2/ The theft address I will start from is 0x6ee which was doing test transactions on July 10th from 0x09b multisig with SHIB and was funded with 6 X 0.1 ETH from Tornado.
0x6eedf92fb92dd68a270c3205e96dccc527728066
A technical breakdown of the attack by Mudit can be found below
3/ With the 6 X 0.1 ETH withdrawals from Tornado Cash on July 10th I was able to demix this and find 6 X 0.1 ETH matching deposits made the day before.
0xc6873ce725229099caf5ac6078f30f48ec6c7e2e
The demix is accurate as 0xc68 was also doing tests with 0x304 multisig on July 9th with SHIB.
4/ 0xc68 was funded with 1 ETH from Tornado cash on July 8th at 3:03 PM UTC
0xe3b4cf64e0fc25fafb10d226984b18addc038879ed77f730abbed4737db6a5fc
The matching 1 ETH deposit was made 9 hrs before
0x87c01ca1f56ef3663651b05cd8ebcf133281c5fdd0ef1016f83a16a862c4a235
Both 0xc687 & 0xc891 transferred to each other on July 9th breaking the privacy benefits Tornado provides.
5/ If I trace back from 0xc891 can see it was funded in two txns with 0.36 ETH and 0.66 ETH on July 8th from an exchange
1/ Meet Haby (Havard), a Canadian threat actor who has stolen $2M+ via Coinbase support impersonation social engineering scams in the past year blowing the funds on rare social media usernames, bottle service, & gambling.
2/ On Dec 30, 2024 Haby posted a screenshot in a group chat showing off a 21K XRP ($44K) theft from a Coinbase user.
rN7ddvk4DrGHZUrBfNARJEEAbPkky9Mwcz
3/ On Jan 3, 2025 Haby posted a screenshot from his Exodus wallet showing his Telegram & IG accounts.
I matched up the historical balances to the screenshot and found the XRP address linked to two other Coinbase user thefts for ~$500K total.
1/ An investigation into how I identified one of suspects tied to the $28M Bittensor hack from 2024 by identifying anime NFT wash trades linked to a former employee and earned a whitehat bounty for my efforts.
2/ 32 $TAO holders experienced unauthorized transfers in excess of $28M from May to July 2024 and the Bittensor network was temporarily halted on July 2, 2024.
A post-mortem published by the team revealed the thefts were the result of a supply chain attack after a malicious PyPi package was uploaded in late May 2024
Victims who downloaded the package and performed specific operations accidentally compromised private keys.
3/ I began tracing the stolen funds from two initial theft addresses, TAO was bridged to Ethereum via Bittensor native bridge, and then transferred to instant exchanges where the attackers swapped to XMR.
1/ An unnamed source recently compromised a DPRK IT worker device which provided insights into how a small team of five ITWs operated 30+ fake identities with government IDs and purchased Upwork/LinkedIn accounts to obtain developer jobs at projects.
2/ An export of their Google Drive, Chrome profiles, and screenshots from their devices was obtained.
Google products were extensively used by them to organize their team’s schedules, tasks, and budgets with communications primarily in English.
3/ Another spreadsheet shows weekly reports for team members from 2025 which provides insight into how they operate and what they think about.
“I can't understand job requirement, and don't know what I need to do”
1/ An investigation into how @cryptobeastreal scammed followers by lying they were not behind the $190M -> $3M $ALT market cap crash where 45+ connected insider wallets sold $11M+ on July 14, 2025.
2/ Earlier this month Crypto Beast began aggressively promoting $ALT on X and TG.
On July 14, 2025 ALT crashed from 0.19 to 0.003 after insiders sold a large percent of the total supply.
All of these posts promoting the token. have since been deleted.
3/ Crypto Beast previously shared a public wallet on X & TG in now deleted posts.
1/ My recent investigation uncovered more than $16.58M in payments since January 1, 2025 or $2.76M per month has been sent to North Korean IT workers hired as developers at various projects & companies.
To put this in perspective payments range from $3K-8K per month meaning they have infiltrated 345 jobs on the low end or 920 jobs on the high end.
2/ Here’s a look into one of the six clusters I have been monitoring and was able to attribute 8 different DPRK ITWs that obtained roles at 12+ projects.
I traced out the payment addresses from the table to two consolidation addresses.