There has been plenty of heat and light surrounding the recent act of sabotage at Brize Norton. Let’s unpick some of the facts and add some thoughts. 🧵1/15telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/06/2… 2/ As usual, everyone focusses on the things they can see. Airfield perimeters are very hard to make impervious, which is why we have defence in layers. I’m not going to discuss those layers here, but it’s possible that some were either not in place or failed at Brize Norton.

Ok, I’m going to say it. This was somewhat over complicated, and looks more like the perfect execution of the plan they would had prepared assuming that it was a US pre-emptive strike and that they were the first ones in.🧵1/8 2/ But, over a week of Israeli strikes has brought the Iranian defence network to its knees, and their Air Force have been able to operate even 4th generation aircraft overhead Iran with impunity. Air supremacy is a tough state to achieve but it has been over Iran.

A very complex and fatiguing mission that resulted in 7 x B2s dropping 2 x GBU-57 MOP bombs each on the two primary nuclear sites of Fordo and Natanz, with Isfahan being struck by at least 24 submarine launched TLAMs (Tomahawk missiles).🧵1/7

https://twitter.com/osint613/status/1936766423533060316

2/ The B2s launched overtly into the Pacific yesterday were a deception (but it is not clear what that achieved, other than reducing the size of the actual bomber force). The real strike package flew across the Atlantic, and joined up with fighter aircraft already in the region.

A few guesses (leaks?) ahead of next weeks’ release of the long awaited UK Defence Review👇. So what can we expect and what should we look out for? 🧵1/18

2/ The budget is set: 2.5% rising to 3% by next Parliament (Healey says 2034). And there are rumours of a future 3.5% target for NATO nations. Whilst 2.5% will probably only paper over the cracks, the higher %s will depend on National economic performance and HMT good will.

Does the UK have a Defence Strategy problem? All we ever hear these days is that our Defence is underfunded, overspent, gapped & overstretched. So what can the 2025 review do to fix it, because we already know what the budget is. 🧵1/20 2/ The fundamental truth is that over the last few decades we have spent less & delivered even less, yet our ambition of global reach and influence has hardly wavered. Previous reviews have singularly failed to bridge this gap, whilst many plead for money we just don’t have.

The @RoyalAirForce presents its first Autonomous Collaborative Platform (ACP) - “Stormshroud”. 🧵1/7raf.mod.uk/news/articles/… 2/ Also known as Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) or Loyal Wingmen, this is a combination of the Tekever AR3 drone tekever.com/models/ar3/ and Leonardo’s Britestorm electronic warfare payload uk.leonardo.com/en/britestorm

There has been a lot of fuss made recently about combat aircraft numbers in the UK. I think that aircraft fleet management is worth a thread to try and explain how it works, and why just focussing on the numbers ordered, bought and delivered is only part of the story.🧵1/20 2/ Aircraft have some important characteristics that make them rather unique. The most critical is their “fatigue life”, which is a function of activity cycles that eventually weaken an aircraft to its cleared limit or life - extending that is rarely an option.

In case you didn’t know, it’s the SDR silly season in the UK. There have been a few stories recently about our combat aircraft - how many, who owns them and what type? This one tries a whole new approach by trying to rehash the SDR of 15 years ago. A “Where do I Start” 🧵1/13 2/ The article takes the premises of: (A) a combat air shortfall exists, and (B) the Carrier strike capability must be preserved. I agree wholeheartedly on the former point, but looking at the problem solely through the lens of the Carriers skews and limits the airpower aspects.

The #SignalGate charge sheet is not restricted to one individual:

WALTZ - mistakenly admitted the journalist.

HEGSETH - released TOP SECRET data by inappropriate means.

GABBARD - denied under oath any classified data had been released.

A “who should carry the can” 🧵1/10 2/ Multiple others carry varying degrees of culpability, by either condoning the release at the time or denying it subsequently. The deflection attempts are focussing on the journalist or the definition of war plans - these are irrelevant to the fundamental argument.

There is a slight twist to the #signalgate scandal. The USN and USMC have always preferred the probe and drogue method of air refuelling. Because the USAF prefers the boom method, UK tankers spend quite a bit of time refuelling USN & USMC aircraft. 🧵1/4

https://twitter.com/tbrit90/status/1905027269728366741

2/ It looks like the UK may have been providing fuel to the US strikes against Houthi targets. This is not new, we have participated in strikes in the past. But this mission was in the context of a breach in National Security, that also included statements denigrating Europe.

