Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev reaffirmed that Russia would not accept or uphold any negotiated peace settlements with Kyiv short of Ukrainian capitulation, the destruction of the entire Ukrainian state, and the full occupation of Ukraine.
Russian forces will eventually make operationally significant gains if Ukrainian forces do not stop ongoing Russian offensive operations, but the Russian military cannot sustain such loss rates indefinitely, especially not for such limited gains. 🧵(1/7)
2/ ISW previously observed data indicating that Russian forces have lost at least five divisions' worth of armored vehicles and tanks in Pokrovsk Raion alone since October 2023.
3/ Russian forces have likely accumulated a large amount of equipment in priority frontline areas, but dwindling Soviet-era tank and armored vehicle stockpiles and current armored vehicle production rates will likely make such losses prohibitive over the longer term.
NEW: Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be assuming that US President-elect Donald Trump will defer to the Kremlin's interests and preferences without the Kremlin offering any concessions or benefits in return. 🧵(1/5)
2/ Putin stated during his November 7 Valdai Club address that he is open to discussions meant to "restore" US-Russia relations but that the United States must initiate these negotiations...
3/ ...and implied that Russia will only consider a reset in US-Russia relations if the United States drops sanctions against Russia and ceases supporting Ukraine – terms that exclusively benefit Russia and offer no benefit to the United States.
NEW: Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to shape US President-elect Donald Trump's foreign policy and achieve another Russia–US reset on Russia's terms. 🧵(1/6)
2/ Putin addressed the 21st annual meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club on November 7 and advocated for a reset of US–Russia relations. Putin implied that Trump’s presidential campaign expressed a "desire to restore relations with Russia, to help end the Ukrainian crisis" and later noted that Russia is open to the "possibility of restoring relations with the United States."
3/ Putin attempted to blame the United States for undermining US–Russia relations, noting that the United States imposed sanctions and restrictions on Russia, and chose to support Kyiv - without mentioning that these measures were in response to Russia’s illegal and unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Iranian Retaliation Against Israel: Recent statements by senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders suggest that the IRGC may conduct a direct attack on Israel from Iranian territory in response to the October 25 Israeli strike targeting Iran. Iran may conduct a smaller-scale direct attack on Israel than it did in April and October 2024 to preserve its diminishing long-range missile stockpile.
2/ Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei described the features a future supreme leader should embody during his first public meeting with the Assembly of Experts on November 7.
3/ Houthi Response to US Election: Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi stated on November 7 that the reelection of former US President Donald Trump does not impact the Houthis’ campaign against shipping or Israel. Abdulmalik said that Houthi fighters will continue to attack merchant vessels, US and Royal (UK) Navy vessels transiting through the Red Sea, and Israel itself.
NEW: The PLA maintained a high number of incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone in October, consistent with the new normal it established since ROC President Lai Ching-te’s inauguration. (🧵1/4)
2/ Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported that PLA aircraft entered Taiwan’s ADIZ 370 times in October. The PRC increased ADIZ incursions significantly after Lai’s inauguration in May, with over 300 incursions every month since.
3/ A large portion of the total in October came from the 111 incursions on October 14 as part of the PRC’s Joint Sword 2024B exercise around Taiwan.
The high frequency of ADIZ incursions drains Taiwan’s resources, exhausts military personnel, and degrades Taiwan’s threat awareness. Taiwan does not scramble aircraft in response to all PRC ADIZ incursions, but it does put military personnel on standby to respond quickly if needed
Key takeaways from the latest Iran Update w/ @criticalthreats:
Post-War Control in the Gaza Strip: Fatah is attempting to extend its control over the Gaza Strip after the October 7 War, but Fatah’s lack of pro-Fatah Palestinian Authority (PA)-affiliated military forces in the Gaza Strip will make this extremely difficult. Fatah likely views the death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and Hamas’ weakened military position as an opportunity to confront Hamas over Hamas efforts to maintain control in the Gaza Strip.
2/ Israeli Military Operations in the Gaza Strip: Israeli forces are conducting a major clearing operation across the northern Gaza Strip to disrupt militia reconstitution efforts. Palestinian militia elements could continue attacks in Jabalia after the IDF withdrew there in May 2024, though it was unclear how effective the Hamas military organization in Jabalia would continue to function. Hamas’ military wing has probably attempted to rebuild itself where possible in Jabalia since May 2024. It is unclear how successful these efforts would have been, however, given Hamas’ inability to resupply its fighters and attrition during Israeli operations in May.
3/ Iraqi Militias and Ballistic Missiles: The commander of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada boasted about Iranian-backed Iraqi militia ballistic missile capabilities on November 5, likely to deter potential Israeli strikes in Iraq. The Iranian-backed Iraqi groups probably also seek to message their strength to gain more influence within the Axis of Resistance amid the severe weakening of the Axis’ previous crown jewel, Hezbollah. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have deepened collaboration with the Houthis since October 7, 2023, which could give Iraqi militias access to the knowledge necessary to do rudimentary ballistic missile production.