Six months ago I wrote a viral thread, arguing that NATO has 2-3 years to prepare for Russia challenging NATO Art 5.
I wanted to revisit the topic for a while. In light of @JDVance1's pick as VP, today seems as good as any.
TLDR: panic should set in. 1/15
But first recap, why 2-3 years?
Russia's primary objective in attacking NATO territory would not be to take & hold land - at least initially.
Russia would want to challenge Art. 5 to destroy NATO as a relevant military-political entity, giving it free rain in the future.
2/15
How might 🇷🇺 achieve this?
By initiating small-scale incursions into Eastern Europe, followed by rapid escalation against Western European states to increase the costs of resistance, and coerce them into seeking a settlement.
If Western Europeans falter, NATO is finished.
3/15
This scenario doesn't necessitate rebuilding a massive land army. In a worst-case scenario, Russia could amass the required forces relatively quickly, even while engaged in a land war in Ukraine.
So, what can we do prevent this scenario? 4/15
I argued that deterring Russia would require both capability AND demonstrating resolve.
We must make it clear to Russia that we not only have the means to respond, but that we are also absolutely willing to do so, even at great personal cost and risk.
5/15
I concluded that NATO is not performing well on either front.
Our military buildup is taking too long.
Even worse, we continuously signal to Russia immense levels of risk aversion and pain intolerance.
In January, I estimated that NATO had 2-3 years to turn things around. 6/15
How do things stand now?
With Vance as the VP pick and considering his previous comments on Ukraine and Europe (along with those of Trump), it's clear that a US withdrawal from NATO—whether formal or through political statements—is fully on the table.
7/15
While we admittedly can't predict the future and things might turn out better than the worst-case scenario, assuming this as the baseline for your planning is foolish.
We must prepare for complete military and political separation from the USA. Anything else is insane.
8/15
European states can no longer rely on the availability of US military assets when planning for a potential Russian attack.
This is devastating because the USA not only offers the most overall capabilities but also provides critical capabilities specific to this scenario.
9/15
While resolve is often conceptualized as a more political factor, it is directly linked to military capabilities.
You are more likely to show resolve if you are confident you can wage an effective war if things go south.
We know this; Russia knows this. 10/15
Losing access to US military capabilities will not only undermine our capacity to defend ourselves, it will further push the perceived balance of resolve in Russia's favor.
Needless to say, that's very dangerous, as this will ultimately determine weather Putin attacks.
11/15
In the meantime, we have done very little in Europe to convince Russia of our steadfastness if push comes to shove.
Key Western European states continue to prioritize their own security above all else in regard to Ukraine, demonstrating risk aversion and pain intolerance.
12/15
Overall, things have taken a turn for the worse since January.
While a Trump Administration might not change the previously given 2-3 year timeframe, it significantly increases the likelihood that Putin will challenge Art. 5 in the years ahead.
13/15
It is paramount that we act, and I want European decision-makers to panic.
Not the kind of panic that paralyzes you, but the kind that triggers your fight-or-flight instinct—and you choose to fight.
Don't wait until November 2024. Start acting now.
14/15
Build up your militaries. We don't need war-capable European armies in 2030; we needed them yesterday.
Most importantly, our actions in the coming months and years will determine not only whether the war in Ukraine escalates but also whether we are next.
When people claim medium-range missiles in Germany are destabilizing because they can reach homeland targets deep inside Russia, including Moscow, ask how often they’ve complained about short-range ballistic and land-attack cruise missiles stationed in Kaliningrad.
1/5
For over a decade, Russia has been threatening European capitals and homeland targets with its Iskander-M ballistic and cruise missile systems, both nuclear & conventionally armed, from Kaliningrad.
Russia has also frequently hinted at using them in first-strike scenarios.
2/5
But now that NATO deploys exclusively conventional missile systems, capable of threatening military targets deep inside Russia, escalation risks will suddenly spiral?
Why? NATO only reciprocates the threat that Russia has imposed on Germany and others for years.
3/5
The lack of a public debate on the deployment of INF-range missiles in 🇩🇪 has been criticized.
But such a debate would have been counterproductive. Why?
1) It would have been more damaging than helpful 2) It would have undermined our credibility 3) There was no need for it
1/9
Most importantly, I disagree with the notion that this debate would have been some kind of enlightened discourse on the relative benefits of deterrence, reassurance and arms control.
The opposite: It would have been ugly and damaging to our democratic system and reputation.
2/9
The far left and far right would have hammered home the point that this is another instance of NATO provoking and threatening Russia.
Russian agents would have capitalized on the controversy to further divide our society and undermine support for NATO and Ukraine.
3/9
I saw a few takes today on why deploying INF-range missiles to Europe/Germany might strategically backfire, and that the timing of the decision was overhasty.
I want to present the counter-narrative: this move is strategically sound and the timing is appropriate. 1/8
1. INF-range missiles in Europe will offer NATO substantial military advantages and strengthen our deterrence posture.
To fight wars effectively, you have to be able to threaten the adversary's rear, including time-sensitive targets. 2/8
The missile systems deployed to Germany will provide for both. This will facilitate NATO's stated objective of forward defense and complicate Russian planning efforts both for invasion type and escalation management scenarios. 3/8
Some thoughts on the "national security interests" argument, which has recently emerged as a second key point in the discussion about why 🇩🇪 is unable to supply Taurus to 🇺🇦.
I believe the argument lacks coherence but will ultimately be effective in concluding the debate. 1/19
Most notably, the national security argument against Taurus has been advanced by the Minister of Defense.
In a recent interview, he stated, "There are aspects that are so crucial to national security that we cannot discuss them publicly." 2/19
While the Minister and other senior officials have not provided details on these national security interests and how they arise, they more than likely relate to the role of the Taurus cruise missile in German military strategy and its implications in wartime. 3/19
This is another thread on the M48 & M57 ATACMS capability profile and why it is needed. It consolidates information from previous threads, corrects past mistakes, and provides a more robust analysis. And yes, the thread also talks about ATACMS' bridge-busting capability.👇🧵 1/21
The M48 and M57 ATACMS carry the 227kg WDU-18/B unitary warhead. This warhead includes 98 kg of DESTEX high explosives. With this data, we can determine the lethal radius (LR) for various structures based on target hardness and the required overpressure for destruction. 2/21
Most above-ground structures will crumble or collapse under an overpressure of 20 pounds per square inch (psi) caused by a high explosive detonation. The capacity to generate such overpressures is largely a function of the warhead's yield and its distance to the target. 3/21