A thread on Classified Information - its handling, and why it matters 1/15 1/ Nations have secrets - they can be about their own vulnerabilities or those of potential enemies. They can be used to protect sensitive technology or information that confer an advantage. They can be about plans to take certain actions.

Here is a recent NSA OPSEC BULLETIN warning of the vulnerability of the SIGNAL application. The NSA works to the DNI (Tulsi Gabbard) who was on the SIGNAL thread. But there are a couple of other things to note here: A Classification 🧵1/4 2/ Note that in the header of the document there is a standardised classification heading which tells the reader exactly what the classification is and, therefore, how to handle the document and its details.

The #SignalGate episode is far, far more serious than the US administration is trying to suggest. It is not just a question of Mike Waltz making a “mistake” by accidentally including a journalist. They should never have been using the medium for the purpose they did.🧵1/6
2/ The level of information that was posted appears to amount to at least Secret (targets, times and weapons ahead of a strike), but some may possibly be even higher than that (CIA Operative names). These are clear breaches if true, and everyone involved should have known that.

Europe has some serious thinking and acting to do about the medium to long term. But what can it do in the short-term that could make a difference in Ukraine? It’s time for a No Fly Zone thread: how one could work and why it might help 🧵1/10 2/ First let’s make some assumptions: 1) the US will not expend any military effort pre or post peace; 2) any peace will need a degree of air control to monitor and deter; 3) peace could take some time to be negotiated and Ukraine needs assistance/reassurance during that period.

As I see it, NATO/European Defence has four strategic options in light of recent events. They cannot be separated from the situation in Ukraine, which is fundamental to European security. So what are they? 🧵1/12 2/ Option 1 - Hold our nerve & stay as we are in the belief that the US will see sense and adjust their views on Europe, Ukraine & Russia. I think we are too far gone to take this choice and I can’t believe I’m seeing and saying that! Score 3/10

Seeing as somebody in authority has decided to call early the cause for the terrible air accident in Washington, it might be worth adding some details of what we know and what sort of things the NTSB Investigation team will be looking at. 🧵 1/10 2/ We know that the American Eagle flight (AA5342) was making a cleared approach to Runway 33 at the Ronald Reagan Airport. Whilst a standard approach it is less commonly used than Runway 01, which is the longer runway.

European security and helping Ukraine - what next?🧵1/13. The dire situation in Ukraine, the arrival of N Korean troops, and the (as yet unknown but feared) consequences of the US election, have brought Europe to a cross roads that has been looming on the horizon for decades. 2/ Europe’s over-reliance and high dependency on US leadership and military might dates back to the birth of NATO, and a lack of serious concern post the collapse of the Soviet Union has led us to here - the invasion of Ukraine has been the wake up call that hasn’t yet woken us.

So, what are the defence & security implications of an incoming Trump Presidency? And what might it mean for NATO, Europe and the UK? Peace & stability or to Hell in a handcart? A🧵1/14 2/ It’s fair to say we shouldn’t assume that he will follow through literally on every statement he has made, but with the Trifecta of the popular vote as President and a majority in both Houses he will be emboldened by that mandate.

With the US election imminent, much has been made of European allies not pulling their weight on defence. Looking at the pure numbers, there is a case to answer. GDP: 🇺🇸$15.7Tn🇪🇺$16.6Tn; Population: 🇺🇸316m🇪🇺510m. Using GDP alone it should be somewhere close to a 50:50 split. 1/13 2/ Although, if you used GDP per Capita you could come to a very different conclusion, but for the sake of simplicity let’s stay focussed on pure GDP as the yardstick.

We need to talk about nukes. A tactical nuclear🧵1/20. When people imagine nuclear exchanges they understandably tend to focus on Doomsday scenarios - but there are plenty of smaller weapons out there - especially in Russia. state.gov/report-on-the-… 2/ Some still believe that nuclear stand-offs are a thing of the past since the end of the Cold War. Whilst some view the threat as a binary choice between capitulation or Armageddon - the latter view has become particularly prevalent in our handling of the situation in Ukraine.

A short🧵1/9 on the Israeli air raids into Iran yesterday. This was more than a precision strike, it was a clear demonstration of capability, intent and will. [This replaces a previous thread that mistakenly reposted a misleading video - thank you to all who rightly corrected me] 2/ The raid demonstrates a level of co-ordination and execution that is way more precise, sophisticated and devastating than the salvo firing of some less-than-successful drones or missiles - which is Iran’s only viable conventional means to strike Israel.