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Jul 16 88 tweets 14 min read Read on X
The Russian publication Chest' imeyu ("I have the honour") has published an interesting commentary on "Tactics of infantry attacks in the Ukrainian war based on the experience of 2022-2023". It discusses the challenges of trench warfare in Ukraine. ⬇️
1/
The article, written by Andrey Markin and published in the January 2024 edition of Chest' imeyu, highlights the practical difficulties for both sides of assaulting positions located in narrow belts of trees along the sides of Ukraine's wide fields.
2/
Markin writes:

"Materials on the tactics of attacks used, which have become publicly available, demonstrate at least three "oddities" of infantry attacks in the current war aimed at capturing enemy positions in the trenches: 3/
1) in the immediate vicinity of the attacked trenches, soldiers of the attacking side move almost at full height at a slow (!) pace, often freezing (!) in place to fire 3-7 meters from the enemy trench. 4/
When stopping their movement, they do not always move to the "lying down" position in the immediate vicinity of the enemy trenches, often taking the "kneeling" or "kneeling" position or remaining in the "standing" position, barely ducking down; 5/
2) the assault almost always proceeds along the trench, and not frontally; 6/
3) the approach to the attacked trench is carried out "in single file", that is, practically in a column, one at a time, without deploying in a chain (wedge), and often such a "column" in front of the enemy trench gathers into a small crowd, … 7/
…when the leading soldiers of the column stop, and those walking behind continue to move forward until they catch up with the soldiers who stopped in front. 8/
If disembarking is carried out from an APC/BMP then it is carried out 10-20 meters from the enemy trench (when disembarking from the stern of an BMP, the side of the vehicle is often positioned approximately parallel to the trench line, i.e. the infantry behind the stern… 9/
…does not take cover at the moment of dismounting; not to mention the fact that soldiers often sit on top of the armoured vehicle during the approach), and the dismounted soldiers then approach the attacked trench in a "crowd", without moving to the lower level. 10/
All this indicates that the density and effectiveness of the defenders' fire in front of the forward edge of the defence is extremely low, otherwise the above actions would be simply impossible. 11/
For the purposes of further discussion, this method of completing an attack will be called a "single column attack", although the conventionality of this term is clear. 12/
To appreciate the non-standard nature of what is happening, it must be understood that none of the tactical schools existing in the world provided for the possibility of completing an attack in this way. 13/
In essence, all "regulation" methods of completing an attack can be classified into three groups: 14/
a) a running throw in a chain, often after a volley of grenades, accompanied by automatic fire from the hip (conventionally the "Soviet method", the British had a generally similar method); 15/
b) a quick step in a chain with shooting off the cuff from short stops for aiming (conventionally "pre-Vietnam American", the Bundeswehr had a generally similar method); 16/
c) crawling along a corridor that is not under fire, i.e. crawling into a trench after placing (not throwing) a grenade into it, while suppressive fire is conducted to the right and left of the entry point, and subsequently mopping up the trench from the inside with… 17/
…reinforcements passing through the same corridor that is not under fire (the so-called "Canadian" method, a generally similar method is now used by the Americans, only not one, but two soldiers roll into the trench at the same time). 18/
Leaving aside the question of the conditions for the applicability of one or another method, let us note that none of them provides for a long walk at full height ("sticking") in front of an enemy trench, and even going in a crowd. 19/
This is quite understandable - according to classical views on tactics, the zone in the immediate vicinity of the enemy trench is the most dangerous due to the possibility of the defence to conduct oblique (flank) fire, especially if this fire is 'dagger' fire, … 20/
…and at the moment of the greatest vulnerability of the attackers (in English-speaking sources such fire approximately parallel to the line of trenches in their immediate vicinity is called fire along the "final protective line"). 21/
The ability of the defence to throw grenades in volleys and the fact that the attackers are close to the defender's trenches also plays a role, making them relatively easy targets to hit. 22/
It should also be noted that being in a column during a battle is considered unacceptable, since in this case the unit is at risk of coming under longitudinal (enfilade) fire from machine guns along the column, the increased effectiveness of which is known. 23/
The author of these lines explained walking “in single file” as follows: if you walk in a chain, then a burst from a machine gun will knock out the entire chain, and if you go “in single file,” … 24/
…then only the first few soldiers in the column will be hit, and the rest will be able to lie down. 25/
The contradiction of this explanation with the entire world military experience accumulated before the Special Military Operation only shows that the factor of fire from small arms in current conditions is of little significance when choosing the formation of attackers. 26/
Here we should also note that materials appearing in the public domain demonstrate an almost complete disregard for the “regulation” methods of attack, on both sides. 27/
This applies to both Russian (modified Soviet) methods and the notorious NATO standards (platoon hasty attack battle drill and its equivalents) in the Ukrainian version.

