2/ Russian forces recently crossed the Vovcha River into central Vovchansk amid continued fighting north and NE of Kharkiv City. Geolocated footage published on July 7 shows that Russian forces crossed the Vovcha River and hold positions on Kharkiv Street in central Vovchansk.
3/ Russian forces recently marginally advanced NW of Kreminna amid continued Russian ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on July 10. Geolocated footage published on July 10 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced south of Novovodyane.
4/ Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction. Geolocated footage published on July 10 shows that Russian forces advanced southwards towards the northern outskirts of Pivdenne (southeast of Toretsk).
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Ukrainian forces recently advanced during tactical counterattacks north of Kharkiv City amid continued fighting north and northeast of Kharkiv City on July 7.
2/ Geolocated footage published on July 6 shows that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest of Hlyboke while counterattacking in the area, and available satellite imagery suggests that Ukrainian forces conducted a counterattack in the area between July 3 and 6.
3/ The current status of Hlyboke is unclear, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are regularly counterattacking near Hlyboke and that Ukrainian forces advanced near Hlyboke from the southwest.
NEW: Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian ammunition depot in Sergeevka, Voronezh Oblast on the night of July 6 to 7.
Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City.
2/ Satellite imagery confirms that the Ukrainian Air Force conducted a successful strike against a reported Russian regimental command post in Belgorod Oblast in late June 2024, likely with Western-provided weapons – further demonstrating how Ukraine could disrupt Russian offensive operations should the West continue to lift restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia.
3/ Ukrainian drone operators appear to be improving their capabilities to interdict longer-range Russian drones in mid-air, and these technological innovations may allow Ukrainian forces to ease pressures on short-range and medium-range air defense assets if successfully fielded at scale.
Ukrainian counteroffensive operations that liberate operationally significant territory remain the soundest course of action for degrading Putin's confidence in and commitment to his desired end state for his war of aggression against Ukraine. (🧵1/5)
2/ Putin's rejection of any ceasefire indicates that he is increasingly confident in his assessment that Russia can pursue victory by continuing creeping advances in Ukraine, outlasting Western support for Ukraine, and winning a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces.
3/ Putin's demands, achieved through either Ukraine's capitulation or the protracted war he assesses Russian forces can successfully wage, are not consistent with the survival of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people, nor are they compatible with NATO's vital security interests.
Putin is demanding both the surrender of a significant portion of Ukraine's territory and people to Russian occupation and Ukrainian military capitulation in advance of any negotiations on an end-state to the war. (🧵1/7)
2/ Putin called for the complete Ukrainian withdrawal from "Donbas and Novorossiya" as a prerequisite for ending the war during his press conference with Orban.
3/ This is a reference to Putin's June 14 demand for Ukraine to recognize the Russian occupation of occupied Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts and for Ukraine to surrender all territory that Russia does not currently hold in the four oblasts.
NEW: Putin used a meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban on July 5 to oppose a negotiated ceasefire altogether and expressed his commitment to pursuing a "final" end to the war that would achieve his goal of destroying Ukrainian statehood. (🧵1/4)
2/ Putin explicitly rejected Russian participation in any meaningful negotiations on a ceasefire agreement on July 4 in a departure from his usual feigned interest in negotiations, and Putin notably outright rejected any negotiated ceasefire in a July 5 press conference w/Orban.
3/ Putin stated that an agreement between Russia and Ukraine should not result in a temporary ceasefire since this would allow Ukraine to regroup and rearm and that Russia instead favors a "complete" and "final" end to the conflict.
NEW: Putin explicitly rejected Russian participation in any meaningful negotiations on a ceasefire agreement, instead demanding Ukraine's "irreversible" "demilitarization" as a precondition for any ceasefire agreement. Putin is thus demanding that Ukraine effectively surrender in advance of any ceasefire.
Key Takeaways🧵 (1/6)
2/ Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers reportedly detained the commander of the Russian 83rd Guards Airborne Assault (VDV) Brigade, Colonel Artyom Gorodilov, on fraud charges on July 3 following reports of the brigade suffering heavy losses in the Kharkiv direction in June 2024.
3/ Russian President Vladimir Putin supported the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's (SCO) efforts to expand its presence in Central Asia and will likely use an increased SCO presence as one of its levers to expand Russian influence in the region.