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Combination K Profile picture
@Combination_K
Jul 27, 2024 • 39 tweets • 10 min read • Read on X
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A thread discussing the Soviet concept of combat readiness throughout the Cold War: Image
A common misconception that is often peddled (especially in regards to force comparisons between East and West) is the notion that due to the lack of peacetime deployment the CCCP's military demonstrates a lack of combat readiness. Image
This couldn't be farther from the truth, while it is accurate that the various branches of the Soviet military (contrary to their contemporaries within NATO) greatly discourage the concept of unnecessary peacetime deployment.
In Soviet conscience readiness is defined by the readiness of the armed forces to deploy for war. This is especially apparent within the Soviet navy which functions as a defensive force as opposed to the US navy which exerts its force internationally during peacetime. Image
This in turn results in the Soviet navy by comparison being more than capable of fielding its entire fleet at a moments notice, around 60% of combat vessels, the rest being serviceable within just 20 days. Image
Unlike the US and British navy which send sailors to sea only partially trained (said training is completed at sea as they work up to maximal efficiency), Soviet sailors spend most of their time in simulators and exercises close to shore. Image
This principle applies to almost every branch of the Soviet military, a fantastic example of this practice is the conditioning of armored units. Soviet forces very rarely exercise within their premier equipment, crews often train on older systems. Image
Though this not a deficit, as due to the rampant standardization (mentioned in earlier threads) these vehicles operate much the same as their more advanced counterparts.
This has led to misconceptions as a result of faulty observation, one of which insinuates Soviet tankers seldom train to fire on the move. These inferior systems take the shape of T-72s for Category A divisions, T-62s for Category B divisions, and so on. Image
This has a number of advantages, though the primary value is that most if not all of the CCCP's vehicles are kept pristine, and in turn, as the Soviets would say, "ready for war".
It also allows for the Soviets to effectively replace large swathes of vehicles with relative ease in an incremental sense. Maintenance costs are more efficiently expended and industries can because of this maintain a steady line of production. Image
This contrasts favorably to the West, as NATO'S equipment is often used with increased frequency and is therefore less reliable. It is often argued that this cannot possibly be the case, and that regular use leads to higher reliability- Image
But this is ultimately a flawed and misguided argument.
This is due to the fact that it very much so appears to be true, though this is not a result of universal practice but the fact Western R&D tends to deliver systems before all of its features have been properly implemented. Image
Allowing the units who receive it to conduct the required experimentation in the field, giving the impression use scales favorably with reliability.
A result of this system is that the Soviets high initial availability improves the function of the Soviet logistical system in times of mobilization, demand is lowered considerably.
This is due to Soviet theory concerning itself significantly with the opening hours of a major conflict, and the outcome of those early hours being favorable. Image
This means that Soviet divisions are often manned unevenly, Guards divisions, populating the western terminology of Category A, are kept at 100% combat readiness, and will therefore make up the majority of actions during those initial hours. Image
Category B divisions, comprised of conscripts, are kept at 70% readiness, Category C is to be kept at 30% given they are comprised largely of border guard and internal ministry. Image
these divisions will rapidly arm themselves and pull from available reserves to reach 100% combat readiness in the event of conflict. This allows the Soviet military to field the large quantity of both men and equipment required to maintain is numerical advantage. Image
This provides a reliable and available line to fall back on in the event of failures along the central axis. Image
Anyways, the thread concludes here, thanks for reading. Image
@Leftyempire Carry a significant chance of actualization.
@RaytheonLeftist To address all of your statements, firstly, no, the US military did not rely on conscription throughout the early cold war, you are confusing the act of wartime drafting with that of compulsory service.
@RaytheonLeftist Your statement to the efficacy of 1980s equipment is well and good but you need to keep in mind the Bradley was not a functional platform until the mid 80s and the M1A1 would only enter service in 1985, leaving a considerable technology gap prior.
@RaytheonLeftist Third, I have no idea where you got the notion that the US "outproduced the CCCP", this is completely inaccurate and could be disproven with basic research, I believe you are speaking from hearsay and have not actually studied this topic.