The question of why this happens is beyond the scope of this article. 28/
This can be explained by the low level of training of military personnel, by the inconsistency of the conditions for applying the regulation methods to the current situation, and by the low realism/incomprehensibility of the training process, when after the classes,… 29/
…overloaded with regulation methods, the trainee understands only that it is impossible to act in the way he is taught.

From the practical point of view of the regulations it can be said that there are none. 30/
This issue deserves separate consideration and, to repeat, is beyond the scope of this article, especially since it has the potential to undermine the entire training system based on the authority of the combat manuals. 31/
Given the conspicuous disconnect between combat practice and the normative requirements of governing documents, it seems practically important to focus on two facets of the problem: 32/
1) the causes of the spread of "attacks in a column one at a time";
2) changes in tactics and training associated with the spread of "one-by-one attacks in a column." 33/
Of course, the easiest thing to do would be to dismiss the emerging combat practice and attribute the emergence of "attacks in a column one at a time" to the combination of untrained troops and ordinary stupidity. However, this does not seem quite correct. 34/
There are some objective factors. Let us consider them. 35/
1) The fact that most positions are located in wooded areas with large fields between them (1-1.5 km between plantations) or in forests results in the fact that to establish an effective oblique (flank) fire system requires so much work is needed to clear sectors of fire… 36/
…that it is simply impossible to do so given the available forces and time. The field in front of the plantation is well covered, but the enemy who enters the forest plantation disappears from sight of the flanking defensive firepower. 37/
In order to allow such firepower to penetrate the area in front of the clearing, it must be moved outside the clearing and made easily detectable and, consequently, destroyed. 38/
In certain cases, clearing sectors for oblique fire is actually undesirable, as the camouflage properties of forest plantations will be lost. 39/
On the other hand, for attackers there is almost always a convenient hidden approach to the flank of the defended position either along a perpendicular forest plantation,… 40/
…or from the opposite side of such a perpendicular forest plantation farthest from the forest plantation where the defender is located. 41/
Forest plantations greatly complicate the fire means of supporting the defenders from the rear, since the attackers are poorly visible from the tactical depth - the same forest plantation in which the defenders’ trenches are located is in the way. 42/
Taking the trenches out of the forest plantation and placing them in an open field is hampered by the increased ability to observe and adjust artillery fire using UAVs and, to some extent, the use of ammunition drop systems from UAVs. 43/
If trenches are not almost completely covered from above (and there are simply not enough materials, as well as time and effort resources to do so), those in such a trench will be knocked out rather quickly. 44/
It is quite problematic to return to the practice of canopies over trenches, which was practised in the First World War, precisely because of the lack of resources in the broad sense of the word for their construction. 45/
In addition, it was noted as early as the early 20th century that canopies interfered with the use of trenches as a starting point for attacks, limiting their usefulness. Canopies were subsequently abandoned. 46/
Defence in a forest plantation can be compared with defence at the edge of a forest, but the problem is that positions are not usually recommended on the edge of the forest, but rather in the depths of the forest. 47/
However, in the case of forest plantations, these recommendations do not apply. There is simply no depth.

It seems that the current war has once again created a situation that some rules, which were considered universal, turned out to be inapplicable in a particular case. 48/
2) The second factor is the insufficient attention paid by the guiding documents to the preparation of a defensive position for close defensive combat at ultra-short ranges. 49/
Traditionally, defensive positions are prepared based on the need to stop enemy attacks at relatively distant ranges. Doctrinally, there are two approaches to the remoteness of such lines. 50/
The domestic tradition is based on opening fire on the attacking enemy as he approaches the range of actual fire from the defenders’ weapons, i.e. practically at the maximum range for the given conditions. 51/
Tactical views in a number of foreign countries (for example, the German tactical school) prescribe opening fire when the attackers enter the zone of maximum effectiveness of the defender's fire, i.e. practically from 100-150 metres. 52/
This range of opening fire, in addition to using the effect of a sudden close fire attack, significantly limits the support of attackers with heavy weapons fire due to the proximity of friendly soldiers to the positions of the defending enemy. 53/
But in both approaches, the defensive positions are designed to stop the attack primarily at a distance. The expectation is that the attackers will usually refuse to continue the attack if they suffer significant losses during the advance phase. 54/
Little attention is paid to defensive combat at distances of 3-7 metres, when the attacking enemy has managed to get to an ultra-short distance.

