The Central Bank of Russia is suspending the publication of statistics on the over-the-counter currency market. This follows from a message on the regulator's website. The Central Bank explains that the decision was made to limit the impact of sanctions. This means that
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the ruble has absolutely no clear exchange rate. Now the Central Bank sets this rate at its own discretion. But the main expectation is July 26, when the Central Bank will announce an increase in the key rate. Experts predict growth from 16% to 18% but there may be surprises
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Ruble exchange rate statistics are not the only information prohibited from publication. The closed nature of gasoline production statistics in Russia also leads to problems. "The first problem is that we actually do not know exactly how much is produced, consumed, and so on
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because now we have huge problems with the openness of statistics. Problem number two is that it is very difficult to properly plan production activities when the industry is in manual regulation mode," says Grigory Bazhenov, head of the analytical center of the Independent
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Fuel Union. All this leads to an unregulated increase in fuel prices in Russia. Today, the exchange price for AI-95 gasoline has reached its maximum for this year and amounted to about 74.5 thousand rubles ($850) per ton. This is evidenced by the results of trading on the
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St. Petersburg International Mercantile Exchange. The reasons for the current situation are an information vacuum, manual regulation and an environment in which it is unclear what volumes of refinery capacity have fallen due to UAV attacks. And due to the lack of data on
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production and supplies, prices can be driven up by rumors, says Grigory Bazhenov, head of the analytical center of the Independent Fuel Union. Russia continues to search for opportunities to sell LNG. "Mysterious companies" from the UAE are purchasing tankers for the
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transportation of liquefied natural gas (LNG), which has already led to an increase in prices for such vessels, writes the Financial Times. The publication points out that such dynamics indicate that Russia is preparing for tougher sanctions on LNG supplies and is building
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up its "shadow fleet" to bypass future restrictions. According to Windward, a company that consults ship owners, since the second half of last year, more than 50 LNG carriers have been purchased by companies registered in the UAE. It is noted that it is almost impossible
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to trace the chain of ownership in such transactions. Kpler says that such operations may be related to Russian interests. According to the company, one of these tankers is definitely loading LNG in Yamal. Russia also continues to sell gas to China. In January-June 2024,
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Russia supplied China with 3.515 million tons of liquefied natural gas (LNG) worth $2.066 billion, RIA Novosti writes, citing data from the General Administration of Customs of China. Compared to the same period last year, supplies fell by 9.24%. In the first half of 2023,
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China bought 3.873 million tons of LNG from Russia for $2.693 billion. Overall, in 2023, Russian LNG supplies to China increased by 23%. Last year, China purchased 8 million tons of Russian LNG for $5.2 billion. Western countries should increase sanctions pressure on Russia
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and China. China has been helping to circumvent sanctions in many ways, trying to profit from Russia's problems.
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The Russian economy is losing momentum. Sberbank chief German Gref warned that the country is entering a period of serious challenges. Speaking at the bank’s annual shareholders’ meeting, Gref pointed to military spending, inflation, and high interest rates as key factors
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that will continue to weigh on the economy through 2026. He noted that loan quality is declining, and more individuals and businesses are seeking to restructure their debts. Meanwhile, Bloomberg reports that senior bank executives see the risk of a banking crisis within
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the next 12 months. Unpaid loans are quietly piling up, though this has yet to show in official figures. The agency estimates that bad loans could hit 3.7 trillion rubles — about 20% of the banking sector’s capital. Much of this traces back to the war. Many soldiers received
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According to BILD, "Russia is expected to emerge stronger after the war in Ukraine, and the Kremlin is actively preparing for a potential invasion of NATO countries." While the Russian threat remains real, and it must not be dismissed — and we must indeed prepare for it — at
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this stage, nearly all statements about a potential Russian attack on NATO countries are nothing more than attempts to divert NATO’s attention and resources away from the war in Ukraine. Let’s look at the facts. The so-called “grand” summer offensive in the Sumy region
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stalled after just a month. Russia gathered 50,000 troops, but it has no more equipment. Its reserves are nearly depleted, while Ukraine’s arsenal is expanding — its range of weapons is growing, and its capabilities are increasing despite all the challenges with manpower.
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Ultimately, the main achievement of both Putin and Trump is that NATO has now committed to increasing annual defense spending to at least 5% of GDP by no later than 2035 — a level unseen since the Cold War. Previously, the target was just 2%. Some countries, like Estonia, 1/7
are already set to reach this threshold as early as next year. Spain opposed the move, but it is geographically the farthest from the main threat — Russia. At least, that’s how it seems to them. But one should not forget that Russia’s core strategy revolves around hybrid 2/7
threats, which have no borders. For major European countries — France, Germany, and others — the decisive factor was pressure from Trump. The war in Ukraine, ongoing since 2014, had not pushed Europe toward a more serious approach to security. While the Baltic states, Poland, 3/7
NATO suggests that Russia can sustain the war at its current pace until 2027. Of course, I may be accused of being sympathetic to Ukraine and having a biased opinion, but let’s look at the facts—what’s wrong with this statement? The Russian war machine currently relies on
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Soviet-era equipment reserves, a large number of soldiers, and the National Wealth Fund. Let’s start with the first point. Soviet equipment reserves are almost completely depleted. The offensive on Sumy is carried out mainly through infantry assaults, and the amount of
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destroyed Russian equipment in recent weeks is two to three times lower than during the same period in previous years. If Russia continues the war at the same pace, by 2027 almost all of its equipment will be gone—perhaps even the few donkeys they have. As for soldiers,
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The appointment of Robert Brovdi, known by his call sign "Madyar," as head of the Unmanned Systems Forces of Ukraine has already yielded noticeable results, according to Russian military bloggers. They report that Ukrainian drone strikes are now primarily aimed at eliminating
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Russian UAV operators. Madyar has openly declared his goal of building a "drone wall" along the entire front line and destroying up to 35,000 Russian soldiers per month—the estimated number that the Russian army can mobilize on a monthly basis. He advocates for establishing
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dedicated UAV units for each section of the front line, with operators who are intimately familiar with their own sector, rather than deploying UAV teams as a mobile reserve shuffled between hotspots. His concept is to create a continuous "kill zone" across the whole
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The war in Iran benefits Russia in the short term, but in the long run, the loss of Iran would be a major defeat for Moscow in the region, further weakening its already diminished position in the Middle East. The fall of Syria has significantly undermined Russia’s influence
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there, and Iran remains its last major ally in the region. Russia is trying to squeeze every possible advantage out of this unfavorable situation. The war in Iran distracts the West and its allies from the conflict in Ukraine, but the main gain for Russia is the rise in oil
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prices. Russia’s 2025 budget is under enormous strain because it was planned based on an oil price of $80 per barrel. However, since the summer of 2024, oil prices have been steadily falling, reaching around $50 per barrel for Urals crude in the spring of 2025. The war in
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