@RaytheonLeftist From 1960 to 1985 the Soviet union produced vastly superior equipment and operated a more capable doctrine to actually employ them, your statement in regards to outproducing the CCCP with superior kit is fantasy, you unintentionally, or intentionally, fabricated
@RaytheonLeftist Next, you cannot compare the Soviet Union to Russia, you cannot compare modern US equipment and tactics to that of the CCCP, this is an unreasonable mistake and shows a lack of understanding.
@RaytheonLeftist And yes, you are correct that this thread is not to say which is better, but is to instead elucidate how the CCCP engaged these practices, im not sure why you felt the need to say this.
@varjag Ideologically motivated volunteers, and not standard conscripts.
@RaytheonLeftist


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@RaytheonLeftist NATO outproduced the Soviets though, right?
@RaytheonLeftist The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union, THE SOVIET CONTROL STRUCTURE: Capabilities for Wartime Survival, The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization, and Equipment, Soviet Military Thinking-
@RaytheonLeftist The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine, and The Soviet Armed Forces: A History of Their Organizational Development, and others, if you want a generalist idea of where I get my information, these are great reads to start with!
@GriffenCastle The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union, THE SOVIET CONTROL STRUCTURE: Capabilities for Wartime Survival, The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization, and Equipment, Soviet Military Thinking
@GriffenCastle The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine, and The Soviet Armed Forces: A History of Their Organizational Development

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More from @Combination_K

Combination K Profile picture
Jan 14
A thread discussing the theoretical framework of Soviet night fighting tactics (part 1) 🧵: Image
The foundation of Soviet night fighting tactics (similar to previously discussed concepts) center around predetermined "rules" for success. These include efficient light support, effective application of artillery/air attacks (fire support), sudden + decisive action, the use of varying "night conditions" to improve the actualization of surprise/stealthy maneuver, continuous cooperation between sub-units throughout the duration of the offensive, and increased tactical flexibility. These norms were defined as a result of studies involving both international and domestic experience, which demonstrated the advantages of engagements at night against an unprepared defensive force. Generally speaking units were capable of accomplishing their objectives with fewer losses when compared to similar endeavors at day, and could defeat significantly stronger enemy forces that would otherwise be impossible to reliably defeat. For this reason, night conditions were to be exploited to achieve the destruction of defensive forces, units advancing to conduct a counter offensive, or retreating formations (in a pursuit).
It is believed that under the most favorable conditions, the offensive should transpire at nightfall, this allows for darkness to be exploited for the longest period of time. Though it must be noted an offensive in the second half of the night (shortly before dawn) is considered equally as advantageous, as the vigilance of the defending force will be decreased and success can be exploited into the day. Normally these attacks would be conducted on the move, without pauses or breaks in the advance, this is done to maintain momentum and avoid the enemy preparing their defenses for a potential assault, withdrawing to occupy a secondary location or moving up reserves to reinforce the position. Conducting night offensives on the move has a number of secondary advantages, such as improving the potential for surprise, it is difficult to pinpoint where exactly the main body is, making fire support from artillery/aircraft harder to deliver accurately, and in general less engineering work is required at the front. The disadvantages of this method include a reduced window of organization, diminished time for units to study the terrain + prepared defenses, the importance placed on a covert advance, and greater vulnerability of sub-units on the march.Image
Read 17 tweets
Combination K Profile picture
Jan 5
A thread discussing the theoretical framework of Soviet urban combat doctrine at the sub-unit level: Image
