Something super weird happening right now: just been called by several totally different media outlets in the last few minutes, all with Windows machines suddenly BSoD’ing (Blue Screen of Death). Anyone else seen this? Seems to be entering recovery mode:
If you're watching this unfold and aren't unfamiliar with the name "CrowdStrike", they're a *massive* player in the security space and have billions of dollars of annual revenue. Their products include "EDR", which is endpoint detection and response. Think of it as antivirus.
Products like this need to auto-update as they're continually evolving to respond to emerging threats. New attacks need new defences, so these products need to regularly update on your PC.
They also usually operate in what we'd call a "privileged" space on your machine, that is they have very broad-reaching control in order to detect and mitigate risks. That also means that if something goes wrong with an update, it's able to catastrophically nuke your machine.
I don’t think it’s too early to call it: this will be the largest IT outage in history
Just an important point on this as I’m seeing some misunderstandings: this is not a “Microsoft outage” (disclosure: I don’t work there or speak for them, Regional Directors are totally independent), it’s a CrowdStrike issue impacting Microsoft PCs.
This is basically what we were all worried about with Y2K, except it's actually happened this time ☠️
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Let's start with what should be obvious: any infosec story that includes a headline about "largest", "greatest", "worst", or similar superlatives should be regarded with suspicion right from the outset. That said, let's delve into this one: cybernews.com/security/rocky…
Firstly to the title - "RockYou". This harks back a decade and a half to a 2009 data breach that exposed 34M records. It was particularly noteworthy as the passwords were in plain text: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RockYou
Following this breach, the "RockYou password list" became almost the defacto standard list for password crackers. It's one of many breaches that seeded the data in @haveibeenpwned's Pwned Passwords list.
Firstly, this has come after @zackwhittaker's article which boils down to "it's stalkerware and it has appeared in a bunch of hotels it maybe shouldn't have and we know this because it has vulns disclosing what's captured and the company isn't responding" techcrunch.com/2024/05/22/spy…
It appears that in response to that piece, someone has gone and found a very easily exploitable bug that boiled down to a SOAP based API with an associated WSDL that documented the endpoints, one of which returned valid AWS creds
So this is an interesting one for several reasons. Firstly, the defacement which was obviously designed to antagonise a conservative media company. Maybe someone with an axe to grind, but definitely evidence of breach.
Then there are the 3 different classes of data set published at the bottom of the defacement, let's go through each by file name:
editors.json: this includes the name, personal email, phone and sometimes address of the journo. Given the politically charged nature of some of the content, PII exposure of this nature is extra concerning. It's now easy to match a story to someone's physical address and phone.
Alright folks, this is starting to smell like bullshit. Not the alleged breach (which smells bad for reasons I'll explain in a moment), but the "AI" line from both Europcar and the PR agency that just emailed me pitching someone's hot take on it. Here's why:
Firstly on the legitimacy of the data, a bunch of things don't add up. The most obvious one is that the email addresses and usernames bear no resemblance to the corresponding people names. For example:
Next, each of those usernames is then the alias of the email address. What are the chances that *every single username* aligns with the email address? Low, very low.
We often receive comments to the effect of “we want to purchase a @haveibeenpwned subscription but our company doesn’t allow us to use a credit card”. What is the financial reason behind this?
This is a very small portion compared to those that *do* pay by card, but why is this?
To add to this, having spent 14 years at Pfizer I’d see policies like this all the time. But it’s also not like there was a blanket ban: try going on a business trip and asking the person at the noodle shop you’re having lunch at to raise an invoice on 60 day terms 🤣
This also isn’t about traceability; spend the money, raise an expense claim with receipt, job done. I could understand if the answer was “because an invoice and wire transfer stops people randomly being stuff and puts procurement in control”, but they could still pay with a card.
Let me add some more context to the Dymocks breach, starting with giving them a massive pat on the back for responding so quickly. It was less than 48 hours ago between me contacting someone there via LinkedIn and them having sent disclosure emails to customers. Massive kudos!
What's not as clear from the story is the extent to which the data was already circulating before I was able to get in touch with them. Multiple Telegram channels and a popular *clear web* (not dark web) forum were broadly circulating the data.
I also suspect we're about to see a repeat of the question so many people raised after Optus and Medibank: why do they still have my data? About a quarter of the rows are flagged "inactive" with dates as far back as 2005, yet still sit there with address, email, phone etc.