NEW: Ukrainian forces blunted one of the largest Russian mechanized assaults in Ukraine since October 2023 in western Donetsk Oblast on July 24.
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2/ Geolocated footage published on July 24 shows that Ukrainian forces stopped a reinforced battalion-size Russian mechanized assault near Kostyantynivka (southwest of Donetsk City) after Russian forces advanced up to the southeastern outskirts of the settlement.
3/ ISW last observed Russian forces conduct a battalion-sized mechanized attack in Donetsk Oblast in March 2024. Russian forces have not conducted larger mechanized assaults in Ukraine since the first days of Russia's four-month-long operation to seize Avdiivka in October 2023.
4/ Russian forces likely intended to advance further into Kostyantynivka as part of their efforts to seize the settlement and cut the Vuhledar-Kostyantynivka T-0524 highway.
5/ Russian sources have long identified interdicting the T-0524 highway (green) and disrupting Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Vuhledar as a primary tactical objective in this direction.
6/ Russian milbloggers recently suggested that Russian forces would intensify operations south of Kostyantynivka in support of this objective and force Ukrainian forces to retreat from positions in and around Vuhledar.
7/ Russian forces likely will not make operationally significant advances in this area of the frontline in the near term even if they achieve tactically significant advances and prompt Ukrainian forces to retreat from nearby positions...
8/ ...as the surrounding area has no operationally significant objectives and is largely comprised of fields and isolated, small settlements and no significant nearby tactical heights.
NEW: The Russian military has recently expanded the Russian Central Grouping of Forces' AOR in Donetsk, suggesting that the Russian military command has deprioritized the grouping's previous task to act solely as an operational maneuver force in the Avdiivka direction. (🧵1/6)
2/ The Russian military command may instead be tasking the Central Grouping of Forces with overseeing the bulk of Russia's main offensive efforts in Donetsk Oblast.
3/ The Russian military command established the Central Grouping of Forces as an operational maneuver force along a narrow front in the Avdiivka area following the seizure of Avdiivka in Feb 2024 and tasked CMD elements with exploiting Russian tactical advances and pushing as far west as possible before Ukrainian forces established more cohesive and harder-to-penetrate defensive lines in the area.
Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Kharkiv City amid continued assaults north and northeast of Kharkiv City on July 25. Geolocated footage published on July 24 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Hlyboke.
2/ Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Geolocated footage published on July 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Slavna Street within northern Zalizne (southeast of Toretsk) and along Zaporizka Street in central Zalizne.
3/ Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on July 25 but did not make any confirmed gains.
Russian forces reportedly continued to advance northwest of Avdiivka on July 25, but there were no confirmed changes in the area.
The Russian military command's willingness to expend a large number of armored vehicles on limited tactical objectives reflects poor longer-term operational foresight, and constraints on Russian equipment in the medium- to long-term will make such failed mechanized assaults costlier with time. 🧵(1/8)
2/ The Russian military has extensively relied on refurbishing stocks of Soviet-era weapons and military equipment, particularly armored vehicles, to sustain the tempo of its offensive operations in Ukraine.
3/ The Russian government will likely have to further mobilize the Russian economy and defense industry if the Russian military intends to sustain its current tempo of operations in the medium- to long-term as Russia depletes its finite Soviet stockpiles, but it is unclear if the Russian defense industry will be able to produce enough vehicles to sustain a high level of equipment losses even with further economic mobilization.
Russia's ongoing force-generation efforts have allowed Russian forces to sustain their current tempo of offensive operations and maintain their current personnel replacement rate in Ukraine. (1/4)
2/ Russian force-generation efforts so far have not enabled Russian forces to build up a significantly larger force in Ukraine and the Russian military remains incapable of conducting significantly intensified large-scale Russian offensive operations.
3/ Syrskyi's statements highlight that Ukrainian forces have successfully defended and liberated territory in the face of a Russian military with significant manpower and material advantages over the past two and a half years.
NEW: Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that the Russian military has significantly increased its manpower and materiel commitments to the war in Ukraine over the last two and a half years, but Syrskyi's statement is not indicative of a sudden increase in the Russian military's presence in Ukraine and is instead representative of the manpower and material disadvantage that Ukrainian forces have faced for over two years. 🧵(1/6)
2/ Syrskyi told UK outlet The Guardian in an interview published on July 24 that Russian forces currently have 520,000 personnel committed to the war in Ukraine and that the Russian military aims to have 690,000 personnel committed to the war by the end of 2024.
3/ Syrskyi noted that fighting is ongoing along 977 kilometers of the 3,700-kilometer-long frontline and reiterated that the Russian military command continues to pursue tactical gains regardless of significant manpower losses, while Ukrainian forces are attempting to safeguard the lives of Ukrainian troops.
NEW: The United States, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are separately advancing an alternative post-war governance vision for the Gaza Strip that conflicts with a separate Chinese-mediated proposal for a unity government between Hamas and Fatah. 🧵(1/9)
2/ The US-Israeli-UAE plan could move towards accomplishing Israeli war aims by protecting nascent, non-Hamas alternatives in the Gaza Strip. The Beijing proposal would amount to an Israeli defeat, if implemented.
3/ Four unspecified Iraqi sources cited by Reuters on July 22 claimed that an Iraqi delegation in Washington, DC, has requested the United States begin withdrawing its forces from Iraq starting in September 2024.