2/ Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov used a phone call with US SecDef Austin to reiterate standard Russian threats intended to coerce the US out of supporting Ukraine as part of an ongoing reflexive control campaign targeting Western decision-makers.
3/ The UK government has reportedly not permitted Ukraine to use UK-supplied Storm Shadow missiles to strike military targets within Russia, despite previous Western reporting and UK official statements to the contrary.
4/ Indian state-run oil refineries are reportedly negotiating an oil import deal with Russia, likely as a result of the recent meetings between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin and improving Russo-Indian energy relations in recent months.
5/ The Kremlin continues to intensify efforts to encourage self-censorship among information space voices and consolidate physical control over internet infrastructure.
6/ Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration head Yevgeny Balitsky on July 12 and discussed social and infrastructure projects in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.
7/7 Russian infantry units are reportedly assaulting Ukrainian trench positions in single-file columns due to pervasive Ukrainian minefields and poor assault training.
Read more in the July 12, 2024 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment: isw.pub/UkrWar071224
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
NEW: Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reportedly conducted successful drone strikes against an oil depot near Tsimlyansk, Rostov Oblast on the morning of July 13. 🧵(1/6)
2/ Russia and Iran continue to signal their commitment to deepening bilateral relations and multilateral cooperation.
3/ A detained Russian businessman and a Russian military official who were reportedly connected to detained former Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov recently died on the same day.
NEW: Western and US officials reportedly assess that Ukrainian forces will continue to be on the defensive for the next six months and will not be able to conduct a large-scale counteroffensive operation until 2025. (🧵1/6)
2/ UKR forces are already attempting to contest the tactical initiative in limited counterattacks in select sectors of the front, however, and UKR forces may be able to conduct limited counteroffensive operations even while largely on the defensive depending on the arrival of Western aid.
3/ The NYT reported that a senior NATO official stated that Ukraine would have to wait for more Western security assistance and deploy more of its forces to the frontline before conducting counteroffensive operations and that Ukraine would likely not be able to conduct these operations until 2025.
2/ Russian forces recently crossed the Vovcha River into central Vovchansk amid continued fighting north and NE of Kharkiv City. Geolocated footage published on July 7 shows that Russian forces crossed the Vovcha River and hold positions on Kharkiv Street in central Vovchansk.
3/ Russian forces recently marginally advanced NW of Kreminna amid continued Russian ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on July 10. Geolocated footage published on July 10 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced south of Novovodyane.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced during tactical counterattacks north of Kharkiv City amid continued fighting north and northeast of Kharkiv City on July 7.
2/ Geolocated footage published on July 6 shows that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest of Hlyboke while counterattacking in the area, and available satellite imagery suggests that Ukrainian forces conducted a counterattack in the area between July 3 and 6.
3/ The current status of Hlyboke is unclear, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are regularly counterattacking near Hlyboke and that Ukrainian forces advanced near Hlyboke from the southwest.
NEW: Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian ammunition depot in Sergeevka, Voronezh Oblast on the night of July 6 to 7.
Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City.
2/ Satellite imagery confirms that the Ukrainian Air Force conducted a successful strike against a reported Russian regimental command post in Belgorod Oblast in late June 2024, likely with Western-provided weapons – further demonstrating how Ukraine could disrupt Russian offensive operations should the West continue to lift restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia.
3/ Ukrainian drone operators appear to be improving their capabilities to interdict longer-range Russian drones in mid-air, and these technological innovations may allow Ukrainian forces to ease pressures on short-range and medium-range air defense assets if successfully fielded at scale.
Ukrainian counteroffensive operations that liberate operationally significant territory remain the soundest course of action for degrading Putin's confidence in and commitment to his desired end state for his war of aggression against Ukraine. (🧵1/5)
2/ Putin's rejection of any ceasefire indicates that he is increasingly confident in his assessment that Russia can pursue victory by continuing creeping advances in Ukraine, outlasting Western support for Ukraine, and winning a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces.
3/ Putin's demands, achieved through either Ukraine's capitulation or the protracted war he assesses Russian forces can successfully wage, are not consistent with the survival of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people, nor are they compatible with NATO's vital security interests.