The organization and conduct of an offensive to capture a city or parts of a city are radically opposed to the means in which one conducts offensive maneuvers under normal conditions, and become increasingly unconventional if nuclear weapons have been employed prior to the battles transpiration. In Soviet writing about this concept, nuclear munitions are seen as the most efficient means to achieve a decisive victory over forces defending a besieged settlement, and allow for the location to be almost immediately occupied in the shortest period of time with the least manpower employed to do so, as defensive structures and resources which could aid the enemy in repulsing an incursion would be ablated. This does not mean Soviet units would be without resistance in this hypothetical, large zones of contamination, debris and other factors would create problems for advancing forces, though it must be noted that fighting within a city is generally regarded to be exponentially harder than preparing motorized rifles for fighting within a post nuclear battlefield. Tactical nuclear weapons may be used on the outskirts of a city, where the flank of advancing forces could be exposed to the enemy, as well as the epicenter of the city as to destroy reserves and units in depth. Before nuclear munitions are to be employed it is extremely important that the cities administrative, military, political and economic value be assessed, and that the attitude of its denizens to the Soviet Military be determined.Image
Within a conventional framework, cities become strongholds which require insurmountable resources to contest. Alongside the concern of commitment is the duration of fighting that is expected from such an endeavor, leading to a diminished offensive pace. If an occupied city must be attacked it is important that units are positioned in such a way that varying axis of advance become possible, this will allow for a simultaneous offensive from multiple locations, diminishing the effectiveness of defending forces. Strong advanced detachments (often reinforced motorized infantry battalions) will be employed to locate gaps in the enemies defenses within, and deny reserves the ability to reinforce its interior. Important facilities and highways are to be immediately captured prior to all other elements. These advanced detachments will make great use of fire support from tube artillery and fixed wing aircraft, and should be capable of capturing two quarters of the settlement as the main body approaches. Air Assault forces are to penetrate the rear of the enemy which works to disrupt defending forces as the forward detachment arrives, they will target primarily routes leading to the city. If the advanced detachment is unusually successful the main body will pursue the defenders as they retreat to ensure a lack of organized withdrawal.Image
Read 15 tweets
Combination K Profile picture
Dec 2, 2024
A thread discussing the involvement of the Soviet Chemical Defense Troops in the CNPP liquidation efforts: Image
The accident at the CNPP (Chernobyl nuclear power plant) transpired while Colonel-General of the Chemical Troops, V.K. Pikalov, and his Chief of Staff, Major-General V.S. Kavunov, were at a training camp in Lviv. At 10:00 AM, Pikalov was ordered by Marshal S.F. Akhromeyev to fly to Chernobyl immediately. They landed in Kiev and traveled by car to Pripyat. The group arrived on April 27th, where a mobile detachment of Chemical Troops was authorized for airlift to the area of the accident. As they approached the plant, they observed the distinctive glow of Cherenkov radiation, raising concerns about the severity of the situation.

By the time Pikalov reached Pripyat, the mobile detachment had also arrived and immediately began identifying radiation levels in the area of operation and mapping safe routes for troop entry and civilian evacuation. At this time, Pikalov had access to only four patrols: one assigned to operations within the zone and another designated as a reserve. To minimize exposure for those working in contaminated areas, Pikalov personally set out in an RHM alongside a Kazakh mechanic-driver.

The safest route to Reactor 4 was from the eastern side, where radiation levels were as low as 5 R/h, compared to the dangerous southern and western sides, which reached up to 2,300 R/h. Therefore, all equipment and personnel were introduced from this axis. The northern side, with radiation levels between 13 and 140 R/h, was designated as a secondary ingress point for worst-case scenarios.Image
Between 7:00 and 8:00 AM on April 27th, the mobile detachment, with assistance from a separate reconnaissance company, prepared the first contamination map to support the operation. This map was crucial for drafting evacuation plans and determining measures to protect the population from the disaster's effects. As a result, the evacuation was announced and began at 2:00 PM that day.

Due to the inconsistent nature of the contamination, the possibility that fuel rods had been ejected from the reactor arose, making it of utmost importance to locate them. Another critical task was to determine the quantity of plutonium released from the reactor. It was assumed that the fuel rods would produce a distinctive glow, so aerial photo-reconnaissance was employed. Between April 27th and 29th, approximately 20 photographs were taken, revealing traces of fuel elements on black-and-white images.

