1/n Since the start of the war in 2022, Russia has been strengthening its military industry and increasing its military budget. An investigation on Russia’s “hidden” factories, places not secret but somehow not advertised by the propaganda. @tochnyi tochnyi.info/2024/07/russia…
@tochnyi 2/n The current level of attrition is consistently high, also thanks to the use of relatively inexpensive but effective drones such as FPV heavy bombers and kamikaze. A staggering number of observed strikes on vehicles, with a peak of 1126 observed in April.
@tochnyi 3/n An article from The Economist expresses doubt about Russia's ability to produce enough barrels, estimating that only 100-200 are produced annually. However, this assessment is based on the assumption that Russia has technical and logistical issues.
@tochnyi 4/n However, Russia does have new radial forging capabilities in the JSC Electrostal Metallurgical Plant. This plant was already known to the CIA for its involvement in purchasing 2 GFM SXP 55 radial forming machines between 1975 and 1977.
@tochnyi 5/n SMS Group, ALD, ABP, Siempelkamp and GLAMA USA in 2011 contributed to the full modernisation of the plant, installing a series of new forging presses, in particular, a new SMX 600 radial forging press and also modernised all the furnaces.
@tochnyi 6/n There is strong evidence of Electrostal's involvement in manufacturing weapons due to the well-known presence of GFM SXP 55. A careful exploration of the Russian section of the website reveals spare parts of GFM SPX 55 are being sold.
@tochnyi 7/n Another concerning aspect is the large number of job vacancies at the plant, including positions for engineers (specialists), and a significant number of experienced or new workers, totalling 43 new open positions.
@tochnyi 8/n Electrostal is vital to Russia's war effort, with a rich history in defense production and key radial forging machines. Its specialised steel capabilities and increased job openings indicate a heightened demand for war materials. More details at tochnyi.info/2024/07/russia…
1. At this point, I am becoming a broken disk, but this is NOT a country which is preparing for Peace; this is a country preparing for war, with us. At this pace, they will not need 5 or 10 years... this is just ONE YEAR of work. Thanks to @hizzo_jay for working on this.
2. Perm and Iskra plants are places where weapons to kill more Europeans are made right now, while you sleep and while you order your Latte at the bar. This place produces different types of missiles, and this is just after 1 year.
3. Where, in June 2024, there was a forest, in July 2025 we have flling stations and logistics hubs to fill and ship shells, rockets, and other ordnance.
Alabuga plant: No Chain is stronger than its weakest link
New @tochnyi investigation on Shahed drones and the Alabuga plant, first in a mini-series.
If the Shahed is the arrow and the launch sites the bow, today we cover the blacksmith forging the arrow.
1. If you’d like to dive straight into the full investigation, you’ll find the link below. But for those following along here, this thread offers a summary of our main findings.
2. Over the past 5 months, Russia has tripled its use of Shahed-type drones, now averaging 103 launches per day. Ukraine hasn’t had a single day without attacks. In April 2025, Russia launched 2,485 Shaheds. By July, 6,297. That’s a 1,378% increase compared to July 2024.
Putin’s ears within Europe: Uncovering Kaliningrad’s Hidden Antenna Array
Our latest at @tochnyi investigation into Putin's military expansion in Europe focuses on a new intelligence site under construction in Kaliningrad, just 25km from the Polish border. The site was discovered by @hizzo_jay
2.📍 Hidden in the forests of Kaliningrad, just 25 km from Poland’s border, satellites have spotted something strange: a massive, perfectly circular construction.
Unusual geometry. Huge size. Strategic location.
We decided to investigate. 🛰️
Regarding the challenge of defending against the saturation of drones from an adversary, many advocate for the use of solely “cheaper” mass-produced drones.
Despite this seeming like an obvious solution, it is not.
🧵
2/ The logic goes: if the enemy uses swarms of low-cost drones, the best way to respond is by producing more of your own. Quantity vs. quantity.
But this thinking ignores critical tactical, logistical, and strategic realities.
3/ First, not all drone roles are created equal.
Recon, EW, loitering munitions, and decoys all have different tech, data, and operational demands.
Blindly mass-producing “cheap” drones risks saturating the airspace with ineffective assets.
Un thread in italiano è sempre un po’ doloroso, perché mi ricorda che quando lo scrivo è perché vedo qualcosa in Italia che non va. L’aggressione subita da @Ivan_Grieco non è grave solo per il fatto in sé, ma forse è ancora più grave perché, scavando, si comprende come l’informazione in Italia sia totalmente in mano a incompetenti o propagandisti.
Le manifestazioni per la pace sono sempre qualcosa di giusto e sacrosanto. Ricordo bene quando, all’alba dell’invasione dell’Iraq, il mondo intero provò a dire di no. In quel momento c’era tanta voglia di fare del bene e di evitare una guerra inutile. Io, personalmente, sostenevo l’intervento in Afghanistan, ma non quello in Iraq.
Tuttavia, oggi ciò che si vede è una cieca distorsione della bilancia morale: chi manifesta crede di avere tutta la verità in tasca, di avere ragione, e che la piazza appartenga solo a chi la pensa allo stesso modo.
Tutto questo nasce dalla necessità di semplificare e creare polarizzazione, non appartenenza. Perché quando ci si divide in “noi” e “loro”, si perde ogni occasione per riflettere sui dati e sulla complessità della realtà.
🕷️🧵 “Operation Spider's Web”: Ukraine’s bold and precision-engineered drone strike on Russian strategic air bases.
This thread will explore the more intriguing aspects of Ukraine’s recent drone strike on Russian airbases.
On June 1, 2025, Ukraine executed meticulously planned, multi-pronged, and most advanced FPV drone missions to date operation targeting airbases that house long-range bombers. For a thorough analysis, refer to our linked main article. 1/6tochnyi.info/2025/06/a-deep…
At Olenya Airbase (68.14549, 33.45028), the Tu-95 bombers had KH-101 missiles mounted, cockpit ladders extended, and maintenance gear scattered nearby; clear signs these aircraft were operational and being serviced at the time of the strike. 2/6