Six months ago I wrote a viral thread, arguing that NATO has 2-3 years to prepare for Russia challenging NATO Art 5.
I wanted to revisit the topic for a while. In light of @JDVance1's pick as VP, today seems as good as any.
TLDR: panic should set in. 1/15
But first recap, why 2-3 years?
Russia's primary objective in attacking NATO territory would not be to take & hold land - at least initially.
Russia would want to challenge Art. 5 to destroy NATO as a relevant military-political entity, giving it free rain in the future.
2/15
How might 🇷🇺 achieve this?
By initiating small-scale incursions into Eastern Europe, followed by rapid escalation against Western European states to increase the costs of resistance, and coerce them into seeking a settlement.
If Western Europeans falter, NATO is finished.
3/15
This scenario doesn't necessitate rebuilding a massive land army. In a worst-case scenario, Russia could amass the required forces relatively quickly, even while engaged in a land war in Ukraine.
So, what can we do prevent this scenario? 4/15
I argued that deterring Russia would require both capability AND demonstrating resolve.
We must make it clear to Russia that we not only have the means to respond, but that we are also absolutely willing to do so, even at great personal cost and risk.
5/15
I concluded that NATO is not performing well on either front.
Our military buildup is taking too long.
Even worse, we continuously signal to Russia immense levels of risk aversion and pain intolerance.
In January, I estimated that NATO had 2-3 years to turn things around. 6/15
How do things stand now?
With Vance as the VP pick and considering his previous comments on Ukraine and Europe (along with those of Trump), it's clear that a US withdrawal from NATO—whether formal or through political statements—is fully on the table.
7/15
While we admittedly can't predict the future and things might turn out better than the worst-case scenario, assuming this as the baseline for your planning is foolish.
We must prepare for complete military and political separation from the USA. Anything else is insane.
8/15
European states can no longer rely on the availability of US military assets when planning for a potential Russian attack.
This is devastating because the USA not only offers the most overall capabilities but also provides critical capabilities specific to this scenario.
9/15
While resolve is often conceptualized as a more political factor, it is directly linked to military capabilities.
You are more likely to show resolve if you are confident you can wage an effective war if things go south.
We know this; Russia knows this. 10/15
Losing access to US military capabilities will not only undermine our capacity to defend ourselves, it will further push the perceived balance of resolve in Russia's favor.
Needless to say, that's very dangerous, as this will ultimately determine weather Putin attacks.
11/15
In the meantime, we have done very little in Europe to convince Russia of our steadfastness if push comes to shove.
Key Western European states continue to prioritize their own security above all else in regard to Ukraine, demonstrating risk aversion and pain intolerance.
12/15
Overall, things have taken a turn for the worse since January.
While a Trump Administration might not change the previously given 2-3 year timeframe, it significantly increases the likelihood that Putin will challenge Art. 5 in the years ahead.
13/15
It is paramount that we act, and I want European decision-makers to panic.
Not the kind of panic that paralyzes you, but the kind that triggers your fight-or-flight instinct—and you choose to fight.
Don't wait until November 2024. Start acting now.
14/15
Build up your militaries. We don't need war-capable European armies in 2030; we needed them yesterday.
Most importantly, our actions in the coming months and years will determine not only whether the war in Ukraine escalates but also whether we are next.
Briefly on a potential Israeli attack against Iran's nuclear infrastructure:
My colleague and supervisor, @Malfrid_BH, has written an excellent article on Israel's preventive attacks against Iraq's nuclear infrastructure in the 1980s, which remains as relevant as ever.
1/6
The article reexamines Israel's 1981 strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor. While it delayed Iraq’s nuclear ambitions, the strike also pushed Iraq to pursue a more covert and determined nuclear weapons program in the years following.
2/6
After the attack, Iraq shifted its strategy, dispersing facilities and focusing on secret, military-oriented nuclear development. The attack also increased Iraq's determination, driven by national pride, the desire for a security deterrent, and fear of future strikes.
3/6
On September 25, the Kremlin announced plans to revise its nuclear doctrine, expanding the conditions for nuclear use.
This raises a critical question: How credible is this latest nuclear threat, and how credible are Russian nuclear threats in general?
Short thread 🧵👇:
1/10
I categorize 🇷🇺 nuclear threats into four types: cheap talk, state-sanctioned rhetoric, preparations for limited nuclear use, and preparations for large-scale nuclear use. Each varies in intensity & credibility.
We have observed the first two types, but not the latter two.
2/10
Cheap talk includes non-official rhetoric like TV discussions by excentric talkshow guests about nuking Western cities.
These discussions do not reflect official policy & ignore the immense costs of nuclear use to Russia, making them non-credible and generally ignorable.
A few people asked if all 22 S-300/S-400 sites around Moscow are still active or if some systems have been removed and redeployed, likely closer to Ukraine.
In other words, does Moscow's air defense network underperform because it no longer exists?
A short thread. 1/8
First, @AS_22im is the true expert on tracking S-300/S-400 sites. I recommend you follow him.
My TL;DR: Satellite imagery indicates that most air defense sites around Moscow remain intact, although some have lost a few launchers, while other sites are completely gone.
2/8
A good example of an air defense site that remains fully in-tact is the one near Novovorino (56.1676, 37.82313).
The image on the left is from June 2019, the one on the right from May 2024. The only difference is that the launchers are erected, suggesting higher readiness.
Ukraine's Sapsan SRBM is one of three primary missile projects that 🇺🇦 is working on. The other two are the Neptune ASCM (in production) and the Korshun LACM (in development).
Hrim-2 is a shorter-range variant intended for export and is largely identical with the Sapsan.
1/5
The missile missile follows other SRBMs, like the Russian 9M723 Iskander-M and the South Korean Hyunmoo-2, in form and function.
The missile is powered by solid fuel & has a claimed range of 400-500 km, though reports have stated that this may be extended to 700 km or more.
2/5
Sapsan reportedly has a payload capacity of 480 kg. The tapered warhead seen in the picture of the Hrim-2 is well-suited for a penetrator warhead, providing the missile with significant hard-target kill capability — something currently lacking in Ukraine's missile arsenal.
3/5
Taurus uses a 'smart' fuse that counts the layers and void spaces the warhead penetrates, making sure the warhead explodes at precisely the right moment, rather than relying on a set timer.
With the AGM-158A JASSM now emerging as a viable option for Ukraine, it's a good opportunity to explore the basic capability profile and main advantages of JASSM compared to ATACMS, Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG, and Taurus. 🧵👇
1/15
The AGM-158A JASSM is, broadly speaking, the American counterpart to the German-Swedish Taurus KEPD-350 & the British-French Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG.
Due to its significant export success, it's increasingly becoming the standard land-attack cruise missile in Western arsenals. 2/15
The AGM-158A JASSM entered service in 2003. It has an unclassified range of 370 km and carries a 450 kg (1,000 lb) penetrator warhead.
JASSM stands out for its low-observability fuselage, providing a smaller radar cross-section than other cruise missiles in its class.