The defensive position is often simply inconvenient for conducting defensive combat at such ultra-short distances. 55/
A major problem is created by large and high parapets, often dug out by heavy equipment, which simply technically cannot make parapets of the required size. 56/
This creates many dead zones where the attacker can move relatively freely, while the defender is constrained by the trench line. Means for conducting oblique (dagger) fire are rarely allocated. 57/
Minimising closures that are convenient for attackers near defensive positions is done to a limited extent or not at all. 58/
As a result, unless the attacking enemy is not forced to abandon the attack with fire at a distance, then it is extremely difficult to repel the attack at ultra-short combat distances,… 59/
…and the attackers can afford to move slowly at full height right in front of the defending enemy’s trench. 60/
3) The next important factor is the effectiveness of preparatory artillery fire through fire correction by UAVs, the ability for real-time correction of small arms, grenade launchers and small-calibre mortars at individual defensive positions (firing cells/embrasures) using… 61/
…UAVs, which multiplies the probability of knocking out the most significant firepower of the defenders, as well as the use of UAV ammunition drop systems in preparation for and support of an attack. 62/
A widespread practice is the aerial movement of UAVs in front of a trench-clearing team, the operator of which transmits detailed information about the location of the defending soldiers and their firepower directly to the forward two or three trench-clearing teams, … 63/
…and, if available, the UAVs drop incapacitating munitions. 64/
As a result of the impact of these factors, the defenders, who are initially few in number due to the thinness of the formations inherent in the current conflict, are knocked out a significant number of soldiers and firepower for a given defensive position. 65/
It turns out that the defence of a platoon's position has to be conducted by three or four soldiers.

Of course, we are not talking about any kind of fire system, including oblique (dagger) fire or salvo throwing of grenades. 66/
Defensive combat comes down to self-defence of those few fighters who remained combat-ready in the trench. This factor also reduces the risk of attackers standing at full height in close proximity to the defenders’ trench. 67/
To summarise, it should be noted that a zone 3-7 metres from the trenches of the defenders when standing in it at almost full height and moving in column one at a time, due to the terrain and low density of the defenders in the current war conditions, is not as dangerous as… 68/
…the authors of the guiding documents around the world foresaw, which makes "attacks one at a time in a column" possible. We emphasise that this conclusion does not suggest that such attacks are preferable to regulation attacks. 69/
Here it is only stated that they are possible, which is what we see in practice.

So, based on the fact that "attacks in a column one at a time" are actually used, it is necessary to outline how this circumstance should be taken into account in tactical training: 70/
1) it is necessary to train personnel to conduct defensive combat in conditions of very thin combat formations. The task of defending and fighting three or four in a trench for a squad or even a platoon should be practiced as standard. 71/
This includes the topics of opening corners, movement in a trench with changing guides, group throwing of grenades, entering and exiting a trench through parapets and loopholes, retreating and advancing by rolling over a trench, etc.; 72/
2) the engineering preparation of defensive positions must take into account both the need to fire at a distance and to conduct fire combat in the strip immediately adjacent to the trench itself (0-20 metres from the trench parapet), … 73/
…including positions for conducting oblique (dagger) fire; 74/
3) when engineering a trench, special attention must be paid to possible counteraction to the longitudinal clearing of the trench, namely in the broken line of trenches to make loopholes designed for shooting along the trench, … 75/
…as well as the exit points from the trench through the parapet; /76
4) it is necessary to endeavour to cover the trenches from above, at least from UAV surveillance using fabric materials, and ideally from munitions dropped from UAVs, despite all the objective difficulties of solving this problem. /76
It seems that the covered section of the trench should have cells buried in the wall of the trench, so that the drop of UAV munitions near the entrance to the covered section of the trench (which is not difficult and is widely used in practice) does not lead to damage to… 78/
…the sheltered personnel.

It should be emphasised that simply covering a trench from above, without protection from the fragmentation of a UAV-dropped impact munition near the entrance to the covered area, is not sufficient. 79/
If the covered sections are protected by timbers placed at an angle to the wall of the trench and resting on this wall (as if forming a lean-to hut), then some must be made deep enough so that the fall of a munition near the entrance does not result in injury to those in… 80/
…the recess.

As for the tactical feasibility of “attacking in a column one at a time,” it intuitively seems that “regulation” methods of attack are more effective. 81/
Deploying in a chain (in a wedge) when approaching, and entering the trench after a volley of grenades thrown by the entire chain or through a “non-shootable corridor” seems safer. 82/
However, at the moment there is no data for an objective comparison, since no one uses the regulation methods for completing attacks. At least, there is no information about this. In such a situation, this question is in the field of theoretical reasoning. 83/
One can argue about it endlessly, but it is still impossible to draw a substantiated conclusion. 84/
From the point of view of combat training, it seems advisable to teach both the “regular” methods of completing an attack and explain how an “attack in a column one at a time” takes place. 85/
In conclusion, we note that this article was written on the basis of a sample of materials that came to the author's attention, and such a sample may not be representative. 86/
However, it is hoped that discussion of this issue in the future will help to develop an informed position as more information becomes available. If this article advances the debate on this issue to some extent, we will consider the task of this article accomplished. /end 87/

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