The next step was to determine the extent of contamination across the region and provide accurate figures for daily emissions from Unit 4. Helicopters were used to roughly estimate the scale of the disaster and track the direction in which combustion products were spreading. As a result, large-scale, ground-based reconnaissance operations could finally be conducted. Some helicopters became contaminated and had to return to base for comprehensive decontamination.Image
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Combination K Profile picture
Nov 21, 2024
A thread discussing the history of Soviet NBC defense: Image
The conclusion of the Second World War marked a period of great change within the Soviet military, as it began the herculean task of peacetime restructuring. An often forgotten element of this period was the complete reorganization of the Chemical Troops and Chemical Service Management bodies, which would leave only a small number of units in its wake. Those that survived the reduction were spared as they were required to fulfill important duties such as destroying huge stockpiles of chemical weapons and other hazardous material left over from now occupied German territory. Though the emergence of threats such as nuclear and bacterial weapons became ever present it was obvious that a solution was required and therefore the Chemical Troops saw renewed investment. In the early postwar years the primary task of such units was radiological and bacteriological reconnaissance, treatment, decontamination, disinfection of uniforms/PPE, disinfection/contamination of roads as well as terrain, ensuring that contamination is controlled and reduced as much as possible, handling weapons/equipment which was radioactive or chemical in nature, alongside ensuring that contamination remains local to the affected area and is not spread through environmental conditions.
Post War Modernizations:

During the first wave of reforms between 1946 to 1953, when Soviet procurement was influenced substantially by the study of WW2, it was found that the use of flamethrowers and other incendiary munitions to deny the enemy visual contact with friendly units and camouflage troop movements was exceedingly effective and therefore this was noted as a facet to be further developed within the Chemical Troops. This period was also very influential as it was the birthplace of modern integrated chemical defense within the Soviet military, in the form of Separate Chemical Defense Battalions.Often abbreviated to SCBs, they were tasked with the decontamination of combat vehicles, equipment and uniforms native to the unit they were attached to. At the same time, the Main Military Chemical Department was transferred to a peacetime staff and reorganized into the Department of the Chief of Chemical Troops. Chemical depots were similarly reorganized and received new equipment, designed for local operation and facilities capable of producing instruments and training aids. Throughout the Second World War the Chemical Troops were plagued by poor training and equipment familiarization and therefore in the same year the Inspector General of the Chemical Troops was introduced, this position was first staffed by Major-General of the Technical Troops K. P. Stepanov, who would go on to be appointed deputy chief of the Chemical Troops shortly thereafter. Command and Control was to be similarly modernized and therefore the Chemical Troops Headquarters was established, which was first staffed by the then-Colonel of the Technical Troops D. N. Khodyrev, the HQ would later be disbanded in 1960. Smaller changes such as renaming the Department of the Chief of the Chemical Troops of the Ground Forces to the Department of the Chief of the Chemical Troops of the Soviet Army were also introduced.

