As this will be a very high profile UK deployment next year, it’s worth digging into the F35 aspects. Firstly we should remember this was the previous Government’s commitment, one based on global ambition but also some key new partnerships (AUKUS & GCAP). A #CSG25 🧵 1/12
https://twitter.com/navylookout/status/1817097686169858543
The commitment was thin on detail of where and what but the intention was clear and Japan was singled out: . Some media sources jumped to the conclusion that this would be a “full fat” deployment with the largest possible complement of UK F35s. 2/12gov.uk/government/new…
More measured assessments have been made by those like @TomSharpe134 which have looked at the pragmatic pros and cons of a variety of options that weigh up the reality of the geopolitical context and resources 3/12telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/07/0…
We can’t ignore the immediate context of a defence review, which sees “NATO as the cornerstone of UK defence” but “will identify ways to maintain ties to the Indo-Pacific region” This deployment comes early, or perhaps too early, as a practical test. 4/12gov.uk/government/pub…
I’ll leave others more qualified to talk about the impact on RN resources, but I will just explore the consequences on the F35 force. Not forgetting that we had a rather high profile accident on CSG21 that raised some salutary lessons: 5/12assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/651d73e4…
The UK F35 force remains in a fragile state, where numbers and availability remain uncomfortably low. The recent return of test aircraft to bolster numbers was telling. But the recently formed 809 RNAS will be raring to get out the door on such a high profile detachment. 6/12 
In terms of aircraft no’s and length of embarkation, there will be a tension between what is sustainable/sensible, versus deploying both squadrons (up to 24 aircraft) for the entire deployment. This deliberation will be based more on presentational than operational reasons. 7/12
Deployments such as these have a tendency to exploit multiple opportunities and tasks, rather than have a primary operational focus. So there is no obvious operational imperative to have the entire force (an unprecedented act) embarked throughout the deployment. 8/12
UK Carrier Strike only has so many shots to fire, so pre-determining a deployment time and place means it has to bend to the geopolitical situation it finds, rather than respond more precisely. So it’s not only feast and famine, but you don’t know when you’re hungry. 9/12
So, the size of the F35 contingent should scale up or down based on need at the time. In CSG25’s case that might be a for a period of gentle work up at the beginning of the deployment and for when presence and intent is being demonstrated in the Indo-Pacific region. 10/12
CSG21 amply demonstrated the impact on force growth, fatigue and safety that a long deployment has on a small force. Surging at appropriate times will ensure that we keep enough “gas in the F35 force tank” for whatever else may emerge next year and beyond. 11/12
Some will see this thread as light blue reluctance to go to sea or ambivalence over Carrier ambition, but the stark reality is that we have limited resources which need to be husbanded. Service our global ambition by all means, but don’t break defence in the process. 12/12
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