accrued annually, and ARB at $1, the reward rate for staking would be around 7%.
3/ The point of the staking proposal is to align incentives and increase voter participation, which has been declining.
4/ While this proposal is novel, and could provide some alignment to stakeholders, it fails to take into account that the Dencun upgrade from earlier this year decreased the surplus fees to 8,000 ETH per year, and this estimate is liberal.
5/ The second proposal refers to Timeboost, Arbitrum's new transaction ordering policy. This policy would capture fees from MEV searcher auctions racing for transaction inclusion. The primary contention is whether Arbitrum DAO should collect ETH or burn ARB.
6/ In our view, if the DAO is to pursue an ARB burn in tandem with staking, there could be some benefit; however, the DAO treasury is lacking diversity and recently used half of its ETH to bootstrap fraudproof security. Collecting ETH and its potential yield is crucial.
7/ Finally, the last proposal seeks to increase sequencer revenue by raising the gas fee on the network. The proposal claims that the base fee can change within a threshold that ranges between .01 gwei and .1 gwei.
8/ Our view: Arbitrum is competitive with other L2s by the fact that it is a very cheap network for users. It is unknown how much activity would migrate per a gas increase, and this should be subject to a study on the elasticity of certain actors and parties within the network.
9/9 If you want to read more about the proposals, or our full view, check out @0xMims' Flashnote on Arbitrum!
1/ In just 3 months, USDe has skyrocketed to a $3.5B TVL, making it the fourth largest "stablecoin", trailing only USDT, USDC, and DAI.
Coined "The Internet Bond", @ethena_labs aims to create a synthetic dollar with yield derived solely from crypto-native sources.
2/ Stablecoins have long proven their product-market fit by effectively enabling DeFi as a financial system. However, 90% of the stablecoin supply is dependent on traditional banking.
Ethena is highly relevant today as it strives to create a crypto-native store of value.
3/ USDe maintains its peg through a delta-hedging mechanism using Ethereum and Bitcoin as collateral. Users can stake USDe to capture yield derived from funding payments on perpetual futures exchanges as well as staked Ethereum consensus and execution rewards.
Crypto gaming projects and funds raised nearly $1 billion in November 2021
Yet 30 months later we have only a handful of games that have attracted real users apart from mercenary capital and sustained activity for longer than just a few months.
2/
Most of the games that have "launched" over the past two years can be categorized into three segments:
- Games that never launch
- Games that launch and never have success
- Games that launch, have early success but fail later due to a change in market dynamics
3/
Despite the challenges, several games have managed to stand out and attract attention.
DePIN is ripe to disrupt a range of traditional infrastructure networks.
Let's unpack how investors can best gain long-term exposure to the sector and where the opportunity lies in our latest report, free to read thanks to @POKTnetwork and @AIOZNetwork.
Have you ever wondered how workflows for processing transactions differ across L1 nodes and a shared decentralized sequencer?
@0x___Brick gives an overview of @EspressoSys' answer to the question👇🏼
1/ L1 Nodes
A set of L1 nodes has to agree on a sequence of transactions, subsequently executing the sequence.
This system has to function even if a subset of the L1 nodes are Byzantine faulty.
2/
In general, these nodes have to fulfill three distinct requirements:
・Consensus – guaranteeing an agreement of transaction ordering among all non-faulty nodes.
・Data broadcast – ensuring that the transaction data is broadcasted to every non-faulty node.