Development of increasingly capable and deadly contaminants within the West prompted a modernization of Chemical Reconnaissance capabilities following a spike in tensions experienced in the early 1950s. Therefore, the devices in which such actions were carried out had to be improved, as a result from the PCR-40 chemical detection kit came the PCR-46, which introduced new indicator tube's allowing for the detection of Chloroacetophenone, Bromobenzyl Cyanide and Adamsite. Compared to PHR-40 ampoules and the inlet socket for indicator tubes are located on the pump head. Later, the flashlight (which saw inclusion on PCR-40) began to be placed in the device separately, in the PCR-MV it was removed altogether. On PCR-54 and PCR-MV the nozzle is already screwed on the coupling nut on the pump head. The shapes of blades also differ slightly. Reagents are present only in the indicator tubes. In 1946 the PCR-46 would enter service alongside the AL-3, which would replace the AL-2 army laboratory. In the 1950s another breakthrough for the Chemical Troops would transpire with the introduction of the GSP-1 automatic gas analyzer, which would allow for the detection of Organophosphorus agents, Chlorine, Hydrocyanic acid, Phosgene and Diphosgene. GSP-1 is designed for continuous air monitoring with the purpose of detecting chemical agents, as well as for the detection of radiation. Upon contact with chemical agents and RW in the gas analyzer, auditory and visual alarms are activated. GSP-1 is a photo colorimetric device, when air passes through the indicator tape, which contains reagents, a spot will appear which indicates the chemical reaction which has transpired, this is registered in the accompanying photocell that signals to the alarm system. Later, research and development would center around the sensitivity and automation of such devices, resulting in the introduction of semi-automatic systems such as the previously discussed GSP-1, PPKhr and the more advanced SHM-41 gas mask, which would undergo a multitude of modifications. PPKhr is a semi-automatic system designed to determine the size of radioactive pollution zones, determine the dose of radiation which will occur between entering and exiting the zone, and determine the time personnel will need to spend in the area of contamination.The mask features two circular eyepieces that can fit anti-fogging inserts but also has an integrated Tissot tubes system. The valve housing is made out of metal which is painted dark tan and has a 40mm GOST thread. The mask was made in 5 sizes. Improvements compared to SHM-1 can be found in the stronger valve housing, being crimped instead of glued. SHM-41M would enter service soon after the introduction of the standard variant which would include a double exhale valve, being reinforced further in 1955 through the integration of a metal reinforced negative ring indent. New lightweight protective suits constructed of rubberized fabric such as L-1 (UNKL-3 or T-15) were ushered into service to improve survivability against chemicals which could penetrate ones pores or burn their skin. At this time the Chemical Troops were equipped with degassing kits which were soon made obsolete by the introduction of Organophosphorus substances, which facilitated the creation of the ADM-48, ADK (Artillery Degassing Set) and PM-DK systems. Though the PM-DK would quickly be replaced by the more efficient and convenient IDP-S, which could decontaminate small arms and uniforms alike. The IDP-S can decontaminate up to 8 rifles and 8 sets of uniforms, when doing so it is important that one removes the polyethylene packaging and lightly tap the powder on the uniforms, summer uniforms and winter uniforms require different powder sets, once the agents have been deactivated they may be shaken thoroughly. Systems such as IPP-51 were also available, which was located within a Bakelite case. The lid contains gauze napkins and a metal spike to open the degassing solutions, which contain 15% Sodium Cresolate and 95% Ethyl Alcohol, that are to be used in situations where Sarin type agents are present. In case of Mustard Gas, an ampoule containing powdered Monochloramine B and Zinc Chloride is present along with 82% Ethyl Alcohol. Improvements to decontamination solutions in 1954 resulted in the adoption of the AGV-3, which employs a steam-air-ammonia mixture. Terrain decontamination was also improved at this time as PDP-53 had entered service, which was attached to GAZ-51, ZIL-150, and ZIL-164 respectively.

The PDP-53 was developed to combat radioactive dust, which would be a permanent fixture in a nuclear conflict, such contaminants are to be removed with aqueous detergent solutions. In the case of soil decontamination, the removal of the affected layer is engaged. To ensure the rapid decontamination of a large volume of equipment in an expedient fashion, DKV and ADDK kits were developed. DKV includes agents such as 0.15% aqueous solution of SF-2U powder for general decontamination, 1 or 1.5% aqueous solution for non-spore-forming microbes and 5 or 7.5% aqueous solution of HC for spore-forming microbes. These solutions are connected to a set of hoses connected to pressurized tanks and 42 solution bags. ADDK is designed for the decontamination of floors, walls, and other surfaces within structures. Chemically speaking activated carbon is often employed. In situations where biological agents are present, smoke dispensing equipment was designed to rapidly destroy insects and other carriers, this was to be accomplished using aerosolized disinfectants. This is engaged through the AGP, which consists of a combustion chamber and vaporizer. Aerosol nozzles, hoses and other instruments are also included. The device contains a 7.2 liter tank allowing for 4 minutes of continuous operation. Overpressure determines the angle and density of the aerosol stream. In regards to personnel, DDA-53 shower units were supplied to Chemical Defense units.

