Six months ago I wrote a viral thread, arguing that NATO has 2-3 years to prepare for Russia challenging NATO Art 5.
I wanted to revisit the topic for a while. In light of @JDVance1's pick as VP, today seems as good as any.
TLDR: panic should set in. 1/15
But first recap, why 2-3 years?
Russia's primary objective in attacking NATO territory would not be to take & hold land - at least initially.
Russia would want to challenge Art. 5 to destroy NATO as a relevant military-political entity, giving it free rain in the future.
2/15
How might 🇷🇺 achieve this?
By initiating small-scale incursions into Eastern Europe, followed by rapid escalation against Western European states to increase the costs of resistance, and coerce them into seeking a settlement.
If Western Europeans falter, NATO is finished.
3/15
This scenario doesn't necessitate rebuilding a massive land army. In a worst-case scenario, Russia could amass the required forces relatively quickly, even while engaged in a land war in Ukraine.
So, what can we do prevent this scenario? 4/15
I argued that deterring Russia would require both capability AND demonstrating resolve.
We must make it clear to Russia that we not only have the means to respond, but that we are also absolutely willing to do so, even at great personal cost and risk.
5/15
I concluded that NATO is not performing well on either front.
Our military buildup is taking too long.
Even worse, we continuously signal to Russia immense levels of risk aversion and pain intolerance.
In January, I estimated that NATO had 2-3 years to turn things around. 6/15
How do things stand now?
With Vance as the VP pick and considering his previous comments on Ukraine and Europe (along with those of Trump), it's clear that a US withdrawal from NATO—whether formal or through political statements—is fully on the table.
7/15
While we admittedly can't predict the future and things might turn out better than the worst-case scenario, assuming this as the baseline for your planning is foolish.
We must prepare for complete military and political separation from the USA. Anything else is insane.
8/15
European states can no longer rely on the availability of US military assets when planning for a potential Russian attack.
This is devastating because the USA not only offers the most overall capabilities but also provides critical capabilities specific to this scenario.
9/15
While resolve is often conceptualized as a more political factor, it is directly linked to military capabilities.
You are more likely to show resolve if you are confident you can wage an effective war if things go south.
We know this; Russia knows this. 10/15
Losing access to US military capabilities will not only undermine our capacity to defend ourselves, it will further push the perceived balance of resolve in Russia's favor.
Needless to say, that's very dangerous, as this will ultimately determine weather Putin attacks.
11/15
In the meantime, we have done very little in Europe to convince Russia of our steadfastness if push comes to shove.
Key Western European states continue to prioritize their own security above all else in regard to Ukraine, demonstrating risk aversion and pain intolerance.
12/15
Overall, things have taken a turn for the worse since January.
While a Trump Administration might not change the previously given 2-3 year timeframe, it significantly increases the likelihood that Putin will challenge Art. 5 in the years ahead.
13/15
It is paramount that we act, and I want European decision-makers to panic.
Not the kind of panic that paralyzes you, but the kind that triggers your fight-or-flight instinct—and you choose to fight.
Don't wait until November 2024. Start acting now.
14/15
Build up your militaries. We don't need war-capable European armies in 2030; we needed them yesterday.
Most importantly, our actions in the coming months and years will determine not only whether the war in Ukraine escalates but also whether we are next.
I published a new Missile Matters post today, offering an initial battle damage assessment of Flamingo’s first combat use.
Proof of concept was established, but the strike also revealed likely shortcomings.
Access the post via the link in my bio. Summary below.
1/6
High-resolution satellite imagery shows two impacts.
Depending on the nominal aimpoints, missile one probably missed by 15 to 40 meters and missile two by 80 to 200 meters.
Missile three did not reach the target area, whether due to outside influence or internal failure.
2/6
Fire Point stated that the Flamingo has a CEP of 14 meters, meaning 50 percent of missiles should land within 14 meters of their aimpoint, about 93 percent within 28 meters, and the remainder outside the 28-meter radius.
3/6
With recent focus on Ukrainian missiles, from Flamingo to "Long Neptune" and others, I thought I'd provide context by tracing the evolution of Ukraine's missile programs.
Link in bio, short summary below.
1/6
Ukraine’s missile industry has moved through several distinct phases since 2014, from modest post-Soviet capabilities and problem-ridden pre-war programs to wartime improvisation, foreign reliance, and now ambitious attempts at independent production.
2/6
From relying almost entirely on Western partners in 2023 for long-range strike capabilities, Ukraine by 2025 fields a diverse but still imperfect missile arsenal, with lighter drones and mini-cruise missiles forming the backbone.
3/6
I published my latest newsletter post earlier today, offering an initial assessment of the FP-5 Flamingo’s specifications, lethality, survivability, and strategic implications.
You can find the full post via the link in my bio.
Short summary below.
1/6
The FP-5 Flamingo is the first "heavy" missile system in Ukraine's indigenous missile arsenal, combining long range with a large payload.
This offers significant advantages in terms of missile lethality through improved warhead penetration and greater explosive yield.
2/6
The ultimate impact of the Flamingo on the battlefield will depend on Ukrainian production levels and its survivability against Russian missile defenses.
Ukrainian output goals of more than 200 units per month by the end of the year are certainly ambitious.
3/6
I estimate U.S. and European production of ballistic missile interceptors and compare it to Russia’s output of conventional ballistic missiles.
Access the post via the link in my bio.
Short summary below.
1/7
Russia is currently estimated to produce a total of 840 to 1,020 ground-launched 9M723 and air-launched Kh-47M2 Kinzhal short- to medium-range ballistic missiles annually, or 70 to 85 per month.
This represents roughly a 15 to 40 percent increase compared to 2024.
2/7
In contrast, combined Patriot interceptor production (PAC-2 GEM-T and PAC-3 MSE) stands at 850 to 880 in 2025.
By 2027, this will increase to over 1,100 interceptors, and to over 1,400 by 2029 (if Rheinmetall starts producing PAC-3 MSE interceptors).
3/7
I sent out my latest newsletter post this morning, discussing the state and viability of Russia's nuclear deterrent in 2025.
You can access the post via the link my bio.
Below a short summary.
1/5
Russia's nuclear arsenal faces two primary challenges: maintaining its nuclear warheads and sustaining a viable fleet of delivery vehicles, particularly ICBMs.
While both pose difficulties, warhead maintenance is likely the lesser challenge for Russia.
2/5
In contrast, Russia’s inability to move beyond Soviet-era technology and field a next-generation ICBM presents a more serious challenge over the medium to long term.
To be clear, several nuclear-armed states face difficulties in replacing Cold War-era systems.
3/5
Briefly on a potential Israeli attack against Iran's nuclear infrastructure:
My colleague and supervisor, @Malfrid_BH, has written an excellent article on Israel's preventive attacks against Iraq's nuclear infrastructure in the 1980s, which remains as relevant as ever.
1/6
The article reexamines Israel's 1981 strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor. While it delayed Iraq’s nuclear ambitions, the strike also pushed Iraq to pursue a more covert and determined nuclear weapons program in the years following.
2/6
After the attack, Iraq shifted its strategy, dispersing facilities and focusing on secret, military-oriented nuclear development. The attack also increased Iraq's determination, driven by national pride, the desire for a security deterrent, and fear of future strikes.
3/6