The most difficult area on the front for the Ukrainian Armed Forces in recent weeks has been the section northwest of Avdiivka, a suburb of Donetsk captured by the Russians in February. The Russian army is currently advancing on Pokrovsk and storming Toretsk. However,
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in reality, the Russians are simply advancing on all sections of the front and advancing where they can push through the Ukrainian Armed Forces' defenses, military experts explain. After taking Avdiivka, the Russian army continued to slowly advance west and northwest,
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capturing several villages. An important event was the capture of the village of Ocheretyne, where Ukrainian positions were left unprotected when units were replaced. The front did not collapse, but in three months the Russians have expanded their bridgehead, occupying
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several villages around it. Further south, the Russians' successes are not as noticeable, but there is also progress. The Ukrainian General Staff notes that the Russians have concentrated significant forces in the Pokrovsk direction. According to a fighter of the Aidar
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In addition, in June, Russian troops began an assault on Toretsk, located to the east of Ocheretyne, and advanced several kilometers. Here, the relative success of the Russians is due to the fact that the Ukrainian units were primarily afraid of attacks from the flanks -
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from the north and south of the city, writes Ukrainian military analyst Konstantin Mashovets. However, the Russians did not achieve success on the flanks and began to storm Toretsk head-on - from the east, which came as a surprise to the Ukrainian commanders. Judging by
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the reports of the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Russian troops are attacking near Toretsk no less intensively than in the Pokrovsk direction. Further advance in the area of the Ocheretyne breakthrough, as has already been said, will allow cutting off
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the supply line of the Ukrainian troops. And the capture of Toretsk will complicate the situation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Konstantinovka and Chasiv Yar. Russia is exerting pressure in several directions, probably to introduce strategic reserves where the transition
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of tactical successes into operational ones is expected. However, the Russian army used large reserves for the Kharkiv front, and they are exhausted, apparently. The lack of large reserves is also indicated by the fact that most new contract soldiers are at the front
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in record time. The successes of the Russian army in the last few months have become possible for three main reasons: the Russians have more artillery shells, they use powerful glide aerial bombs with the range extension kit UMPK in large quantities, commanders are ready
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to send fighters to assault, regardless of large losses. However, the Russians' superiority in the amount of ammunition and manpower is gradually fading. According to Michael Kofman, in the Kharkiv region, the opponents are conducting artillery fire with the same intensity,
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in other parts of the front the advantage of the Russians in shells does not exceed the ratio of 5:1 and is decreasing. Retired US Navy Colonel Mark Kansian already sees signs of stabilization of the front. John Kennedy from RAND believes that the main task of the Ukrainian
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Armed Forces is to prevent significant breakthroughs by the enemy until the fall. By that time, the Ukrainian units will be replenished with trained recruits, and the weather conditions will make it difficult for the Russian army to attack. The bombing of Ukrainian
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positions with aerial bombs remains an unresolved problem. Ukraine lacks modern air defense systems to counter Russian aircraft. However, the main thing is that Ukraine really surpasses Russia in terms of using drones and related technologies. Russia also has mass
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production and produces a huge number of drones, but Ukraine has relied on these technologies and this helps the Ukrainian soldiers level the situation at the front, having many times fewer resources. However, it must be understood that in a war of attrition, which this
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conflict has taken, taking one or two new settlements, especially after they are completely destroyed by FABs, does not affect the outcome of the conflict. The resources spent on this do. And Ukraine understands well the goal of many Russian attacks - to capture a city so
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that there is something to report to the authorities. Ukraine is trying to destroy Russia's logistics and resources. Often allowing the Russians to enter the city, but then cutting them off from drone supplies. Another big news story of the past week was the abandonment
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of Krynki. Experts argue about the feasibility of the entire operation and losses, but the Russians lost a huge amount of equipment and soldiers near Krynky. They were also forced to send more resources to the Kherson direction, unable to transfer them to the north.