Offensive elements such as the ROKS-3, FOG-2 and ATO-42 incendiary weapons were replaced in 1950 with the LPO-50 and then TPO-50 (heavy flamethrower), the latter was a rather significant upgrade over the former, especially in regards to range, and ammunition capacity. The TPO-50 operates 3 tanks each with 21 liters of fuel and has a crew of 2. It can fire up to 180 meters extending its range well past that of LPO-50, though it was diminished significantly by its lack of portability due to weight and size. The LPO-50 consisted of 3 canisters, each containing 3.3 liters of fuel and a valve for relieving pressure. The weapon was fired electrically via a slow burning pyrotechnic charge, and required a battery pack of four 1.5 volt cells (or one 6 volt cell) to facilitate this, upon pulling the trigger, one of the 3 tanks would be discharged in a 2 to 3 second burst, it was noted that there would often be a 3 second delay between pulling the trigger and the weapon firing. Outputs from the three tanks are connected to a manifold through one way valves which ensure fuel does not flow from one to another. These systems were designed to destroy targets located within trenches or buildings/structures and repel offensive actions such as counter attacks. The adoption of the improved flamethrowers prompted changes in the organization of flamethrower units. As a result, two distinct formations emerged, separate battalions equipped with heavy flamethrowers and separate battalions equipped with light flamethrowers. The genesis of the heavy flamethrower battalions were the motorized anti-tank flamethrower battalions of the Second World War, which featured eight machine guns to engage targets at distances exceeding the flamethrowers range. Though this promising unit would see a lack of funding as a result of the Soviet military system as a whole straying away from conventional weapons and investing heavily in its nuclear capabilities, a mistake it would rectify with the reforms that defined the 1970s, which would see such battalions disbanded. Therefore, the Chemical Troops were relegated to employing their portable aerosol generators to create vast smoke screens, diminishing the capabilities of both air and ground observation of troop formations.

Between 1954 and 1959 the Chemical Troops and their capabilities advanced alongside the growing nuclear stockpile within the USSR and US alike. Though the renewed interest within the US towards bacterial arms sparked a great deal of concern and therefore the anti-bacterial capabilities of the Chemical Troops was improved significantly. The number of units and subdivisions within the Chemical Troops increased, as was the need for incendiary munitions. This was confirmed after studies conducted on the Korean War and their efficacy in regards to supporting infantry on the offensive. Systems such as DP-62 and DP-1A were introduced at this time alongside the DP-21A, though the most influential of these was the DP-11A, which was the first issued radiometer capable of measuring the degree of contamination found on soil, uniforms, and skin, as well as the presence of particulates within water, food and foliage. The DP-11A is capable of measuring in the range of 0.018 mR/h to 30.0 mR/h and beta radiation between 0.05 thousand to 585/600 thousand. The DP-62 allows one to detect Gamma radiation from 10 to 500 mR/hour, which is displayed via an indicator lamp. The device functions from -20 ° C to +50 ° C and at a humidity of 98%. The device is powered by an alternating current generator, the voltage is at least 5.5 volts. The DP-1A is a field portable dosimetric device which allows measurements within the range of 0.04 to 400 x-rays per hour, it can also measure between 40 to 400 r/h via a microampermeter. DP-1A can function between temperature ranges of -40 ° to +50 ° C.Image
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Combination K Profile picture
Nov 13, 2024
A thread discussing Soviet air defense: Image
Soviet Air Defense doctrine (like many elements of the Soviet Army) has its roots in the failings of the Red Army throughout World War 2 to integrate and effectively actualize its principles. Defending multiple axes and maintaining complete coverage over the area of operation being the most notable/costly of these failures. As a result the need for a highly mobile, long range, and insurmountable network was required, especially against an enemy such as the United States, which sought to conduct air operations in simultaneous fashion across a wide front.
Soviet air defense includes a multitude of capabilities and actions which work in tandem to ensure the destruction and suppression of enemy aircraft. The first of which are all actions taken to destroy enemy air power with nuclear, chemical or conventional munitions, as well as their control capabilities such as ATC installations, which would be priority targets in such attacks. The second are all actions taken to destroy enemy aircraft prior to the penetration of friendly airspace, and the third is all actions taken once said aircraft has successfully penetrated. Due to these phases of defense it is essential that air defense capabilities be separated between a wide array of systems with varying capabilities to ensure their actualization. The objectives of this network are clear (prevent opposing air forces from interdicting on Soviet formations) though become increasingly complex as they are dissected. Success is measured across a myriad of outcomes, the most common of which is premature munition expenditures. Studies conducted by Soviet military academies, aimed at both the Vietnam War and WW2 discovered that pilots are likely to expend their munitions well before they have entered its effective range when under fire as to preserve their lives and the system. It was also found that traditional anti aircraft artillery forces the height in which such attacks are flown to be raised significantly, which in the age of the missile is invaluable to the defending party. When observing proxy conflicts the existence of resistance alone (even if numerically insignificant) was enough to severely degrade the efficacy of air attacks, and that engagement via missiles severely degraded the cohesion of attacking pilots. This was further demonstrated in the Middle East, where Israeli pilots were frequently routed by relatively weak air defense in the form of fire from anti aircraft machine guns atop armored vehicles. A secondary objective of air defense is to protect air assault forces from fixed wing attacks, though this would be accomplished almost exclusively by high altitude air defense with ranges extending past the line of contact.Image
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Combination K Profile picture
Oct 22, 2024
A thread discussing the history of the Strategic Airborne Forces within the USSR: Image
Following the Second World War, a decision was made concerning the subordination of the Strategic Airborne Forces. Initially, and during WW2, airborne troops were underneath the Supreme High Command of the USSR, though were still considered a part of the air force, this would be forgone in favor of reorganization underneath the Ministry of Defense, at this time titles such as Commander of the Airborne Forces were being reestablished. In April of 1946 Colonel-General B.V Glagolev would assume the position. Alongside these organizational shifts, the Airborne Forces of the USSR would see extensive rearmament initiatives, with the purpose of giving these units a greater capability for independent operations within enemy depth, which was severely lacking as experienced in WW2. They began to receive systems increasing their ability to engage both indirect, and direct fire, the operation of artillery and mortars within these units improved their efficacy substantially, in 1953 this ideal was fully actualized. Following this an effort to adopt improved anti-armor capabilities was pushed, seeing as this was an element which was similarly absent in WW2, which was one of the defining requirements surrounding the expedient development and integration of the 3M6 Shmel ATGM.Image
It was also demonstrated during the war that airborne forces were only as valuable as the aircraft that could transport them, and therefore some of the first developments which followed this period surrounded aviation which could effectively deliver them. Initially these would take the form of Il-12 and Il-14, which followed the discontinuation of gliders and other less conventional means of deliverance. It was later found that similarly, the parachutes employed by the airborne forces were just as (if not more) underdeveloped than even their lift capability, in regards to the landing of heavy equipment such as light armored vehicles. Due to this deficiency work on improving these systems was pushed. Prior to these improvements, jumps could not be carried out at speeds exceeding 180 kilometers per hour, in accordance to the requirements of these programs this rose to 300 kilometers per hour, which allowed the airborne forces to keep up with the development in transportation at the time. This would culminate in Dolgov and Andreev receiving Hero of the Soviet Union after a record breaking jump from the stratosphere, demonstrating that the combined efforts of Savitsky, Lobanov, Tkachev, and Glushkov had been successful (Andreev would fall for 270 seconds before opening his parachute less than a kilometer above the ground, Dolgov would open his parachute earlier, though unfortunately died due to the depressurization of his equipment). At this time, work on multiple parachute systems for heavy equipment saw simultaneous development, which would conclude with the adoption of PP-127 (max load of 4600kg) in the late 50s, allowing for the airborne forces to effectively land artillery, vehicles, radio stations, engineering equipment, and chemical protection elements, though the PP-127 would soon be replaced by the superior PP-128 (max load of 6700kg).Image
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