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The new talks between Trump, Putin, and Zelensky are likely to end in yet another deadlock. This time, Putin has softened his illegal demands and is now “ready to give up” the Zaporizhzhia region in exchange for a ceasefire and control over the rest of Donetsk region. These
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“concessions” have probably signaled to Trump that Putin is ready for negotiations, and that maybe, finally, he can strike a peace deal and get his long-coveted Nobel Prize - since it didn’t work out with Israel, where Hamas opened fire again. The White House rhetoric has
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once again shifted sharply, from “Tomahawks are already on their way to Kyiv” to “Donbas should be Russian.” It’s the same old Kremlin ploy - when things go badly, start pushing for negotiations. All this commotion began after Putin’s call with Trump and has now turned into
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In Russia, a new wave of hatred toward Chechens is flaring up - and this time, the reason seems surprisingly harmless: a Central Bank vote to choose the image for a new 500-ruble banknote. Yet another attempt by the authorities to distract from economic and social problems
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has unexpectedly exposed deep-seated interethnic tensions that have been smoldering in the country for decades. Two options emerged as frontrunners in the online voting: Mount Elbrus and the Grozny City business center - a symbol of the modern Chechen capital. In the region
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itself, the campaign has taken on the character of a national project: authorities, schools, hospitals, and military units have been organized to participate. The process is personally supervised by Ramzan Kadyrov and his administration. This activity provoked a stormy
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The Russian Ministry of Defense has drafted a bill to involve Russian citizens in the Armed Forces reserve in performing tasks during peacetime, RBC reports, citing a copy of the document. The government approved the initiative on October 13, according to a source familiar 1/9
with the matter. The bill proposes that reservists can be called up for special training sessions by presidential decree. These “special sessions” are described as military gatherings aimed at fulfilling specific defense-related tasks in cases of armed conflict, 2/9
counterterrorist operations, or the deployment of forces abroad. According to Andrei Kartapolov, head of the State Duma Defense Committee, the bill expands the ability to use reservists in various circumstances. He noted that it introduces broad legal definitions that would 3/9
Russian Uralvagonzavod - the country’s main manufacturer of railway cars and also tanks (since Soviet times, Russia has had a tradition of dual-purpose factories, where the producer of metal buckets might also make artillery shells) - is switching its civilian workforce 1/7
to a four-day workweek. The change will affect only employees in the railcar production division. They were offered to transfer to “other divisions with active orders,” since the situation is quite different in tank production. Uralvagonzavod, part of the Rostec corporation, 2/7
is Russia’s largest tank manufacturer. After the start of the war, the plant switched to a three-shift schedule, and since August 2022 has been operating around the clock. Russia’s economy is increasingly shifting to a war footing, while its civilian sector is rapidly 3/7
Another sign of growing problems in the Russian economy. Next year, Russia will cut spending on the production and repair of aircraft by one and a half times — from 139.6 billion to 85.7 billion rubles. This was reported by The Moscow Times. “The Russian government plans 1/9
to reduce funding for the federal project ‘Production of Aircraft and Helicopters’ by 1.6 times in 2026 - from 139.6 billion to 85.7 billion rubles,” the report says. According to the draft of Russia’s new budget for 2026–2028, spending will also decrease in 2027 compared to 2/9
previously planned figures - from 109.7 billion to 86.9 billion rubles (a 21% drop). Funding is expected to slightly increase only in 2028 - to 89.3 billion rubles. The publication notes that the most significant cuts will affect state support for Russian airlines renewing 3/9
Europe still does not fully understand the threat posed by Russia. There has been growing talk of a possible attack on the Baltic states, but in reality, this threat is minimal - and the real danger lies elsewhere. Putin has found a grey zone, and so far it brings far
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greater benefits than any ground operation could. NATO has spent its entire existence preparing for a conventional war with infantry and tanks, but the main threat today is hybrid warfare. There is no need to launch missiles to paralyze airports or completely collapse
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a country's banking or energy system - cyberwarfare is a reality, not a fantasy from Hollywood films. Putin’s goal is to sow discord within Western societies, and hybrid war offers a wide range of tools to achieve that. His main target remains Ukraine, and he is doing
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